- Jubilee offer: spend £10 or more on any product sold by Amazon.co.uk on or before June 6 and you can buy The Diamond Jubilee A Classical Celebration Album for just £2.50 Here's how (terms and conditions apply)
Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam
and over one million other books are available for Amazon Kindle .
Learn more
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||
 Trade In this Item for up to £1.55
Get an extra £5 when you trade in books worth £10 or more until June 30, 2012. Trade in Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam for an Amazon.co.uk gift card of up to £1.55, which you can then spend on millions of items across the site. Trade-in values may vary (terms apply). Find more products eligible for trade-in.
|
Special Offers and Product Promotions
Frequently Bought Together
Product details
|
Product Description
Review
"Nagl's study is especially relevant today, and one that military leaders and interested citizens at all levels should read. It suggests how to encourage the spirit of innovation - a spirit that helped the British Army succeed in Malaya and that is currently transforming America's Army in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and around the globe." - From the Foreword by General Peter J. Schoomaker "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife has become must reading for high-level officers in Iraq because its lessons seem so directly applicable to the situation there." - National Review Online"
Product Description
Invariably, armies are accused of preparing to fight the previous war. In "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife", Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl - a veteran of both Operation Desert Storm and the current conflict in Iraq - considers the now-crucial question of how armies adapt to changing circumstances during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared. Through the use of archival sources and interviews with participants in both engagements, Nagl compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1960 with what developed in the Vietnam War from 1950 to 1975. In examining these two events, Nagl - the subject of a recent New York Times Magazine cover story by Peter Maass - argues that organizational culture is key to the ability to learn from unanticipated conditions, a variable which explains why the British army successfully conducted counterinsurgency in Malaya but why the American army failed to do so in Vietnam, treating the war instead as a conventional conflict. Nagl concludes that the British army, because of its role as a colonial police force and the organizational characteristics created by its history and national culture, was better able to quickly learn and apply the lessons of counterinsurgency during the course of the Malayan Emergency. With a new preface reflecting on the author's combat experience in Iraq, "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife" is a timely examination of the lessons of previous counterinsurgency campaigns that will be hailed by both military leaders and interested civilians.
Tags Customers Associate with This Product(What's this?)Click on a tag to find related items, discussions, and people.
|
What Other Items Do Customers Buy After Viewing This Item?
Customer Reviews
Most Helpful Customer Reviews
10 of 11 people found the following review helpful
Format:Paperback
Colonel Nagl's book is an excellent study though inevitably is bears traces of its original existence as a Oxford University doctoral study.
I have no problem with the Vietnam section but in regard to what Colonel Nagl has written about the Malayan Emergency, the argument is advanced that the army was running the intelligence behind the counterinsurgency
operations. However, the supreme intelligence agency was the Malayan Police Special Branch which was responsibile for political, security and
operational intelligence. The army did not run its own agents and General Templer, the British High Commissioner and Director of Operations, made it quite clear on several occasions that the Special Branch was the supreme intelligence organisation. Although indeed some 30 or so military intelligence officers were eventually (around 1952) attached to the Special Branch, they were not in charge of intelligence, and they acted under the direction of the senior Special Branch officer to whom they were attached. Their role was limited to passing on operational intelligence obtained by the Special Branch to the army in a form that the army could readily understand. The reader should therefore bear this important qualification in mind in reading Colonel Nagl's otherwise commendable contribution to counterinsurgency warfare.
I have no problem with the Vietnam section but in regard to what Colonel Nagl has written about the Malayan Emergency, the argument is advanced that the army was running the intelligence behind the counterinsurgency
operations. However, the supreme intelligence agency was the Malayan Police Special Branch which was responsibile for political, security and
operational intelligence. The army did not run its own agents and General Templer, the British High Commissioner and Director of Operations, made it quite clear on several occasions that the Special Branch was the supreme intelligence organisation. Although indeed some 30 or so military intelligence officers were eventually (around 1952) attached to the Special Branch, they were not in charge of intelligence, and they acted under the direction of the senior Special Branch officer to whom they were attached. Their role was limited to passing on operational intelligence obtained by the Special Branch to the army in a form that the army could readily understand. The reader should therefore bear this important qualification in mind in reading Colonel Nagl's otherwise commendable contribution to counterinsurgency warfare.
3 of 3 people found the following review helpful
Format:Paperback
A well written contribution to the rapidly expanding stockpile of Counter-Insurgency literature available today. The focus on the organisational learning and behaviour remains particularly insightful and highly relevant in addressing the core focus. Nagl's experience as not only a COIN thinker but a COIN practitioner no doubt contributed to the quality of this study. 'Learning to eat Soup with a Knife' is a must read for military personnel, academics and anyone with a strong interest in field of Counter-Insurgent Policy.
On a final note to the general reader, the depth and style of analyse in this work is likely to go beyond the needs for everyday conversational knowledge and would not be largely useful for historical overview of either conflict. Nevertheless at a time where COIN is at the forefront of Policy, Nagl's work highlights timeless principles that remain relevant today and have the potential to provide useful insight in many modern conflicts.
On a final note to the general reader, the depth and style of analyse in this work is likely to go beyond the needs for everyday conversational knowledge and would not be largely useful for historical overview of either conflict. Nevertheless at a time where COIN is at the forefront of Policy, Nagl's work highlights timeless principles that remain relevant today and have the potential to provide useful insight in many modern conflicts.
1 of 1 people found the following review helpful
Format:Paperback
I was lucky enough to meet Col Nagle earlier in the year and following on from conversations i had with him i was keen to read this work.
This is an imformative and intuitive look at the subject drawing lessons from both campaigns but moreover takingextensive extracts from numerous other litterary publications on the subject.
As a compendium of reference material, "Learning to eat soup with a knife" offers clear direction to the reader on further reading and asscociated text. I would reccomend his work to anyone studdying counter insurgency principals, or to any British reader who wants to hear an American expert wax lyrical about how our armed forces are historically better than his own in these environments.
This is an imformative and intuitive look at the subject drawing lessons from both campaigns but moreover takingextensive extracts from numerous other litterary publications on the subject.
As a compendium of reference material, "Learning to eat soup with a knife" offers clear direction to the reader on further reading and asscociated text. I would reccomend his work to anyone studdying counter insurgency principals, or to any British reader who wants to hear an American expert wax lyrical about how our armed forces are historically better than his own in these environments.
Would you like to see more reviews about this item?
Were these reviews helpful?
Let us know
Most Recent Customer Reviews
Not just a military book
This book is principally one of organisational culture and organisational learning set in the historical context of `small wars' / counter insurgency. Read more
Published on 13 April 2010 by Mr. Andrew Evans
Open mindedness
It took 60000 corpses in the seventies for an american lieutnant-colonel and the USA to understand (did they?) how the British did it in Malaya. And to put it in writing. Read more
Published on 10 Jun 2009 by Jose G. Almeida
A Must for those Heading to the Sand Pit
John Nagl's book is simply a must for those heading to the sand pit and includes a great deal of insights into the workings of the British and American army's. Read more
Published on 20 Mar 2008 by Mr. Na Mazzei
A well written and intelligent book
Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife is a well written book by an author who has a good deal of experience in field on which he writes. Read more
Published on 19 Jun 2006 by W. Meddings
Customer Discussions
|
This product's forum
Active discussions in related forums
Search Customer Discussions
|
Related forums
|
Listmania!
Look for similar items by category
- Books > History > Countries & Regions > Africa > South Indian Ocean Islands
- Books > History > Countries & Regions > Asia > South East Asia > Malaysia
- Books > History > Countries & Regions > Asia > South East Asia > Vietnam
- Books > History > Military History
- Books > Society, Politics & Philosophy > Government & Politics
Look for similar items by subject
Feedback
- Would you like to update product info or give feedback on images?
- I am the Author, and I want to comment on my book.
- I am the Publisher, and I want to comment on this book.
|
