- Paperback: 576 pages
- Publisher: Arrow Books Ltd; UNKNOWN edition (16 Feb 1989)
- Language English
- ISBN-10: 009956520X
- ISBN-13: 978-0099565208
- Product Dimensions: 21.6 x 13.5 x 3.6 cm
- Amazon Bestsellers Rank: 2,387,212 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
Did you know you can trade in your old books for an Amazon.co.uk Gift Card to spend on the things you want? Plus, get an extra £5 Gift Certificate when you trade in books worth £10 or more before June 30, 2012. Visit the Books Trade-In Store for more details. |
|
There is a newer edition of this item:
|
Product details |
More About the Author
Product Description
Review
"Bevin Alexander... argues in this well-researched and readable book that the United States fought two wars in Korea, winning one against North Korea and losing the other to Communist China."
--This text refers to an alternate
Paperback
edition.
Product Description
This fast moving study is the first to be written by a professional army historian and capably challenges many of the traditional interpretations.
--This text refers to the
Hardcover
edition.
Tag this product(What's this?)Think of a tag as a keyword or label you consider is strongly related to this product.
Tags will help all customers organise and find favourite items. |
Sell a Digital Version of This Book in the Kindle Store
If you are a publisher or author and hold the digital rights to a book, you can sell a digital version of it in our Kindle Store.
Learn more
Customer Reviews
There are no customer reviews yet on Amazon.co.uk.
5 star
4 star
3 star
2 star
1 star
Most Helpful Customer Reviews on Amazon.com (beta)
Amazon.com:
8 reviews
11 of 11 people found the following review helpful
Too broad in scope, too little detail
12 April 2001
Format:Paperback
Korea: The First war we lost
Bevin Alexander's book suffers from too much of a good thing-organization. 492 pages are divided into 63 chapters. Each chapter identifies a good point, but in trying to cover all of them, the book develops few of them sufficiently. Instead, Alexander skips from idea to idea, devoting fewer than ten pages, and then flits off to the next idea.
The scope of his topic, from the bowels of the White House and Pentagon to the nameless ridges and valleys of Korea, is immense. In trying to cover it all, he has instead touched only the "wavetops." At the end of the book, after following the trail of policy decisions, Alexander fails to present a cogent, convincing argument that the US and her UN coalition partners indeed lost this war. The (final) stated war aim was to restore South Korea's sovereignty, and that was accomplished. I think that Alexander implicitly accepts MacArthur's statement that there is no substitute for victory, and no such thing as a war for limited objectives. While the first part is true, victory is defined by the use of military means to accomplish political objectives, and in Korea, the US and UN coalition succeeded.
The strongest theme in the book is the identification of the policy struggles between the new National Command Authorities, National Security Advisor, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Commander in Chief, Far East. Alexander does a solid job of defining the problem in terms of positions and policy, rather than the normal MacArthur versus Truman debate. He also explores the impact of MacArthur's seniority relative to the Joint Chiefs (MacArthur was the only active five star general).
Another strength of the book is its maps. Since (usually) authors have to pay for whatever maps they want included in a book, most include as few as possible. Alexander includes fourteen, most of them tactical level maps. Building off of the maps, the chapters that deal with separate battles are solid. The weakness is that Alexander fails top explain the operational integration of a series of battles into a campaign designed to accomplish strategic objectives.
If you are already familiar with the Korean War, this book can serve as an interesting read for a new look at the integration of the strategic aims with the daily battle plan, and a revealing look at the difficulty of making defense and foreign policy since 1947. If, however, you are looking for a one volume single read introit to the subject, this is not the book to read.
3 of 3 people found the following review helpful
An unfortunate subtitle
26 July 2000
Format:Paperback
Bevin Alexander's book on Korea would probably still be in print if it had a subtitle other than "The First War We Lost." One might assume from this subtitle that this book attempts to advance an unconventional theory about this well-documented subject. Such is not the case; the title simply means that the US/ROK forces had defeated North Korea before the Chinese attacked, driving the US back to the South. Alexander's book is a well-written, interesting description of the Korean war. The author skillfully explains the war from a variety of perspectives- from unit actions to the generals to the political leaders. Adequate maps enable the reader to follow the movements over unfamiliar place names. The author's background as a Korean vet and a military historian are evident in his battle descriptions, but his book does not mirror standard military viewpoints. Alexander's frank comments on MacArthur, Truman, Syngman Rhee and others explain the politics of the war, and he also provides clear, though less-detailed, analyses of the views of Chinese and North Korean leaders. This book is more comprehensive than James Stokesbury's fine book on the same subject. Though both books will hold your interest, if you plan to read only one book about the Korean War for the 50th anniversary, Alexander's is well worth the search.
5 of 6 people found the following review helpful
Excellent Meld of Military and Political Aspects of the War
19 Aug 2000
Format:Paperback
MY GOODNESS, I HAVE JUST read three Korean War books in a row. Completing the hat trick is Alexander's book. Don't judge the book by its title: there is a fair compendium of the facts (and fantasies) of all the Korean War participants: China, Russia, NKPA and ROK forces, the UN, the US and affiliated armies all swung from victory to defeat; wild bouts of optimism and valleys of despair. Perhaps it is fitting that this country of Morning Calm and intense moods; of vertical ridges and sprawling mud flats, should so condemn those who set foot on its rich and fragrant soils. Do not make Alexander's book the first book you read about the Korean War. Read Appleman, Knox and perhaps Acheson first. Then Alexander's mastery of the war and its complex web of intrigue (NY to Seoul; Beijing to Moscow; London to Delhi) in the high courts of the nascent cold war will hit you hardest where it should: right in the heart. When you count the staggering loss of life-especially in the two years the negotiations dragged on, a delay Alexander rightly blames largely on the USA-and realize they were spent to capture worthless ridges, I doubt tears won't come to your eyes. What a pathetic account Truman and Acheson make of themselves, even if many decisions they reached had merit.
Alexander's grasp of history here is very insightful. He claims that it is our obsession with 'total victory' over Japan in WWII that allowed the Russians to enter the Asian war and led to the division of the Korean peninsula in the first place.
So too is the author's discussion of NKPA actions off the main Seoul/Taejon/Taegu battle axis. If NKPA forces had not dilly dallied in the west (defending ports the UN never attempted to regain) and on the east coast (deploying in the mountains to prevent ambushes, which also never came), they would have crushed the still weak Pusan defenses weeks before a perimeter could be established.
Few books mix politics with military analysis. Even fewer do it well, and Alexander's is one of them. He breaks the diplomatic/political initiatives into tangible issues. While intelligent and analytic, he remains youthful in his comments: "One can only imagine the dispatches that transpired between Moscow and Ambassador Jacob Malik!" The photo of the Russian diplomat's vacant chair at the Security Council meeting is a Korean War icon. To right wingers, an appropriate metaphor for what communist state-ism would always be: empty.
Alexander's grasp of history here is very insightful. He claims that it is our obsession with 'total victory' over Japan in WWII that allowed the Russians to enter the Asian war and led to the division of the Korean peninsula in the first place.
So too is the author's discussion of NKPA actions off the main Seoul/Taejon/Taegu battle axis. If NKPA forces had not dilly dallied in the west (defending ports the UN never attempted to regain) and on the east coast (deploying in the mountains to prevent ambushes, which also never came), they would have crushed the still weak Pusan defenses weeks before a perimeter could be established.
Few books mix politics with military analysis. Even fewer do it well, and Alexander's is one of them. He breaks the diplomatic/political initiatives into tangible issues. While intelligent and analytic, he remains youthful in his comments: "One can only imagine the dispatches that transpired between Moscow and Ambassador Jacob Malik!" The photo of the Russian diplomat's vacant chair at the Security Council meeting is a Korean War icon. To right wingers, an appropriate metaphor for what communist state-ism would always be: empty.
While other analyses (In'chon, Chosin, the decision to cross the parallel) and conclusions (that the US was an aggressor! for going into North Korea) are more suspect, they do not detract from the book.
Were these reviews helpful?
Let us know
Listmania!
Look for similar items by subject
Feedback
- Would you like to update product info or give feedback on images?
- I am the Author, and I want to comment on my book.
- I am the Publisher, and I want to comment on this book.
