As already stated by previous reviewers, this book is a cold, dry, almost scientific dissection of the Afghan war. The conclusion I drew -the author leaving the question up in the air - was that the war is lost. The Taliban were a beaten force soon after the initial Western invasion, enjoying little popular support. Almost immediately the occupation forces began screwing things up, returning the old, hated warlords to power,and relying on age-old imperialist tactics of tribal divide and rule. Add this to lack of investment and brutal, indiscriminate responses to isolated Taliban actions, and the western forces rapidly lost support.
The book includes a very informative discussion of the Taliban model of insurgency, which the Western forces have struggled to define. A consequence of this has been that their military response has been chaotic and largely ineffective. In addition the Afghan national army is
weak and even its best units are unable to survive unless stiffened by
Western troops.
Soon after reading this book,the UN was reporting that the Taliban had
a significant presence in 80 percent of Afghan districts, and that Kabul
was only accessible via a single, heavily defended road. In addition,the
war is spreading deeper into Pakistan - thats nuclear armed Pakistan - with US missile attacks and insurgent targeting of haulage firms supplying NATO forces. The decidedly off-message head of the Afghan army has said that 550,000 Western troops will be needed to win the conflict. The Soviet Union only managed 100,000, and one thing they weren't short of was soldiers.
The last thing this region needs is an escalation of the conflict. Somebody needs to send Barak Obama a copy of this book and tell him to think again on Afghanistan before it is too late.