Justin O'Brien, a lecturer at Queen's University, Belfast, has written a most revealing book about the murder of the solicitor Pat Finucane in 1989.
Six weeks before the killing, Junior Northern Ireland Office Minister Douglas Hogg set solicitors up as terrorist targets when he said, "I have to state as a fact, but with great regret, that there are in Northern Ireland a number of solicitors who are unduly sympathetic to the cause of the IRA."
The RUC Special Branch knew of the loyalist threat to Finucane's life but did not warn or protect him. Finucane's killers were members of a loyalist gang which the RUC Special Branch had infiltrated and which Brian Nelson, an Army agent, had given information.
Sir John Stevens, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, concluded in his inquiry that the murder `could have been prevented' and that the collusion ranged from "the wilful failure to keep records, the absence of accountability, the withholding of intelligence and evidence, through to the extreme of agents being involved in murder. ... Informants and agents were allowed to operate without effective control and to participate in terrorist crimes. Nationalists were known to be targeted but were not properly warned or protected."
O'Brien shows how the state gave excessive power to the Special Branch which then corrupted the RUC, undermined the Finucane murder hunt, recruited his killer as an agent, and perverted the course of justice by lying to and sabotaging the Stevens inquiry. He details the collusion between loyalist paramilitaries, RUC Special Branch, MI5 and certain British Army personnel.
Within four days of the army's deployment in Northern Ireland in 1969, the General Officer Commanding in Northern Ireland had taken control of the entire security apparatus. The state gave priority to gathering intelligence by any means. The state's agents gave potential informers immunity from prosecution for crimes up to and including murder, overriding the rule of law. The state then tried to cover its tracks by scapegoating alleged `rogue operators'.
O'Brien shows how the British state corrupted itself by using terrorists. As he concludes, "The derogation of fundamental rights on the grounds of emergency legislation too easily enacted and rarely seriously challenged has profound moral consequences, as the Northern Ireland experience has demonstrated."
The British state has used this dirty policy over and over again, employing loyalist paramilitaries in Belfast against republicans, running Islamic terrorists in London to Kosovo. Ministers seem to think that they can use terrorists with impunity, but they risk the British people's security.