This is an excellent book.The crucial divide between Keynes and the economics profession of the 1930's and 2000's was his deep understanding of the nature of the fundamental differences between decision making under conditions of uncertainty(partial ignorance) and/or ignorance(or D.Ellsberg's ambiguity or Benoit Mandelbrot's " wild " risk)as opposed to risk.Keynes understood that financial and stock markets were not efficient except under very special situations that would require an extremely heavy government regulatory apparatus aimed at minimizing the amount of speculation occurring in the financial,commodity,and stock markets over time.Keynes's formal,logical,technical mathematical analysis in the A Treatise on Probability(TP,1921;practically all of Keynes's relevant analysis was available in the fellowship dissertation that Keynes submitted to Cambridge University in 1908 ) ,that Walsh correctly describes as being understood by no more than 3 individuals,(The names of the 3 individuals were Bertrand Russell,Alfred North Whitehead and William Johnson.Unfortunately,there is only one individual alive today who understands what it was that Keynes accomplished .)allowed him to realize that the mathematical laws of the probability calculus[ the addition and multiplication rules at the heart of the " Modern " theory of finance constructed by the University of Chicago school of Markowitz,Treynor,Sharpe,Fama,Black,Merton,Scholes,etc.,as the foundation of the Efficient Market Hypothesis(EMH)] were greatly limited because no sample space of all possible outcomes or unique probability distribution could be defined in situations of partial or complete ignorance,in a world of constant,endogenous technological and financial change,which was the rule .Keynes realized that the Normal distribution, used automatically by all practitioners of the EMH in applications to financial markets ,and taught to all MBA students as " The Truth ", was NOT normal in financial markets.In fact, it was rarely the case(Here Walsh could have improved his book somewhat if he had spent some time showing the connections between J M Keynes's line of reasoning and the analysis of B Mandelbrot and N.N.Taleb).Only under conditions of risk would the EMH be a reliable theory to use to underpin financial portfolio analysis.There is no empirical,historical,or statistical support for the EMH.ALL goodness of fit tests presented in published work in the 20th century show that the probability distributions are not even half way close to being even approximately Normal .
Walsh ,similarly,shows the connections between the investment strategy and philosophy of the " later " Keynes, who had finally realized the immense damage to the economy caused by speculators, and those of Graham and Buffett( Soros is also very close to Keynes in his understanding of the impacts of uncertainty on financial decision making as well as having realized the severe damages inflicted on the economy by speculation.Both Soros and Keynes finally understood the ancient wisdom of Adam Smith in this area).
I have deducted one half star because Walsh appears not to realize that all of Keynes's insights into financial decision making arise from Keynes's discussions of decision making in the TP.Keynes was the first to put forth an explicit ,formal mathematical analysis of " safety first" considerations in decision making in chapters 26 and 29 of the TP.