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'…such an important book…not merely another book on the history of Keynes's monetary thought. It provides compelling evidence of where 'Keynesians' of all shades have gone wrong and simultaneously provides them with the ammunition to generalize what passes for modern monetary theory and macroeconomics. It enables macroeconomists to put Keynes back into Keynesian economics.' - Colin Rogers, University of Adelaide, Australia
'This is an extraordinary book and a major and significant contribution to Post-Keyensian literature.' - Jan Toporowski, School of African and Oriental Studies, University of London, UK
'Above all, this book is a good read, which may achieve that rare combination of a high level of scholarship with relevance to the policy advisor.' - Mark Hayes, University of Cambridge, UK
What's all the fuss about then? Well, unlike most books on economics, this one is beautifully written, with only the simplest few equations, no acronyms or abstruse jargon in sight, and not too long. In three parts – History, Theory, and Macroeconomics after Keynes – Tily explains carefully and clearly what Keynes was concerned about and actually wrote; how that was used and abused by his contemporaries for their own academic purposes; and what are the implications of his persuasive arguments for the contemporary policy debate. …. Tily argues in his new preface, at first surprisingly but ultimately convincingly, that it follows that Keynes's own view would have been that the problems of the last decade have been caused by so much credit advanced not at interest rates that were too low, but rather too high – and that the multitude of derivatives (CDO² and so on) were then spawned in a doomed attempt to lower the effective cost of the debt burden assumed. … It is a work of inspiring scholarship that will surely make a great present for someone interested in both economics and the history of the mid-twentieth century who would like to understand more about whom to support in the current vigorous policy debates: Krugman or Rogoff? Wolf or Osborne? And just what Keynes himself would have thought about what they have to say, …. Do buy! - Diana Hunter, Financial World
'This is an extraordinary book and a major and significant contribution to Post-Keyensian literature.' - Jan Toporowski, School of African and Oriental Studies, University of London, UK
'Above all, this book is a good read, which may achieve that rare combination of a high level of scholarship with relevance to the policy advisor.' - Mark Hayes, University of Cambridge, UK
What's all the fuss about then? Well, unlike most books on economics, this one is beautifully written, with only the simplest few equations, no acronyms or abstruse jargon in sight, and not too long. In three parts – History, Theory, and Macroeconomics after Keynes – Tily explains carefully and clearly what Keynes was concerned about and actually wrote; how that was used and abused by his contemporaries for their own academic purposes; and what are the implications of his persuasive arguments for the contemporary policy debate. …. Tily argues in his new preface, at first surprisingly but ultimately convincingly, that it follows that Keynes's own view would have been that the problems of the last decade have been caused by so much credit advanced not at interest rates that were too low, but rather too high – and that the multitude of derivatives (CDO² and so on) were then spawned in a doomed attempt to lower the effective cost of the debt burden assumed. … It is a work of inspiring scholarship that will surely make a great present for someone interested in both economics and the history of the mid-twentieth century who would like to understand more about whom to support in the current vigorous policy debates: Krugman or Rogoff? Wolf or Osborne? And just what Keynes himself would have thought about what they have to say, …. Do buy! - Diana Hunter, Financial World
Product Description
Geoff Tily argues that Keynes was primarily concerned with monetary policy, not fiscal policy. Viewed as a coherent whole, Keynes's work was concerned with the appropriate technique and infrastructure for the management of money at low rates of interest. More specifically, his rejection of the gold standard led ultimately to his proposal for an international clearing union to support domestic debt-management and monetary policies aimed at cheap money. His ideas became reality. With the start of the Great Depression, governments across the world began a (short-lived) era of the deliberate management of money.
While many others have argued that 'Keynesian' economics is a misrepresentation of Keynes's theory, Tily argues that 'Keynesian' economics also permitted a gross misrepresentation of his economic policies. 'Keynesian' economics was a different theory opposed, and indeed rival, to Keynes's work. With the policy perspective restored, an alternative presentation of Keynes's economics, based on post-Keynesian economics, is permitted.
In this revised edition, Geoff Tily argues that the economics profession has distorted and betrayed Keynes's legacy. In virtually all interpretations – especially that taught to students – Keynes is portrayed as concerned only with government expenditure as a means to cure economic crisis. Yet Keynes's central aim was the prevention of economic crisis. His prescription to do so concerned monetary not fiscal policy.
From the moment the great depression began, Keynes began to influence greatly the monetary policy of the world. Countries, led by the UK and US, put in place capital controls and mechanisms to manage exchange rates, and changes to debt management and credit policies that permitted the orderly management of money at low long-term and short-term interest rates on what should have been a permanent basis. The Bretton Woods negotiations went some way to re-enforce and formalise these policies, but did not go far enough.
The current crisis is rooted in the dismantling of the remnants of the Bretton Woods architecture and the liberalisation of finance that began even before 1970. Tily argues that we should not be surprised that the neglect of Keynes's policies is leading to a crisis of similar magnitude to the depression that motivated the development and implementation of those policies in the first place. It is to the same policies that we must turn, as the crisis becomes a reality.
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Most Helpful Customer Reviews
12 of 13 people found the following review helpful
Format:Paperback
I borrowed the hardback from my library a while back, with a litte more than casual interest (as it happens, I am the treasurer of the UK Royal Economic Society, which enjoys the copyright over Keynes's works from his estate with King's College Cambridge) and was completely bowled over. This amazingly clear and simply presented work solves exactly the puzzle for so many professional economists in comprehending just how and why Keynes's vital thinking on monetary policy for the great depression was hijacked by his academic contemporaries for convenient fiscal policy purposes in their own models. I cannot recommend this too strongly for anyone with a casual interest or more in understanding exactly what the current policy debates in the UK and all developed economies are fundamentally all about.
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2 of 5 people found the following review helpful
Yes. Keynes generalized the monetary Equation of Exchange in chapter 21 of the GT
13 Dec 2010
Format:Paperback
This book appears to be a revised edition of an earlier 2007 book.In general, the author is correct, although he is unable to follow Keynes's technical analysis in chapters 20 and 21 that allowed Keynes to successfully generalize the basic monetary equation of exchange,MV=PO,where M =the money supply,V = Velocity of money,P=the price level and O=real output to MV =pO=D,where p is an expected price and V is now the income velocity,in order to incorporate uncertainty/the speculative demand for money through the specification of the elasticities e ,ep subscript and ed subscript.Money used for speculative purposes,M2, is thus the root cause of inflation,deflation and involuntary unemployment.M=M1 +M2.If M2=0,then the standard equation of exchange holds.
The author is correct that Keynes wanted to maintain a permanent ,low ,fixed rate of interest while simultaneously minimizing the M2 component so that the vast majority of loans would be lent to Adam Smith's sober people who create the jobs.Unfortunately,the forces of banking and finance,represented by Wall Street, will object.
There are two errors in the book.First, Paul Samuelson,Sir John Hicks and Alvin Hanson did not betray Keynes.All three were misled by Joan Robinson,Richard Kahn and Austin Robinson into believing that the GT was full of major mathematical and microeconomic errors because Keynes had not taken the 20 minutes necessary to master the theory of value.Keynes's microeconomic analyses in chapters 20 and 21 was thus overlooked.The " What did Keynes mean by Z " quagmire is the direst result of the failure of Joan and Austin Robinson and Kahn to recognize that Keynes was using the standard theory of pure competition with one fixed input-one variable input while simultaneously incorporating expectations through the use of expected prices and expected profits.
Second,the claim made by Post Keynesian economists ,who follow the dogmatic claims of Joan Robinson and Richard Kahn, that Keynes did not understand the mechanics of his aggregate supply function and curve,is simply false.Post Keynesians still can't work out the simple footnote 2 on pp.55-56 of the GT that specifies that dZw/dN=1=dDw/dN =pO'(N)/w so that w/p=O'(N) or the real expected wage,w/p,equals O'(N), the marginal product of labor.Post Keynesians are still trying to figure this out 75 years after Keynes published the GT.How can they possibly expect to meet high powered,mathematically trained neoclassical economists in intellectual battle if they can't work out a calculus I problem ?????? The answer is that they can't and will not be able to survive in a one-on- one debate.
The author is correct that Keynes wanted to maintain a permanent ,low ,fixed rate of interest while simultaneously minimizing the M2 component so that the vast majority of loans would be lent to Adam Smith's sober people who create the jobs.Unfortunately,the forces of banking and finance,represented by Wall Street, will object.
There are two errors in the book.First, Paul Samuelson,Sir John Hicks and Alvin Hanson did not betray Keynes.All three were misled by Joan Robinson,Richard Kahn and Austin Robinson into believing that the GT was full of major mathematical and microeconomic errors because Keynes had not taken the 20 minutes necessary to master the theory of value.Keynes's microeconomic analyses in chapters 20 and 21 was thus overlooked.The " What did Keynes mean by Z " quagmire is the direst result of the failure of Joan and Austin Robinson and Kahn to recognize that Keynes was using the standard theory of pure competition with one fixed input-one variable input while simultaneously incorporating expectations through the use of expected prices and expected profits.
Second,the claim made by Post Keynesian economists ,who follow the dogmatic claims of Joan Robinson and Richard Kahn, that Keynes did not understand the mechanics of his aggregate supply function and curve,is simply false.Post Keynesians still can't work out the simple footnote 2 on pp.55-56 of the GT that specifies that dZw/dN=1=dDw/dN =pO'(N)/w so that w/p=O'(N) or the real expected wage,w/p,equals O'(N), the marginal product of labor.Post Keynesians are still trying to figure this out 75 years after Keynes published the GT.How can they possibly expect to meet high powered,mathematically trained neoclassical economists in intellectual battle if they can't work out a calculus I problem ?????? The answer is that they can't and will not be able to survive in a one-on- one debate.
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