Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defence [Paperback]

Allison attempts to set straight the "standard picture" of Kant, which he argues does not fairly represent the Kantian view. The philosophers P.F. Strawson and H.A. Prichard are to be held mostly responsible for this mistaken picture argues the author. Allison's position is that the standard picture fails to distinguish between "ideality" and "reality" and between appearances and things in themselves. He attempts to defend Kant's thinking in terms of these distinctions. A reader really interested in an in-depth analysis of his arguments will need to have a thorough knowledge of the German language.

Allison argues that there is a definite distinction between an empirical and transcendental sense of 'ideality' and 'reality'. Empirically, 'ideality' characterizes the private data of an individual mind, but at the transcendental level, it characterizes the universal, necessary, and a priori conditions of human knowledge. This is an interesting reading of Kant, for it refutes the main objection to his philosophy, namely that the structure of the mind precludes any real knowledge of things. A transcendentally real object is then a nonsensible object (noumenon). The (actual) existence of these objects need not be postulated at all when reading Kant. Calling an object 'ideal' is not making a statement about its existence; empirical objects are ideal only because they cannot be described independently of the "forms of sensibility". Again, one can see in this reading of Kant a definite refutation of skepticism, for at the empirical level, the appearances are mental and the things in themselves are physical; at the transcendental level, appearance means relative to the subjective conditions, while things in themselves are independent of these conditions. The conditions do not determine how things appear in the empirical realm, they give universal and necessary conditions for the capability of the mind to recognize an object. One can argue here that it is these very conditions that set the foundation for genuine knowledge of objects; or an even more minimal view that they serve as precursors to genuine knowledge.

To elaborate on Kant in a more organized and rigorous manner, Allison introduces the concept of an "epistemic condition". These are conditions that establish the pure concepts of the understanding and also the forms of human sensibility. They are different form psychological conditions, which are unique to the human cognitive apparatus, and from ontological conditions, which are conditions of the being of things. According to the author Kant refutes Hume by showing that Hume confuses psychological and epistemic conditions, and also refutes Newton by showing that Newton confused epistemic with ontological conditions.

The author also clears up the misreading of Kant that characterizes appearances as "mere representations". Kant's claim is not, according to Allison, that objects have no independent existence but rather that such existence cannot be attributed to them in the manner in which they are represented. It is here though that Allison slips a little and weakens his case against Kantian skepticism when he summarizes the Kantian position as stating that whatever is necessary for the representation of something as an object must reflect the cognitive structure of the mind rather than the nature of the object as it is in itself. He seems to be saying that the very structure of the human mind, and its required use in the attempts to gain knowledge, precludes such knowledge.

The author also clears up the Kantian position versus phenomenalism. Whatever is actual must be an object of possible perception, but this is a consequence of actuality and not a cognition. Whatever can be connected with a given perception in accordance with the "analogies of experience" is to be deemed actual. This move by Kant removes the element of subjectivity in claims on actuality, distancing himself from Berkeley's purely psychological account of perception, defining the possibility of perception in terms of conformity to a priori principles. In addition, the Kantian position on conceptual knowledge is clarified by Allison. Kant contrasts the human capacity for conceptual knowledge versus the notion of an intuitive intellect, the later which is purely creative and requires no cognitive effort. Further, and central to the human capability for abstraction, is the Kantian notion that a concept is an organizing principle for consciousness. Sensible intuition provides the mind with only the raw data for conceptualization, not with the determinate knowledge of objects.

While I have the chance to plug it, I highly recommend Kuehn's biography on Kant (Cambridge UP), esp. for students new to the CPR.

Also, the N. Kemp Smith translation of K's CPR is standard in the field, but the new Guyer-Wood translation (Cambridge UP) is certainly worth checking out. Many corrections.

For an 'empirical' reading of Kant, see Strawson's Bounds of Sense. Also, his Individuals.

For excellent readings and clear interpretations of Kant, see Allison, Guyer (K and the Claims of Knowledge), Strawson (not altogether sympathetic with K's 'T.I.'), and Collins (Possible Experience/ U CAL).

On Kant and "Transcendental Arguments," see Stroud's articles (Human Knowledge/Oxford UP), A. Brueckner (articles), and D. Stern's anthology (Oxford UP).