Justice for Hedgehogs [Hardcover]

A Dworkinian statement is usually clear, sharp, and pointedly thought-provoking. This book contains 423 pages of such statements covering a range of subjects from skepticism to morality, living the good life, interpretation, dignity, free will law, and truth. By conventional interpretation of the phrase "A fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing", the fox hesitates to form one single, all-encompassing value that attaches to all things on earth. The hedgehog, on the other hand, believes that it has its thumb pressed against that solitary, centrifugal nerve and the value that controls all values. Dworkin does not mask his intention to show us that he is an hedgehog, but can he assume that role without grasping and reconciling the truth in all the disparate values that philosophers, scientists, and theologians, have hitherto been unable to reconcile? If Dworkin could, and had done so, one wonders if he might not have been a fox who thinks he is an hedgehog?

To have expressed all his views as emanating from one stock value in such a relatively short book, Dworkin might have had to omit steps in arguments which, no doubt, his critics will pursue. Indeed, Dworkin invites responses in a specially created website: [...]t. There have already been comments and criticisms: See Miachael Smith: 2009 Boston Law Review vol 90 p.509 (commenting on the draft manuscript). Nonetheless, "Justice for Hedgehogs", like most of Dworkin's books, is an elegant, charming, and provocative intellectual work.

Ronald Dworkin wrote "Taking Rights Seriously" in the late 1970's. It was a ground-breaking work; clear, articulate and libertarian.

While Dworkin is still a liberal, this latest offering is neither clear nor quite so articulate. It purports to be an attack on political cynicism and scepticism but indirectly and unintentionally supports exactly such a position. He sees the cynics and sceptics as `foxes', while the kind and moral people are `hedgehogs'. This is a most unfortunate metaphor, given that foxes are quick-witted, perceptive and courageous while hedgehogs blunder about and get run over. In this country hedgehogs are in decline. Dworkin's support for them is unlikely to change that glum fact, although I actually share his ambition.

The book starts brilliantly with a clear exposition of an important principle:
No government is legitimate unless it shows "Equal concern for the fate of every person over whom it claims dominion"(p2). We can all sign-up to that. But then he leaps into an entirely different realm when he says:
"Second, it must respect fully the responsibility and right of each person to decide for himself how to make something valuable of his life". Whoa, those two statements are not joined. Who will adjudicate on the `value' of my neighbour's aims, should they clash with mine? The latter sounds like an unnecessary addendum to a diluted version of the Communist Manifesto.
In "Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance", Robert Pirsig's central character has a mental breakdown because he is asked, by the young teacher's administrator, "Do you teach quality? (value)". He gets badly stuck on shared values. So does Dworkin.
Anyone dealing in `values' must nail his values to the mast. They must be scrupulously and forensically defined. They cannot be assumed and certainly not `assumed to be shared'.

This book seems to be aimed at the American reader as it revisits the constitution and there are links (critical) to the `Tea Party' and its ideals. Dworkin is as liberal as ever and as brave as ever, tackling such grand topics as "moral responsibility", "Ethics" and their application in `politics'. These are huge issues, informed by philosophy, psychology, natural science and legal studies. But the values remain assumed, not defined.
Late in the book (p352) Dworkin defends Rawls's notion of `justice' from the economist Amartya Sen's criticism that Rawls (and to some extent, Dworkin too), have created "transcendentalist" notions of idealised justice which go beyond their data. Dworkin says such criticism would be "damning if accurate". He claims that Sen's criticism is unfounded.
I'm not sure about that. Read this important book and form your own opinion.

A well structured and thought provoking book. Not necessarily accessible to the average lay person - although Dworkin's target audience are those who already have some understanding of moral/legal constructs. I would recommend it, just not as light reading.