This book examines Israel's strategic goals in the Middle East. The author argues that traditionally, both America and Israel prefered Arab states to be run by strongmen. The key strategic goal was to keep Arab countries stable. The author argues that after 9/11, this changed. Israeli and American hawks changed strategy, and decided that it was time to reverse the policy. Far from promoting stability, the aim should now be to promote instability in Arab countries. This would weaken Arab rivals to Israel's dominance of the region, and empower minority client groups in Arab nations, with which Israel and the US could form alliances of convenience.
Indeed, the author argues that the rioting, looting and civil war post-Iraq invasion were not the unexpected consequence of a well meaning invasion. They were, contends the author, part of the plan to keep Iraq weak and divided, and thus easier to exploit for its oil and fresh water. Furthermore, it had been an Israeli idea stretching back to the 1980s to encourage Iraq to become de facto a state divided into three (Sunni, Shia and Kurd). The author warns that Iran is next on the hitlist for this "spread instability" strategy, particularly because its posession of nuclear weapons could throw this strategy on its head.
The book is deeply provocative, and anyone interested in the war on terror, Iraq or current affairs generally will gain from this book.