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On the previous edition "It is a timely contribution to the discipline of Economics as a whole and in particular to Information Economics."--Ian Jackson, Staffordshire University
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In this revised second edition, An Introduction to the Economics of Information covers the consequences for the character and efficiency of the interaction between individuals and organizations when one party has more or better information on some aspect of the relationship. This is the condition of asymmetric information, under which the information gap will be exploited if, by doing so, the better-informed party can achieve some advantage. The book is written for a one-semester course for advanced undergraduates taking specialized course options, and for first-year postgraduate students of economics or business. After an introduction to the subject and the presentation of a benchmark model in which both parties share the same information throughout the relationship, chapters are devoted to the three main asymmetric information topics of Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection, and Signalling. The wide range of economic situations where the conclusions are applied includes such areas as finance, regulation, insurance, labour economics, health economics, and even politics. Each chapter presents the basic theory before moving on to applications and advanced topics. The problems are presented in the same framework throughout to allow easy comparison of the different results. This new edition incorporates extended exercises to test the student's understanding of the material, and to develop the tools and skills provided by the main text to solve other, original problems.
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Front Cover | Copyright | Table of Contents | Excerpt | Index | Back Cover
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3 reviews
22 of 22 people found the following review helpful
Information to the reader: this book is good
11 April 2000
Format:Paperback
In less than three hundred pages, the authors are able to introduce Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection and Signalling in an outstanding accessible way. Given the importance of contract theory in modern Economics, undoubtedely this is the first book to be read.
Each chapter is full of examples and graphs that help to understand the mathematics underneath.
The reader is supposed to know Kuhn-Tucker theorem, so any advanced undergraduate student in economics should be able to read it.
The base model, presented in chapter 2, is used as a benchmark to compare wirh the results obtained from the Moral Hazard model (brilliantly presented in chapter 3), Adverse Selection (chapter 4) and Signalling (chapter 5).
Each chapter has very well posed exercises, whose answers are in the end of the book. Furthermore, advanced themes are also discussed in the end of each chapter, giving to the reader a complete overview about theory of information.
So, since this theme has been increasingly important in modern economics, and given that this book is very easily readable, I strongly recommend it to any person who wishes to understand theory of contracts and incetives.
Each chapter is full of examples and graphs that help to understand the mathematics underneath.
The reader is supposed to know Kuhn-Tucker theorem, so any advanced undergraduate student in economics should be able to read it.
The base model, presented in chapter 2, is used as a benchmark to compare wirh the results obtained from the Moral Hazard model (brilliantly presented in chapter 3), Adverse Selection (chapter 4) and Signalling (chapter 5).
Each chapter has very well posed exercises, whose answers are in the end of the book. Furthermore, advanced themes are also discussed in the end of each chapter, giving to the reader a complete overview about theory of information.
So, since this theme has been increasingly important in modern economics, and given that this book is very easily readable, I strongly recommend it to any person who wishes to understand theory of contracts and incetives.
3 of 3 people found the following review helpful
good book that suffers in translation
22 Feb 2009
Format:Paperback
I've been assigned this book (as well as Bolton and Dewatripont's Contract Theory text) for a grad-level information class. In a way I'm of two minds -- this book is for the most part a clear, well-motivated introduction to the subject, a useful accompaniment to B&P's rather dryer book. On the other hand it's an obvious translation, full of typographical errors and amusing Spanglish. I don't know, for instance, what the monotonous likelihood quotient property is, but it certainly sounds bad.
All chapter exercises have answers in the back and there are just enough of them. For autodidacts (in whose company I count myself) this is immeasurably useful, an example I wish more textbooks would follow. Without the guidance of a teacher it's *hard* to pick your way through end-of-chapter problems in most books, when there are usually far too many of them and there's no way to get help when you're stuck.
All chapter exercises have answers in the back and there are just enough of them. For autodidacts (in whose company I count myself) this is immeasurably useful, an example I wish more textbooks would follow. Without the guidance of a teacher it's *hard* to pick your way through end-of-chapter problems in most books, when there are usually far too many of them and there's no way to get help when you're stuck.
0 of 1 people found the following review helpful
Economics of Information
17 Feb 2008
Format:Paperback
Few books are concerned with this subject. Inés Macho-Stadler and David Pérez-Castrillo were able to explain in a intuitive and structural way the problems derived from asymmetric information. This book guides you along the way to understand clearly the features of this themes.
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