This is a review of An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy by Karyn L. Lai.
Since Chinese philosophy has at least a 2,500 year history, it is not surprising (nor is it a weakness) that Lai's book does not cover all of it in its 307 pages. It focuses on pre-Qin philosophy (551-221 BCE, the period covering Confucius through Han Feizi), but also discusses the Yijing (I Ching), a work that only became philosophically influential during the Han dynasty (202 BCE - 220 CE), and concludes with some discussion of Chinese Buddhism. There are many things to commend about this book. Lai's writing style is direct and unpretentious, very suitable for the general reader and scholar alike. Furthermore, Lai includes a discussion of the School of Names and the Neo-Mohists, who are often ignored even though their paradoxical arguments are intriguing and well worth study.
But while there is impressively detailed coverage of some topics, others get more short shrift than they deserve. For example, Mencius had an immense influence on the later development of Chinese thought, particular in Neo-Confucianism. He has also been extensively discussed by contemporary philosophers. (There are two anthologies of secondary essays on him in English.) However, a mere five pages in the book are devoted exclusively to him (36-40), followed by a smattering of passing references.
In addition, some readers may be disappointed that the book is so reliant on other secondary sources. In the four and a half page discussion of Hua Yan Buddhism, Yu-lan Fung's A History of Chinese Philosophy is cited ten times. Other chapters frequently cite A.C. Graham's Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China, Benjamin Schwartz's The World of Thought in Ancient China, and Hu Shih's The development of the logical method in ancient China. This heavy reliance on other histories sometimes gives the book the feel of a survey of the secondary literature, rather than a work of independent scholarship. The author's choices about which secondary works to trust might also be questioned. Hu Shih's study of ancient Chinese "logical method" came out in 1928, while Fung's history was originally published in 1934. Both works are historically influential, but very out of date. This sometimes leads to unfortunate misinterpretations, as when Lai suggests that scholars "commonly" interpret Gongsun Long's white horse paradox "in terms of abstract universals" (119). This Platonistic interpretation was defended by Fung more than four score years ago, but no knowledgeable contemporary historian would agree. In fact, Graham presented a nominalist interpretation of the white horse paradox as far back as his classic 1964 paper, "A First Reading of the 'White Horse'" (reprinted in Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature (Suny Series in Chinese Philosophy and Culture)). (The author mistakenly attributes the development of this nominalist interpretation to another philosopher.) Finally, there are a few factual errors in this book. It is simply not true that "Wang Bi's interpretation [of the Daodejing] was influential during the Warring States Period and thereafter" (72), because Wang Bi lived four hundred years after the Warring States period ended.
I do not want to overemphasize the limitations of this book, though. The informed reader who picks up Lai's book will find man provocative suggestions to think about.