Winston Churchill and the Nazi leadership shared one thing in common - they both expected the latter to be shot out of hand. What prevented it happening was the determination of the United States and, ironically, the Soviet Union, to make a public spectacle of Nazism as an aggressive and destructive force which should be exposed for the rotten system it was and represented. In essence -notwithstanding the "crimes against humanity" - the Nuremberg trials were political in nature.
Churchill was not alone in his view which was widely held in his War Cabinet and beyond. Lord Simon, the Senior Government Legal Adviser, proposed the Nazis be treated as common outlaws and executed without the inconvenience of a trial. In general terms this remained the British Government's position through to 1945. Even during the trial (or tribunal as it was called) Anthony Eden thought the mass suicide of all the defendants would save a lot of trouble. The Americans by contrast wanted to ensure that the Nazi leadership had their full rights as individuals respected according to American legal theory although they also adopted the principle of group responsibility in respect of organisations such as the Gestapo.
Leading individuals were absent. Hitler, Himmler and Goebbels had all committed suicide while Borman was missing (his remains were found in Berlin in 1972) and Eichmann fled to South America. This provided an opportunity for those facing trial to blame the absentees (especially in relation to the extermination of the Jews). Some denied responsibility notably Ernst Kaltenbrunner whose ministerial remit included the genocidal policies implemented by the Gestapo. Hess drifted into and out of a paranoiac world, seemingly at will, while the universally detested Julius Streicher was declared legally sane but was clearly mentally deluded.
On the other hand Goering was completely unrepentant, accepting responsibility for waging war but blaming Hitler and Himmler for the Holocaust. Rudolf Hoess, Commandant of Auschwitz-Birkenau, showed righteous indignation at the suggestion that he stole from Jewish victims but no remorse for murdering millions of them opining that, "as an old fanatic National Socialist" he took it as "truth without question" that the war was against World Jewry. Those who did not blame the war on the Jews blamed it on the British.
One of the most interesting documents is Albert Speer's assessment of Hitler who he portrayed as someone who succeeded when he followed his own instincts and failed when he did not. What was clear was that people working close to him were overwhelmed by the charisma he possessed (or possibly by the lack of their own charisma). While it is true that towards the end of the war Speer lost the feeling that Hitler was an effective leader, his own testimony was hedged with a degree of self serving through which he sought to limit his own responsibility. Goering beat the rope by committing suicide, as did Robert Ley but the chief officers of state were sent to the gallows and a further 200 Nazis were dispatched by Albert Pierrepoint over a period of time.
Historically Nuremberg has been presented as the triumph of good over evil and, in a very real sense it was. However, Overy's outstanding scholarship brings out the tensions that existed between the Allies, both before and during the Tribunal. The Soviets wanted a show trial and presumed guilt. The British (once they had given up the outlaw idea) wanted a public demonstration of responsibility by the Nazi leadership. Hitler's death avoided the tricky question of whether the effective Head of State could be put on trial by the victors and it was left to subsequent events to settle that issue.
Overy has written many books about the Second World War and Nazi Germany. His writing is clear, concise and comprehensive. He is rightly regarded as a leading expert in the field. For anyone interested in the subject this book is an essential read.