The horns of the dilemma that trapped us: the South Vietnamese had to win it and we could not lose it. With just the right amount of detail, McNamara clearly conveys the power of inertia that drove the U.S. to crucify itself for the sake of ideology and international prestige. This book makes me wonder how government functions at all. We expect the executive branch to make sense of voluminous data, to direct a multitude of bureaucrats and a host of officials, who all have their own egos and points of view, in a swirl of ever changing and complex events. McNamara says there was never time to adequately address Vietnam on its own amid the daily decision making and the account in this book is the proof. McNamara gave himself over to his job and tried to rationalize the irrational. He was the one who ordered the study that ended up being revealed by Daniel Ellsberg as The Pentagon Papers. He makes the case clearly that those who say we didn't do enough to win have a hard case to prove. Above all McNamara is adamant against the use of nuclear weapons and that was the ultimate constraint on our activities in Southeast Asia. Most disturbing to me is that while top officials held meetings and floundered in seeming helplessness on the hook of Vietnam, hundreds, thousands were dying in the jungles. In the dictionary, many words have several definitions. Under the word tragedy, one of them should simply be "Vietnam". Two statements made by McNamara in this book remain in my mind: not all problems have immediate solutions and military actions have unforeseen consequences.