Consider the following scenario: a married couple is told by a government official that they will not be allowed to have sexual intercourse since the woman among them may get pregnant. Sexual reproduction is very hazardous for embryos, fetuses, and gestational mothers they are told, and the statistics supporting the dangers in procreation is presented to them. The couple takes the statistical data to a trained statistician in order to obtain an opinion on the reliability of the data. The statistician informs them that the data is correct, including the statement that up to 75 percent of embryos conceived through sexual intercourse never make it birth. Most of the embryos do not implant in the uterus and are spontaneously aborted. The couple, because of the current legal environment that forbids behavior that leads to these kinds of dangers, is therefore prohibited from procreating using traditional intercourse.
This scenario sounds absurd, and one cannot imagine a society whose government would prohibit procreation because it deemed it too "risky." But human reproduction via nuclear somatic transfer, colloquially known as human cloning, has been prohibited for this reason, among many others. Those who want to outlaw reproductive human cloning frequently point to the supposed dangers in carrying it out. These dangers have not been validated, due mostly to lack of experimental data, but even if they were, this would still not be an acceptable reason for prohibiting reproductive human cloning, given the "dangers" of "ordinary" reproduction. If because of technological advances, reproduction via human cloning resulted in only 10 percent of the embryos failing to reach actual birth, would it then be viewed as a more viable method of reproduction? Probably not, for objections to human cloning are based more on irrational reactions than sound, rational, or scientific thinking.
Scientific and ethical refutations of the arguments against human cloning have appeared in a few excellent books in the past five years. This book includes many of these arguments, and the author refines some of them to make them even better. But she includes arguments that the reader cannot find in these earlier books. Her arguments are both original and fascinating, for they pertain to the legal ramifications of anticloning laws, the latter of which have been aggressively proposed by politicians who neither understand the science of human cloning nor its social, legal, and political ramifications.
The legal argumentation in the book occurs mostly in chapter three of the book, wherein the author attempts to show that anticloning laws will violate the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution and will result in an effective discrimination against children that are born as the result of nuclear somatic transfer techniques. She assumes, realistically, that there will be human clones born sometime in the near future, regardless of the status of anticloning laws at that time. These children will subjected to `existential segregation' the author contends. This is a kind of discrimination that is similar to kind experienced in the past by mixed couples who wanted to marry but were prohibited from doing so in some states by `antimiscegenation' laws.
What is most valuable in her discussion of the legal issues involved in anticloning laws is that it educates the reader on various aspects of constitutional law. The insights that the reader will gain from this part of the book will be useful even outside the context of human cloning. The equal protection guarantee she argues is applicable to anticloning laws in that these laws will `classify' human clones. This legal classification she argues will result in `strict scrutiny' and is therefore suspect under the equal protection guarantee.
Indeed there is much in this book that supporters of human cloning will find both interesting and important. It is important to note that the technology is now available to perform human cloning, albeit somewhat risky (but still within the boundaries of what is risky in `ordinary' human reproduction). As technology advances and the possibility of asexual reproduction via cloning or some other technique becomes even more viable, we should be even more attentive to the legal rights of those individuals born in this way. They should be viewed as full-fledged human beings, deserving of every right that all humans possess. They will no doubt have their imperfections or faults as all humans do. Hopefully some of them will work to ending all prejudicial attitudes and any notion of an `illegal being.' These kinds of actions on their part will certainly prove their humanity, if indeed any proof is needed. Hopefully the words in this book will be heeded by more people, and remove the author's status as a minority in rational and coherent thinking on human cloning. But the image of a beautiful newborn (cloned) baby in a crib will no doubt also alleviate much of the remaining skepticism or repugnance towards human cloning.