How We Believe: The Search for God in an Age of Science [Paperback]

When hosting the announcement of the draft map of the human genome, US President Bill Clinton casually discarded over 500 years of human endeavour. Ignoring the fact that since Copernicus the role of divinities in the life has become irrelevant, Clinton dragged a god into the ceremony. The past half millenia has revealed a wealth of information from galactic spectra to the operating details of life itself. But the work was done by people, not some ghost. Mark Twain railed at `god coming in to claim the credit' after human effort produced cures for yellow fever and other ills. Clinton must have made the spirit of Twain gyrate furiously when he credited [g]od with creation, and by default, the cause of the structure of DNA. With so much knowledge of a god's irrelevance confronting him, why did Clinton fall into the trap of giving credit to the supernatural?

Michael Shermer has made a significant effort to detail the background thinking [or lack of it] that sustains the concept of The Desert Deity so firmly in the American psyche. How does the idea of a divine creator persist when the logic supporting it weakens with every forward stride of knowledge? Why do so many Americans, supposedly the most literate nation on earth, retain such adherence to superstition? Who are the believers and why do they believe?

Half a century ago, Robert Nathan wrote a delightful social satire, DIGGING THE WEANS. Archeologists from a future Africa crossed the seas to learn about the extinct people known as the US. In particular, they sought answers to why the US seemed so different from other people. One wonders what Nathan might think today. Since his time `globalization' has become a smokescreen term for Americanization. How these new imperialists think is a compelling issue. Shermer's book has provided insight to one facet of that thinking. It's of particular meaning to those of us living elsewhere. If there's a serious flaw in this book, it's a failure to make some valid comparisons with other people and their faiths.

Still, Shermer tries valiantly to fulfill the mandate he's given himself. How Americans believe is depicted by numerous quantitative studies. How many PhDs, bank managers or trash collectors, burdened with fears of the afterlife [or lack thereof] cling to the image of The Sprite? Shermer can't truly extract which of these is hopeful of something better on The Other Side, or simply fleeing an envisioned post-perish punishment. We can't blame him for this, since the faithful probably can't say, either.

Shermer's attempts to provide insight into WHY so many Americans are so persistent in their piety fall rather flat. The studies quoted seemed rather simplistic, but the question can only be, do you believe in The Sprite, or not. The discussions about agnosticism, non-theist or theist are engaging, but don't address the difficult question: why does the nation with the most Nobel winners remain the most superstitious? Perhaps Shermer would have done better to simply beg off attempting the question as too difficult. At least in only 290 pages. Yet, the question arises repeatedly. It titles the fourth chapter and an appendix and is the theme of Chapter 5. He uses it as a subtopic and for table headings, but we never find out why such a powerful people need to escape reality for the elusive solace of neo-Christianity.

The cure for yellow fever [and smallpox and polio] came from science workers, not faith[ful] healers. Twain wanted priority recognition for those researchers and instead watched the credit go to a god. With such a high proportion of Americans expressing faith, it's inevitable that even scientists will find themselves in different camps. In one of the strangest sections in this book, Shermer launches an assault on Daniel C. Dennett's critique of Steven J. Gould. Gould, co-author of the `punctuated equilibria' mechanism of evolution, is particularly deft at mental gymnastics in proffering his ideas. In this context, he sells Shermer on eschewing the term `random' in favour of `contingency' in describing evolution's process. Dennett, following Richard Dawkins, rightly sees Gould introducing `skyhooks' in his attempts to modify Darwin's natural selection. Shermer is clearly unhappy at this tarnishing of his hero, firmly chastising Dennett for `protesting overmuch'.

Why does Shermer take off on Dennett so strongly? Is it merely because Gould forwarded his last book? Shermer awards Gould too much credit for giving `contingency' a deep philosophical meaning in contrast to `random', a quirky and apparently less definable term. Gould rises in his own defence of contingency, wrapping the evidence in the term `sequence' in his definition of evolution's modus operandi. This seems to give `contingency' a respectability lacking in `random'. The presentation is convoluted and the evidence misleading, however. Random necessarily avoids sequence; otherwise it's no longer random. Nor is contingency sequential - unless, as in this case, evolution makes it so. As for Dennett `doth protest overmuch', Shermer ignores the stature of Gould as America's best-known science writer. If Gould gets it wrong, the impact will be widespread. And he got it wrong. [stephen a. haines - Ottawa, Canada]