How to Read Hume [Paperback]

 

 

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Simon Blackburn has a gift for making philosophy accessible and interesting, as in his widely read books `Think', `Being Good', `Lust' and `Truth'. Blackburn is a devotee of Hume's. He enjoys teasing Richard Dawkins on his refutation of the design to creator argument, with the comment that `David Hume did it much better'. The book is peppered with Hume-support ; `Hume was there beforehand' (p54), `As usual, Hume got it right' (p62), `He was the pioneer' (of evolution of cooperation) (p67), `Hume can dissect the arguments better than anyone' (p90), the essay is `a brilliant success', and Hume is `the most profound thinker of the modern world' (p106). Given that Hume was a bon vivant of the Parisian salons, a commercial writer whose histories earned him acclaim and wealth, whilst his philosophy was only valued posthumously, to what does he owe such accolade?

In Blackburn's summary of Hume's philosophy, reason is inadequate ; we follow our passions. Empiricism means that factual phenomena determine thought ; only empirical `impressions' can generate metaphysical `ideas', `beliefs' and `memories' which cause us to act. Cause is only a regularity of a sequence of events, although on the claimed phenomenon of miracles, Hume suddenly wants causes (p76). It is all `brute happenstance'. Ethics is not a matter of reason, but of what traits our passions admire, or a convention derived from pragmatism. Personal identity is a transient phenomenon.

This might all surprise a reader who believed that the Enlightenment was the Age of Reason. Is reason now dismissed? Do we not act at least sometimes according to reason, even carefully calculated reason? Even where the final determinant to act is passion, is there not a reason for the passion, as clinical psychology would have us believe? And may not random neuron firing rate alongside both reason and passion as a determinant of our action? Hume conflates reason and reasonable (p55), but it is essential not to confuse these unmatched concepts by relying on their shared etymology. There is no reason for what we deem reasonable ; ethics are arbitrary. Hume, I think, agrees, but could have said it better. Above all, how does Hume justify using reason to dismiss reason?

There is no critical discussion of Hume's objection to induction. Hume objected to the circularity of induction ; we can only rely on induction on the basis of its past success. But this applies to deductive logic too, which can only be justified by itself. Induction works with phenomena ; we `know that' something is or happens. But there is an increased epistemic claim when we `know how' something is or happens. Expecting the sun to rise tomorrow because it has risen every day in human history, is inductive logic. We have an arbitrary conservative or radical choice in whether we then think it will rise tomorrow. But expecting it to rise because I know how the earth revolves around the sun and spins on its own axis, adds epistemic strength. Reason does some work here.

Blackburn makes only scant reference to Hume's argument against a separate soul (p45). This is treated more thoroughly by Roy Porter in his `Flesh in the Age of Reason'. The counter-argument from a doctrine of supervenience, that lack of a separate (presumably eternal) soul does not rule out an integrated soul, is not treated at all. It's an important and significant omission, since it works in favour of a much neglected atheist spirituality and doesn't throw the baby out with the bathwater.

For some reason, Blackburn doesn't like management consultants, wrapping them in with astrologers, clairvoyants and faith healers (p81). Probably because they and their lucre seduced a large number of his students! Never mind, it's just an expression of passion, for which you don't need any reason!

So did Hume express the argument against design for a creator better than Richard Dawkins, as Blackburn claims? Certainly Hume's mockery of the argument is amusing (p82), but Dawkins does better by adding a plausible alternative hypothesis for complexity without design, and Dawkins certainly sticks to his guns, whereas Hume virtually capitulates (p84)! I'm no unqualified fan of Dawkins, but on this one he has it against Hume.

This book lacks the appeal of Blackburn's other accessible books on philosophy ; it might show `how to read Hume', but it doesn't leave a strong impulse as to whether to bother.

I found this to be a rather good summary of Hume's thinking. Blackburn has a pleasant writing style and has avoided the academic's trap of using inaccessible language. As philosophy books go, it is an easy read, (although to be honest this may be because I have read a reasonable amount of Hume already). It is very short, but Blackburn packs in lots of value in the hundred or so pages. The result is a helpful summary, with some interesting views on Hume.

This could appeal to someone coming afresh to Hume, although it probably helps to have read some Hume at least, a few bits of the Treatise or parts from the Enquiries first. For me personally, it was useful as a revision aid, taking me through the key points of Hume's thinking in a structured way.

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