This is a very good, and complete book on the war in the Mediterranean. One of the most fascinating aspects is that the author shows how difficult it is to wage war in politically instable areas, where various political stakeholders are less interested in the main event, but are waiting backstage to see how they can gain from the events. The Mediterranean theatre covered amongst others North Africa (with two groups, Vichy and the Free French, claiming to represent France), the Balkans (with the usual complexities) and Iraq (including a revolt as a sideshow to the war), and it is clear that the allied commanders (or their political chiefs) had not always given that side much thought. That gives the book much current value, for many of the current interventions and peace-keeping missions take place in similar circumstances.
One point I would like to flag is that the portraits of many American and British commanders seem to be overly negative, whereas the French commanders (Juin, De Lattre) seem to be getting a fairer treat. It could be that this is well deserved, I am not familiar with the biographies of most of the commanders involved, but it could be that the author, who has done a lot of research on the French military, including a book on the French Foreign Legion and on civil-military relations in France, is slightly favouring the French. Another, less important, point is that the title of the book does not cover the contents. The book actually shows that Hitler was not so much gambling but was drawn into a Mediterranean war reluctantly because Mussolini made a mess of things. It is not unlikely that the title is suggested by the publisher to boost sales of a book on a forgotten theatre of war.