This is volume IV of Samuel E. Morison's History of United States Naval Operations in WWII, and the second of nine on the Pacific theater. It details the two important battles of the Coral Sea and of Midway, where Japanese expansion in the Pacific ended for good.
In the previous volume, Morison introduced a theme of sorts by stating that "Stupidity characterized the strategy by which the Japanese navy was directed..." He expands upon that theme here in the present volume by commenting that "Whenever the Japanese planners disposed of sufficient strength, they divided forces and drafted an elaborate plan, the successful execution of which required a technical competence rare at any time in any Navy..." It also didn't hurt the U.S.'s chances that on both occasions, Coral Sea and Midway, the U.S. had learned ahead of time about the Japanese intentions and plans due to lax security on the part of Japan and outstanding code breaking by the U.S.
Anyone well read on the Pacific theater knows the highlights of these two watershed carrier actions, the abandonment by the Japanese of their designs on Port Moresby in the wake of Coral Sea, and the crushing loss of the four big carriers at Midway, along with the cream of the Japanese naval air service, which they were never able to replace. All of this, starting with Coral Sea on May 7, 1942, Morison poignantly juxtaposes with the Wainwright surrender on Corregidor of May 6. The lowest point in the American Pacific experience happens only the day before the Coral Sea battle, to be followed a short month later by the stunning victory at Midway.