This book does a fine job of supplying a detailed history of Israel. It is over 1000 pages, not even counting the index or the huge bibliography.
Sachar's idea is to tell us what happened and why. That does not mean taking sides. It does not mean saying if the people involved were reasonable or moral in choosing the sides they did.
I can understand this approach. We all wish that we could always view relatively current events from the perspective of those who could see which side was being greedy, which side was simply immoral, or which side was being impractical. But we can't, so Sachar simply reports what happened as best he can. And I don't see how I can ask for more than this.
In addition, the simple retelling of what happened and why tells us plenty about how wise or moral decision-makers were. Let me give one example. Sachar has a hefty section on the response to the UN Partition Resolution of November, 1947. Britain refused to gradually transfer authority to a United Nations commission, explaining that this would result in "confusion and disorder." Britain did everything possible to avoid cooperating with those in the UN or the Jewish Agency. The six UN commission members were made unwelcome. They "were soon reduced to foraging for food and drink. They accomplished nothing."
Meanwhile, the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, simply regarded the Jews as enemies. As Sachar writes, Bevin claimed "that the whole Jewish 'pressure' was a gigantic racket run from America," that the Jews had stolen "half the place" (that is, half of the Mandate territory), and that "he would not be surprised if the Germans had learned their worst atrocities from the Jews." I think this ought to tell any perceptive reader plenty about Bevin.
On top of this, Sachar explains that Bevin and some important British officers were predicting an Arab military victory, and that the Arabs would have no difficulty taking over the whole country. Nowadays, some people appear to have forgotten all this and are pretending that everyone knew that the Arabs would be no match for the Jews, which is yet one more reason why we ought to read this book!
Sachar also tells us about the British swiping the entire contents of the Mandate treasury, to make sure the Jews got none of the money. At the same time, the British gave 300,000 pounds to the Supreme Moslem Council, an indirect subsidy of the Arab war effort. The British strictly enforced an embargo on Jewish immigration and Jewish weapons acquisition. Meanwhile, the British happily sold weapons to Iraq and Transjordan.
It is true that on April 1, 1948, the Jews decided to stop responding to Arab attacks in a purely defensive manner. With Jerusalem threatened, they did decide to take action to relieve the siege. But Sachar has already shown us that one reason the Jews were unable to try such a plan before then was that the British would have stopped them by force.
There is an enormous amount of information in this book. I recommend it to everyone who is interested in the topic, no matter what political views they may have.