Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic [Paperback]

You need a sure guide when dealing with a place like Iran and I came to trust Ray Takeh in his opening chapter that he could explain the country to me, and with a very fine turn of phrase. I enjoyed both the analysis - and the prose. His assessment of Khomeini's legacy rang true. The Ayatollah had understood the national psyche much better than the Shah and built his revolution on the country's roots in its religion, Shia Islam and an abiding distrust of foreigners, not surprising after invasions of Greeks, Arabs, Moguls, Russians, and the British. For this reason Takeh rightly stresses that the regime is not going to disappear overnight. Moving on to the post Khomeini domestic era Takeh does a fine job describing Khamaeni and the conservatives, Rafsanjani and the pragmatists, Khatami and the Reformers, and he explains how these three groups are always around, and are always contending for influence. This is very helpful for understanding the present disputes. They have not come out of the blue. They are an ongoing part of the jostling for power within the wider context of the Islamic Republic. I found Takeh best on foreign policy. He does a brilliant job in explaining how despite all the revolutionary rhetoric there is plenty of rational politics at work in their foreign ministry. He shows how there are three circles - the Persian Gulf; the Arab East; and Eurasia, and how each area gets a different policy depending on Iran's national interest. So in Eurasia, where Iran needs trade and diplomatic support, there is very little talk of Islamic revolution as it is absolutely not in Iran's interest to mess with China or threaten to disturb her Muslims. On the other hand in Palestine it's the opposite. Here there is endless revolutionary talk and plenty of meddling, because at the end of the day apart from symbols, Iran has no vital economic interest in the region. They can afford to be zealous. In the Persian Gulf Iran has very definite interests and initially Ayatollah Khomeini wanted the Gulf states to leave the West and join his revolution. Despite his cajoling and more, they did not oblige and this policy only served to isolate Iran. President Rafsanjani was more pragmatic, but still asked the Gulf States to cut ties with the US. Again they did not oblige. Khatami, understanding that it was in Iran's best interest to be on good terms with the Gulf states adopted a `good neighbour' policy and said everyone can deal with the US separately. In other words, political and economic reality eventually bent revolutionary fervour, even in Iran's own backyard. Another point that this book rightly emphasizes when looking at Iran's tortuous relationship with the West, especially the USA and then the whole nuclear issue is the grim fact that when Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons again and again against Iran - nobody in the West raised a finger to stop him. Indeed indirectly Saddam was supported by the West. Given all the present leadership of Iran were scarred in that war, it is not surprising that this moulds their thinking in private, or as Takeh writes - `The impact of the Iran-Iraq war on Tehran's nuclear calculations cannot be underestimated' Takeh reckons that the awful result of those chemical attacks resulting in 34,000 casualties has led the leadership of war veterans to conclude that no treaty will offer them adequate protection. Takeh concludes this section by saying the only way Iran would begin to seriously negotiate regarding the nuclear issue would be in the context of more constructive American diplomacy. Threatening is of no value. Takeh's clear analysis and succinct writing stays on form with his last two chapters on Iraq and Israel. He notes with many others the irony that the US invasion has vastly increased Iran's influence in Iraq, and, as democracy will deliver a Shia government, is really working with the US, supporting that process. With Israel it is completely different. Apart from a slightly softer tone in the Khatami years, Israel has always been the illegal crusader state. Takeh usefully explains that one cause of Tehran's constant hostility is that it gives Iran a voice across the whole Islamic world, and in Iran itself it remains a benchmark for showing loyalty to the revolution Ayatollah Khomeini launched thirty years ago. Wherever Takeh's pen wrote on Iran - Khomeini, Reformers, the USA, Iraq, Israel, he not only educated me, but also, as said, the prose sometimes so neatly summed up the situation, it was worth reading again.

Would recommend to people with some previous knowledge of Islam/Iran as this makes it easier to read - I know I personally benefitted from having just read a book on Islam before this! Found this an interesting read and intelligent comment on politics in Iran, quite different from the media portrayal we often see. Would recommend.

Prior to his excellent Guardians of the Revolution, Takeyh provides an insightful overview of Iran's internal dynamics and Tehran's important relationships with the outside world, revealing an Iran that is frequently viewed through the wrong prism.
By no means an apologetic for the Islamic Republic, but certainly no endorsement of Hawkish US policies either, Takeyh acknowledges that there are frequent missed opportunities in repairing Iran's strained relations with the United States.
Takeyh examines the three internal dynamics of Iran's political system, namely hard-liners, reformists, and pragmatists, and how these shape both internal and external policy. While not completely dismissive of the Khatami era as an outright failure, Takeyh nonetheless cedes Khatami the success of improving relations with the nearby Gulf States, and achieving a moderation of Iran's rejectionist position toward Israel.
While it may appear that this may have been undone with the election of Ahmadinejad in 2005, Takeyh nonetheless notes that Iran has abandoned previous practices such as overseas assassination of dissidents and subversion of Arab States. Noting that the change of such policy and behavior has been shaped by external considerations such as trade and relations with European states, Takeyh identifies hope that further change in Iran's behavior can be achieved.
Takeyh identifies areas of common cause the US and Iran has held, such as stabilization of both Iraq and Afghanistan, and that a dialogue between the two countries can, and should, be pursued.
While written in 2006, prior to several transformations in Iran, Hidden Iran is nonetheless still a highly recommended read as it is a thoughtful examination of the most important factors affecting Iran to this day.