Heinz Guderian: The Background, Strategies, Tactics and Battlefield Experiences of the Greatest Commanders of History [Paperback]

Heinz Guderian is one of the few German generals of the Second World War other than Erwin Rommel, whose name is readily recognizable to a fairly large audience. He is widely regarded as the "father" of Germany's panzertruppen (armored units) and therefore, a key player in the Third Reich's early military successes. Yet much of the name-recognition of Guderian is based on his post-war memoirs, which continue to be re-printed, not on objective and scholarly analysis. As historian Pier Paolo Battistelli points out in his volume in Osprey's Command series on this general, the real Guderian and his accomplishments are much less well known. Battistelli's short biography does a fair job of revealing Guderian's actual contributions, which were substantial, but a component of Germany's overall military modernization in the 1930s. The author's narrative is effective at "busting" the mythology surrounding Guderian's name, but makes only modest progress in depicting Guderian's abilities and flaws as a general.

The introductory sections of the volume are quite short and cover the first four decades of Guderian's life in just a couple of pages. Although his service in the First World War was hardly stellar, the single paragraph devoted to Guderian's activities in 1914-18 seems clearly inadequate. Yet it is clear that Guderian spent the war as a junior staff officer and did not have significant command experience. The author then spends 5 pages provided a succinct career history of Guderian from 1934-45, which seems a bit pointless, since this material is gone over again in greater depth in the next section. The `hour of destiny' section (about 30 pages), examines Guderian's role in the creation of the panzertruppen in 1934-39, his leadership of panzer units in Poland, France and Russia in 1939-41, his role as General Inspector of Panzer troops in 1943-44 and his final role as Chief of the German General Staff in 1944-45. This text is supported by 5 maps, three battle scenes by Adam Hook (Kursk, Barbarossa and France 1940). The photos are generally pretty good, except for Guderian himself, who only appears infrequently (and not a single photo prior to 1939).

The author effectively demonstrates that Guderian hyped his own contributions in his post-war memoirs and that the development of Germany's panzer forces is attributable to the efforts of a number of individuals, of whom Guderian was initially only a minor member. It should be remembered that Guderian was first and foremost a signal officer with no real command experience, but he was quick to realize that commanding a panzer unit offered a short-cut to higher-level advancement. He used the circuitous route that Germany took to creating the panzertruppen - through the subterfuge of army motorization and signal units - to his advantage and should be regarded as a consummate military in-fighter. The author also makes the point that Guderian recognized that Hitler's patronage was also useful and used the Fuhrer's interest in panzers to his own advantage as well. Later, Guderian conveniently `forgot' his political machinations and Nazi ties, when they became liabilities.

The narrative is weaker on exposing Guderian's flaws as a commander, which became particularly evident in Russia in 1941. Again and again, Guderian failed to close pockets of encircled troops properly - even when ordered -because he was eager to achieve the glory of reaching Moscow first. Guderian's failure to close the Smolensk and Bryansk pockets quickly were not oversights. Although Guderian had been around tanks for seven years by the time of Barbarossa, he was far more of a general staff rider than a panzer leader and I doubt that he ever really understood tactical armored combat. Guderian's slashing style had worked well in Poland and France but when he ran into serious operations at places like Mtensk or Tula, he was at a loss what to do. However, once Guderian returned to his staff role as panzer inspector, he did help to revitalize Germany's depleted panzer forces in 1943-44, at least briefly. As chief of staff, he was essentially hostage to Hitler's directives. Overall, this is an adequate short biography and provides a good alternative to Guderian's own Panzer Leader, but in too many areas it really only scratches the surface.

I agree with much of what reviewers lordhoot and Forczyk have already said. Some of the photos were unique, but the writing was fairly general.

My advice to Osprey Publishing is, hire a proofreader! Examples: on page 10, it is stated that Germany attacked the Soviet Union in 1940 (actually 1941). On page 9, the text states that Guderian's advance in Austria covered 420 miles in two days, but on page 16 it says 435 miles in two days; which is it? The map legend on page 33, covering the German attack on Smolensk, labels the red arrows "French advances" and "French retreat." Oops. And at the top of page 35, it says "More than two years elapsed between Guderian's last field command and his new appointment, on 28 February 1943. . . ." The elapsed time from December 26, 1941 to February 28, 1943 is more than one year, not two.

There has been a spate of Guderian articles and works produced in the last few years -- this is among the most balanced and methodical. Mr. Battistelli is one of the few classical historians remaining -- one who seeks the truth, not to glorify himself through outrageous or politically correct publication. Guderian is -- for perhaps the first time -- reviewed as a human being -- not expected to be perfect in order to be accorded high honors, but still held accountable for his shortcomings -- both as a man and as a pioneer of warfare. Egotistical in that 'true believer' way, difficult for superiors to deal with -- and all the more aggravating because he was so often correct. Beloved by his soldiers in the way that was still possible in the mid-twentieth century, a serious burr under the chain of command's saddle.
However, there are two issues in the book that remain unresolved, both here and in virtually every other work. The first is the outcome of Guderian's reforms of the Mobile Forces in his role as General Inspector of Paner Troops. This work finds that he was unimaginative in this role, yet one wonders what the alternatives were given the production issues of Germany at the time and the tidal wave of Soviet mobile forces that were quickly gaining operational expertise. No answers are to be found here -- one suspects that there was no acceptable solution -- every option was bound to fail. The second is Guderian's performance as Chief of OKH. This period remains a book yet to be written -- most histories are content (as is this one) to relate a few anecdotes about Guderian's and Hitler's shouting matches over timely action on the eastern front (again, Guderian seems to have been mainly in the right on these issues) and their see-saw battle over force distribution between West and East. There is absolutely no hint of whether his peers found him satisfactory in this new role, did they appreciate his contribution or otherwise, was he perceived by the other staff as a man of honor capable of handing his responsibilities or .... Yet other authors (Albert Speer, Walter Warlimont) hint of a deeper participation in the attempt to salvage a future for Germany than is mentioned here or elsewhere. Write on!