Greek Military Intelligence and the Crescent: Estimating the Turkish Threat - Crises, Leadership and Strategic Analyses 1974-1996 [Paperback]

With one step, Panagiotis Dimitrakis has extended the study of contemporary intelligence and crisis management into the Aegean, providing a unique account of how Greek policymakers forged their assessments of the Turkish threat during a tense two decades following the Turkish occupation of half of Cyprus. He draws on the conceptual literature on intelligence and surprise attack, largely developed in the AngloSaxon world with some notable Israeli contributions and uses it as a template against which to evaluate the performance of successive Greek governments. It soon becomes apparent that while the familiar dilemmas concerning the relationship between intelligence and policy may take on distinctive forms in quite different political cultures in many respects they are all too recognisable. In the process fascinating light is thrown on how Greece has sought to manage its relations with Turkey. Even during the Cold War these two NATO allies were as prepared to fight each other as they were the Warsaw Pact, creating great anxiety among their alliance partners. --Sir Lawrence Freedman KCMG, CBE, FBA, FKC May 2010 Foreign policy advisor to Tony Blair and a member of the 2009 United Kingdom Iraq War inquiry.

his comparative analytical work discusses two memorable showdowns between Greece and Turkey, events that exemplified both countries balance of power and political and military strategic capacities and goals in the late 20th-century. These affairs the first, a war of words accompanied by military buildups in 1987 and the second, the much more serious Imia crisis of January 1996 occurred in an environment in which some of the same conditions that applied then apply still now. Analysts will thus find a wealth of useful insight in Greek Military Intelligence and the Crescent, which will help in assessing the Greek-Turkish relationship today. The book is, of course, also an engrossing read for the armchair historian or intelligence buff. The vivid recounting of the decision-making processes of Greek leaders, civilian and military intelligence, and the armed forces (particularly the Navy) is peppered with new commentary from former high-level officials who were active during the period in question, adding to the book's appeal. While many other factors in regional and global politics have changed since 1987 and 1996, it is thus clear that many have also stayed the same. If any new altercations occur between Turkey and Greece due to the 'traditional issues,' intelligence practitioners and politicians alike would be wise to pay close attention to the tactical lessons presented in Greek Military Intelligence and the Crescent, as this might help to prevent past mistakes from happening again, and thus minimize the chances of needless conflict. --Chris Deliso - balkanalysis.com

During the 1987 Greek-Turkish crisis, Greek military intelligence provided essential information on Turkey s limited military preparations, so helping to prevent an escalation to confrontation. In the 1996 crisis, Greek military intelligence failed to provide tactical information and details of the Turkish intent to deploy troops on one Greek islet. This failure allowed the Turks to turn the tables on the Greeks. Greek Military Intelligence and the Crescent successfully draws together the crucial assessments made throughout each episode that defined the crisis-management styles of Prime Ministers Andreas Papandreou and Costas Simitis. Dimitrakis s expert knowledge of the geographical and politico-military landscape reveals the complexity of the relationship between Greece and Turkey; two antagonistic NATO allies.