Go Tell The Spartans [DVD]

Based on Daniel Ford's novel "Incident at Muc Wa," the strength of this film is Wendell Mayes" brilliant script, which was nominated for a SAG Award. The film features one of Burt Lancaster's best performances as Major Asa Barker, a military adviser who knows in 1964 there is no light at the end of the tunnel. Lancaster heads a group of American military advisors in the time before Johnson made the massive commitment of troops to the war, who see the parallels between what is about to happen and the downfall of the French a decade earlier, and who know there is nothing they can do to stop their country from making a terrible mistake.

Obviously our reading of this film is colored by what we already knew in 1978 and what we take for granted now: the Vietnam War was a fiasco of epic proportions. Craig Wasson has the other main role as Corporal Courcey while other recognizable members in the cast are Marc Singer as Captain Olivetti, David Clennon as Lt. Finley Wattsberg, Dolph Sweet as General Harnitz and Clyde Kusatsu as Colonel Minh. Oh, and I have to make special mention of Dennis Howard, who plays Corporal Abraham Lincoln.

Ultimately, "Go Tell The Spartans" does not portray what it was like for grunts during the Vietnam War--you can watch "Platoon" or even "Forrest Gump" to get a much better idea of that experience than you will here--but this film does deal with the greater tragedy of the war than any other film I have seen, even if it takes place before we really got involved waist deep in the Big Muddy.

A comprehensive deconstruction of the causes of the Vietnam War and the USA's involvement in it is more the province of serious academic study and Government-commissioned report-writing. And there have been many, very many of these since 1975. But perhaps a few key points might suffice to the casual reader and viewer of Vietnam War films.

First and foremost, the Republic of South-Vietnam was never a unified country, as the West would define 'a unified country.' As with most post-colonial nations, their national boundaries were an administrative technicality imposed on the region(s) by the former colonial powers, in Vietnam's case France. Ethnic divisions were uniform. The majority Viets stuck to the coastal lowlands and some of the river valleys, along with the sizeable Cham and Khmer minorities throughout the south. Then there were many ethnic minorities, collectively termed Montagnards (mountain peoples) by the French - Bru, Katu, Sedang, Bahnar, Jarai, Rhade, Muong, Stieng, etc. - and ne'er the twain did meet. The educated (Bhuddist and Catholicized) Viets were contemptuous of the savage Montagnards, and the (Bhuddist and anamist) Montagnards hated the arrogant and cruel Viets. The ruling Viets were insensitive to the Montagnards, either driving them into the arms of the Viet-Cong or turning them into very willing recruits of the US Special Forces training programmes. Regular ARVN and Montagnard 'Ruff-Puffs' (RF/PF = Regional Forces/Popular Forces organized and equipped by US Special Forces for regional/local self-defence) rarely ever co-operated in military operations.

The 'educated' and semi-Westernized Viets were The Problem. Top of the hierarchy (Roman Catholics all) was the French-installed but weak-willed and self-seeking 'Emperor' Bao Dai, until toppled in a brazenly rigged referendum by his premier, Ngo Dinh Diem in 1955. From then on President Diem and his cronies (Diem appointed his brothers to key government positions; his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu's wife, Madame Nhu, was South-Vietnam's 'First Lady') became increasingly autocratic - alienating further both Montagnards and Bhuddist Viets alike. Following open taunts from Madame Nhu and heavy-handed police actions against Bhuddist demonstrators (who felt that Catholic Diem's policies were increasingly discriminating against Bhuddist traditions), young Bhuddist bonzes (priests), in accordance with an ancient tradition, took to publicly dousing themselves in petrol and burning themselves to death whilst their co-religionists prevented fire-engines or ambulances from approaching. Such images caught by Western television crews were genuinely horrifying.

Meanwhile, the ARVN was notionally built-up with American arms and equipment by the US Mission (military advisors, later on MACV), but in the field showed a remarkable lack of aggression. In an action at Ap Bac (Plain of Reeds, NW of Saigon, 2 January, 1963) a numerically superior ARVN regiment, with ample air and artillery support, was ignominiously repulsed by a Viet Cong battalion of ca. 400 men. By 1 November, 1963 even senior ARVN generals were fed-up with Diem's autocracy, which was by then also alienating American aid, and instigated a coup (although the CIA may have aided the ARVN generals, the Kennedy administration opted for 'benign non-involvement'); Diem and Nhu 'died mysterously' during arrest the following day.

This got rid of autocracy but not of corruption. This was so endemic throughout the social strata - military and civil - of the Viets that it was incomprehensible to the Americans. The French belatedly understood it, but the Americans never did. Examples: ARVN officers above the rank of captain were reluctant to take part in field operations, condidering it beneath their dignity and status; junior ARVN officers receiving the ration of rice or other foodstuffs and/or ammunition for their troops, would often sell it, at public auction, to the highest bidder - which often included the Viet-Cong.

And another example is the key moment of GO TELL THE SPARTANS. Major Barker realizes that the only way to get the South Vietnamese provincial officer to use his artillery shells is to bribe the man to do so ... whilst being aware that even after accepting the bribe, the provincial officer still might not actually fire his artillery in support of Barker's military action, preferring to save the shells, perhaps for sale to the highest bidder later ... It was this basic but fundamental appreciation of South Vietnam's situation, as submitted in several fact-finding mission reports (having to cajole, bribe, or withhold suplies/subsidies from Viet civil and military officials alike to actually Get Things Done), that prompted the larger US military involvement in 1965. All that was needed was some kind of 'provocation.' The Tonkin Incident in August 1964 provided it.

And the rest became an unfortunate chapter in America's history.