Getting Our Way [Paperback]

Following on from his previous book 'DC Confidential', this book puts Sir Christopher Meyer's wealth of experience in the diplomatic field onto a much wider field but as previously, in a style of writing that is all of very good and interesting reading, very descriptive, captures the English language impeccably and includes a dry sense of humour. What more could one wish for?

Very strongly recommended.

This is an argument for a hardheaded approach to foreign policy driven by the long-term interests of national security, wealth generation and social values. He regards a professional diplomatic service, backed up by a preparedness to use force, as an essential tool to aid preparation and to deliver that policy.
Through drawing examples from 425 years of British history he demonstrates that the character of the state is slowly changing and that it is not always easy to perceive just who is manipulating whom in formulating policy. Bravely, admitting that he is no Sinologist, he tackles three episodes of British-Chinese relations. In the first Britain is rebuffed, in the second she is successful through the twin tools of the opium trade and the power of the gunboat, in the third the invidious treaties forced through by the second episode are instrumental in the hard line adopted by the Communist Government. All the examples chosen repay examination with an open mind.
The author has strong opinions and is rarely able to mention those who have thwarted him without fulminating. Cool, rational analysis might occasionally have worked better. He finds difficulty in not obtruding himself into the narrative. Some may find this attractive; others may be reminded of similarly egotistical colleagues.

I really enjoyed reading this book. Meyer uses his considerable experience and insight to tease out the key qualities for a successful diplomat. In concluding, Meyer made no secret of his view that Britain would be better served by a strong Foreign Office that could enact a clear foreign policy on behalf of the national interest. I enjoyed the breadth of examples that were cited to explore both the role of diplomacy and the national diplomat in international relations. Many were of topics and subject areas I had little knowledge of before. Below is my brief summary of what was covered.

Meyer highlights three `pillars' of `national interest'; security, prosperity and values. For each pillar, Meyer selects three `case studies' and with a brief description of each case he explores and examines the key aspects of diplomacy. In doing so he reveals that effective diplomacy needs a both a `clear goal' and a crisp understanding of the national interest.

To explore the pillar of `security', Meyer starts with an examination of the role played by `Killigrew' during the reign of Elizabeth I. Sent to Edinburgh, Killigrew sought to ensure that the `English' favoured faction won in a power struggle; the goal achieved, its northern border secure, it allowed protestant England to focus on threats from France and Spain. The second case explores how Lord Castleragh, at the Congress of Vienna in 1814, set out to and succeeded in establishing the balance of power in Europe between Austria, Prussia, Russia and France following the fall of Napoleon. The third case focuses on how in 1962 the British Ambassador to the US, Sir David Ormsby-Gore, used his personal connections with President Kennedy to impress on the Americans the need for an independent British nuclear deterrent. In all three cases Meyer exemplifies how the personal skills of the diplomat was allied to a clear vision/goal to secure the needs of the government of the day. In all three cases success was achieved.

Success was not necessarily the outcome from some of the case studies chosen to illustrate the pillar of `prosperity'. Indeed as examples chosen from Britain's relationship with China illustrate, there are occasions when not even an experienced diplomats skills are enough to secure the national interest. The first case explores how in 1792, in Georgian Britain with the tea trade flourishing, Viscount McCartney, led a tribute laden trip to China but failed in its mission to redress the trade imbalance. Some sixty years later `Bowrings' mission was more impactful as by use of force of arms he was able to secure the Island of Hong Kong as a base from which to conduct trade. The trilogy of cases is concluded by a discussion on how the last governor of Hong Kong, Chris Pattern, oversaw the return of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty in 1997. The trilogy underlines how the balance of power can change; how the legacy of previous interactions impact on subsequent negotiations; and how the diplomat has to `play his cards' from either a position of strength or weakness.

To explore the third pillar of `values', Meyer uses three cases to exemplify how the growth of `public opinion' has become a factor in international relations. Victorian Britain saw the support of the Ottoman Empire, in the face of Russian expansion, as imperative to its security in maintaining the balance of power in Europe. However, following atrocities committed in suppressing Nationalist uprisings in Bulgaria in 1875/76, newspaper reports of the atrocities led to public opinion becoming antagonistic to the policy of support for the Ottoman Empire. The British ambassador in Constantinople, Elliot, became a sacrifice to public opinion despite supporting government policy as Gladstone played the `values' card against Disraeli. The second case explores how Vanisttart, the Permanent Under Secretary (PUS) in the Foreign Office, despite his own `realist' judgement, became burnt by sticking to `League of Nations' approach as Italy under Mussolini invaded Abyssinia. The third case returns to the Balkans and the recent disintegration of Yugoslavia. How, the multilateral bodies of EU and UN floundered in finding a solution before the US took the lead in securing the Dayton accords in 1995 using `old fashioned' power backed diplomacy to assert a solution on the combatants.