Germs [Paperback]

Although bioweapons have been banned by treaty since 1975, several countries have been busy as bees working covertly on this area. The former Soviet Union seems to have been in the lead, producing huge volumes of new microbes whose infectious efficacy was improved by bioengineering, processing to make the germs easier to disseminate, and experiments to create delivery systems of great efficiency. The book also details efforts by the United States, Iraq, and South Africa over these years. A major potential problem has been that there are a lot of unemployed scientists in this field from the former Soviet Union who are being recruited to start new bioweapons programs for other countries. Iran has been trying to do this. The book also describes attempts by terrorist groups to get involved. The infamous Osama bin Laden is described in the book as one terrorist leader who has been training his followers in chemical and bioweapons.

After having fallen asleep in this area since the treaty was put in place, the United States began to scramble to catch-up in the 1990s, and left itself just about as vulnerable as when the decade started despite spending serious money. Identified weaknesses in the book included a poor ability to diagnose diseases caused by bioweapons, limited vaccines and medicines to counteract the diseases, a weak structure for coordinating the response, and limited tools to fight a contagious bioweapon (which conventional anthrax is not).

On the other hand, bioweapons are attractive for terrorists. It doesn't take much money to build them. Off the shelf equipment can be used. They are easy to transport. Few people are needed to deliver them and start a contagion. All that is needed is the knowledge of what needs to be done. The book describes the efforts by terrorists in the past to use bioweapons. The most significant domestic event occurred in 1984 when followers of the Bhagwan Shree in Oregon deliberately spread salmonella in restaurant salad bars as part of an attempt to gain political control.

In some ways the most chilling part of the book is the evaluation of how close Coalition Forces came to facing bioweapons in the Gulf War. Iraq had the bioweapons and the delivery systems to have created a major loss of life. Nuclear saber-rattling seemed to have been effective in deterring Saddam Hussein not to use his bioweapons. There may have been deals through back channels that we don't know about. Perhaps the decision not to oust him from power was part of some bioweapon blackmail. Who knows? It is well worth considering the implications of the fact that Iraq was willing to forego many billions of dollars in oil revenue since the Gulf War in order to protect its ability to develop and produce bioweapons.

The book ends with many suggestions for how to limit our exposure to the full threat of bioweapons. If you add to these observations the experiences we have been having with anthrax-laced letters, you will see that an ounce of prevention is worth vastly more than a pound of cure after the fact. However, even the prevention is very expensive. But I don't think we can afford the alternative. After you read this book, I'm sure you will agree with me.

I graded the book down one star for being overly bulky in telling its story, and mischaracterizing some details with which I am familiar.

Will we use advanced science to unleash horrible epidemics on each other? What internal and external forces will be sufficient to avoid such a catastrophe?

Use science to serve humanity . . . and to become more humane!