This is a book that was first published in the late 1950s. Despite its age, and the rather dated and somehwat stilted style in which it is written, it remains a very interesting, well-researched, in-depth - and at times fascinating - study of Alexander's generalship by a retired British general that was one of the earliest promotors of tank warfare.
The book still exhibits multiple qualities. These include:
- the acknowlegment of Alexander's debt towards his father Philip, stating that "Alexander's greatest asset was the army he inherited from his father and that without it, and in spite of his genius, his conquests would be inconceivable". One piece is perhaps missing here: Alexander's military talent was perhaps as much acquired as it was a result from his "genius"
- a related strong point of this book is the attention given to context, with the first four chapters of the book devoted to describing the Greek cities and Philip's wars, the Macedonian army, the youth of Alexander, the geography and the Persian Empire,
- it is only then that Fuller comes up with his "strategical narrative" - a history of Alexander's campaigns, before going into more detail and examining Alexander's main battles, his sieges, his "small wars", his statemanship and his generalship.
As an indirect praise and testimony to the quality of this book, you should also be aware that a number of more recent authors have largely been inspired by this structure and the contents of this book, a typical example being English with his three volumes on Alexander (his army, his sieges and his field campaigns).
In some respects, however, this book is somewhat dated. For instance:
- the author's comparisons between Alexander's "shock tactics" on the battlefield, using his Companion cavalry as tanks would be used in the XX century is an obvious anachronism. So are comparisons with Clausewitz's writings. Neither comparisons are entirely valid.
- what Fuller terms Alexander's "genius" is nowadays called his charisma, a mixture of awareness and need to always lead from the front and inspire by personal example, with modern historians insisting on his human side, his personality (and its failings) rather than his "superhuman" genius.
As modern historians now acknowledge, Alexander always "wanted more" and needed to be seen as better than anyone else. It is these psychological characteristics of his personality that make him so outstanding a general: the archetype of the "high risk - high reward" general, always ready to risk it all (starting with his own life) just to pull of one more victory. As such, he is also a very rare general in the sense that he almost always managed to pull it off: he could so easily have got himself killed in any of his major battles and in quite a few of his "small wars" as well. His generalship therefore stands in almost perfect contrast with that of Philip and Parmenion, but also with that of most other generals throughout Antiquity (think of Caesar) who, after careful and methodical planning, took calculated (and mostly limited) risks.
In contrast, Alexander appears to have been a gambler ready to risk it all. What makes him so outstanding is, to a large extent, that he managed to win almost every time, although a carefull analysis of his battles and sieges shows that he almost lost every time. Nevertheless, Alexander was and remains unique, and so does this book, well worth reading for all Alexander fans and anyone interested in this period, despite his age...