"Gallipoli 1915" by Philip Haythornthwaite is an informative entry point into the disastrous Allied assault on the Turkish peninsula. This book is definitely not suited for serious scholars of the First World War; surely the author was writing for a youthful audience or one that was wholly unfamiliar with the Dardanelles campaign. That said, the writing is not without merit; for the reader wanting a quick and easy to read summary the text is ideal, though Haythornthwaite's prose often lacks embellishment or thoughtful insight into the specifics of the epic battle.
Perhaps the defining feature of this book is its colorful layout. The text is effectively spread throughout the pages, supported by an excellent collection of maps and photographs which make up for the dryness of the prose. These visual aids made the book quite enjoyable and provided a holistic approach to retelling the main components that defined the battle of Gallipoli.
The book begins with a basic rundown of the major personalities that defined the decision making process during the campaign. Dull and predictable characters such as British General Ian Hamilton are contrasted with the dashing and bold leadership of Turkey's Mustafa Kemal. The basic breakdown of Allied generalship and the Turkish ability to rise to occasion is established in the first few pages as the reader learns of the disparity between opponents and how key figures stepped forward in crucial moments. Despite the summarized nature of the text, the author is able to reiterate this point as it appears time and again and is the commonly held notion of why Gallipoli was so disastrous for the British and their allies. Haythornthwaite conveys the frustration and indecisiveness that doomed such sturdy and fearless troops to slaughter. The reader learns that Gallipoli epitomized the World War 1 phrase describing the relationship between Generals and enlisted men as "donkeys leading lions."
After the profile of the campaign's leaders, the next chapter gives a typically brief description of the armies they commanded. There is quite a focus on the technical nature of each army as statistics concerning the composition of field units and their equipment is given. I found these to be slightly interesting, but again the writing lacks embellishment, bordering on blandness. But the author does convey the superiority of the Allies on paper, which would play into their belief that Turkey would be a pushover. This underestimation of the fighting capabilities of the Ottoman Empire was a crucial mistake, one of the many that doomed the campaign to failure.
The campaign itself began with a typically ill-fated naval engagement, as the Royal navy attempted to force its way through the Dardanelles, incurring heavy losses due to shore batteries and mines. It is only after this attempt was halted that ground troops were committed in the first D Day of modern warfare. The primitive amphibious strategy is one of the most interesting aspects of the battle, as lessons learned here would be invaluable in years to come, particularly in the Second World War. The fatal mistake was the lack of communication and disconnect with the command structure which halted the beach heads at Anzac Cove and Cape Helles before they could capture the high ground and link up, allowing the Turks a chance to organize. Hamilton's decision to negate the element of surprise, only pressing on when the troops were all massed following entrenchment was to be a death knell for the operation. It was repeated again at Suvla Bay in August as an amphibious landing could have turned the Turkish flank but defensive entrenchment was favored over lighter and faster assaults. The result was nearly a year of alternating human wave attacks, causing 250,000 casualties on each side before Allied withdrawal.