Final Entries 1945: The Diaries of Joseph Goebbels [Paperback]

This was the third of three Goebbel War Year diaries that I bought and read. Although not the easiest prose to read -- in part they were not written necessarily to be read but to be perhaps used in a memoir that was destined to never be written -- this and the other two diaries are fascinating books for people fascinated by that era.

This diary ends on 9 April 45. According to the introduction he continued writing through at least 22 April 45 when he and his family moved into the bunker. It would be interesting to read any additional entries through 22 April -- and beyond if available -- as the situation became more hopeless. The book does, however, conclude with an epilogue that included his and his wife's last letters to his stepson, the only member of the Goebbels family to survive the war.

The term "Jekyll and Hyde" was easily applicable to the first diary and not as easily applicable to this diary. However there term is somewhat applicable. The man -- despite the obvious problems at the fronts -- still has hope. Maybe the hope is flickering but he still has hope. He does realize that military victory is now unattainable but maybe if the military can score one or two major successes they can finagle some kind of a negotiated settlement more favorable than "unconditional surrender". This thought appears to be running through the Nazi government during the February - April 45 timeframe covered in the book.

Whereas in the previous two diaries great words are written about great events that resulted in great victories, this time Goebbels write great words about not so great events. The brave German military puts up great resistance to stall an American, or a British, or a Soviet offensive. Nazi forces counterattack and push eight or ten or twelve kilometers. The war is not lost yet! Why are such events important? The longer the war goes on and the more casualties are inflicted upon the enemy maybe the people in the West will grow tired and more conciliatory towards a less than complete defeat of Germany. Or maybe by stretching out the war maybe the Nazis can finagle a separate settlement with the Soviets. Or maybe the western Allies will realize how dangerous the Soviets are -- who are, after all, spreading its Bolshevic tentacles over eastern Europe contrary to previous agreements. Goebbels is hoping that something -- anything -- will happen to preclude what looks like an inevitable defeat.

Reading the book one realizes how little hold the government actually had over the people. Even in the previous diaries there were criticisms of the government that was voiced by the people that Goebbels acknowledged. Of course, in 1945 there was little the government could do. The people were unhappy about the air raids for which the government generally and the Luftwaffe specifically had no answer. Althought Goebbels still disliked several of his counterparts in the government like Foreign Minister Ribbentrop his greatest condemnation falls upon Hermann Goering. He feels Goering's corrupt and inept leadership of the Luftwaffe is the main reason why victory that appeared so close in 1941 is now so far away in 1945. Yet he still writes that even as late as April 1945 if there are major personnel changes in the military and the government National Socialism could still be saved in Germany.

He is not beyond criticizing is Fuehrer. He still thinks Adolf Hitler himself can do no wrong. The problem is that Adolf Hitler has surrounded himself with wrong people and for whatever reasons will not get rid of them. Although Hitler agrees with almost all of Goebbels suggestions for fixing the government Hitler does virtually nothing. Goebbels is frustrated.

It is also interesting how his attitude toward the inferior Slavic Soviet forces has evolved. He is still convinced the Soviet military is -- man for man -- inferior to the German soldier. But the Germans are being overwhelmed by superior numbers and machinery being thrown at them by the Allies. But he is impressed with Stalin. Once upon a time he and others had scorned Stalin for the massive purges of the Soviet military in the late 1930s. At one point in the book he relates reviewing the biographies of the leading Soviet military leaders. The Soviet military leaders were all under the age of 50 and were die-hard Bolshevics who would do anything to win. This was a big reason why the Soviets survived the seemingly hopeless situation in 1941 and why they were winning the war in 1945. In contrast, the German military leaders were old and had no deep political or philosopical ties to National Socialism. If they won the war, great. If not, oh well. Goebbels concludes that maybe Stalin was not so crazy for purging his military and after the war the Nazis should do likewise with their military.

The popular perception of Hitler and his entourage is they were living in an insane fantasy land as the Soviets closed in on Berlin. Unfortunately, the last three weeks of Goebbels life were missing so maybe there was some degree of truth to that perception. But in the book you see a somewhat different view. Yes the war was going bad but he had to grasp at some kind of hope -- whatever that may be. Goebbels recognized that if the end is near it would be a catastrophic defeat. Therefore his only hope was to stretch the war out as long as possible and hope for some miracle. Hitler himself is not so much a ranting, raving lunatic (many of the accounts of Hitler's final days were written by witnesses who were the target of his anger and thus had a reason for depicting his as insane) as a man who is angry with his generals but is resigned to his fate.

As we know, neither Joseph Goebbels nor his Fuehrer survived the war and neither man was able to write their autobiographies explaining why they did what they did. Perhaps the closest thing to a Hitler autobiography would be Mein Kampf that depicted his early life and early political battles through 1924 and his "Table Talks" -- a series of monologues recorded between 1942 and 1944. For his Propaganda Minister these diaries is the closest we can probably hope to find to an autobiography. These "autobiographies" may be distorted but they are distorted in their own words.

This is an extremely valuable account of the final days of the Nazi regime, written by the ultimate insider, Propaganda Chief (and ultimate believer given his entire family's bunker suicide) Dr. Joseph Goebbels. Goebbels spent much time on his diary, and volumes going back as early as 1923 have been published, in both German and English. This is the final volume and covers the period from February through April 1945. There is a fine introduction by the editor, the late Hugh Trevor-Roper (author of a widely-recognized account of Hiter's last days), and he has as well added helpful annotations throughout explaining various terms or developments as background to Goebbels' account. While the book contains a number of essential maps and pictures, I found it handy to have at hand a copy of Beevor's "The Fall of Berlin 1945" which has better maps as well as additional photographs.

The format of each entry is the same: an initial section addresses the "military situation," and then Goebbels adds a usually somewhat lengthy more general narrative. I found it unnecessary to review the military situation section, because Goebbels would comment on important developments in his more general narrative. I found it interesting to compare Goebbels' account with that in "Hitler's Table Talk." Yes, the top Nazi leadership really believed the British might drop out of the war; that the Russians might end up going at the Americans; that a negotiated resolution short of complete surrender might be possible; and that the American people would repudiate FDR and the British repudiate (as they did after the war) Churchill. At the very same time as the military situation is turning to ashes, Goebbels and Hitler both believe that somehow (perhaps as a result of the new jet fighters) Germany will prevail if it can just hold on a bit longer (frequent allusions are made to how Frederick the Great did just that). Intense infighting did occur during the last months: Goebbels is after Goering's hide, and he is not too impressed with Speer and other top officials either. But his worshipful fixation on Hitler only diminishes on a few occasions. Well, he did go down with the ship.

This paperback edition is printed on fine paper with very clear typography--a pleasure to read. It contains an extensive chronology, a nice photo section, and both place and name indices. At around 360 pages, the narrative moves along at a good clip and is almost always quite interesting. Goebbels could write very well. It is an old saying that "there is no substitute for being there," and this fascinating volume validates that piece of wisdom.

In the closing weeks of the European component of WWII, Goebbels's attitude towards the Jews remained unchanged: (April 3, 1945): "The Jews have applied for a seat at the San Francisco Conference. It is characteristic that their main demand is that anti-Semitism be forbidden throughout the world. Typically, having committed the most terrible crimes against mankind, the Jews would now like mankind to be forbidden even to think about them." (p. 305).

However, Jews were not the only scapegoats; nor were they the only ones blamed for starting WWII. On March 18, 1945, Goebbels referred to Poland's losses to, of all things, "...Polish arrogance in August 1939..." and having failed to accept the "...extraordinarily generous [German] proposals at that time..." [Sic!] (p. 165). Goebbels engages in an even more overt blame-the-victim mentality towards Poles when, in his entry of March 30, 1945, he quips about: "...Poland, which began this war anyway..." (p. 274). In addition, on March 26, 1945, Goebbels mentioned "...Poland and Russia, the most primitive countries of Europe." (p. 233).

In other contexts, Goebbels had various scapegoats coming in handy, as summarized by historian Trevor-Roper: "...castigating whole classes, whole groups, whole nations: the miserable bourgeoisie, the generals, the Luftwaffe, the Churches, the Jews, the Swiss, the Swedes." (P. xxx).

It is both sobering and sad to realize that someone of Goebbels's character had a much better grasp of Soviet intentions that did Churchill or Roosevelt. Goebbels even quoted a British newspaper in this regard (March 3, 1945): The Daily Mail just made a truly sensational admission; it says that for two years now I have been the only person to analyze the case of Poland correctly and forecast accurately the way in which England would succumb to the Kremlin. Churchill comes in for criticism of rare severity." (p. 30).

In stark contrast to the appeasing attitude of western politicians towards "Uncle Joe" Stalin, Goebbels commented (March 9, 1945): "In the region which was formerly Poland the Soviets are pursuing their bloody reign of terror undeterred by Anglo-American protests. They take not the smallest notice of Churchill and Roosevelt. A new wave of arrests is sweeping across the country, the victims being mainly the Polish nationalists." (p. 88). Also (March 21, 1945): "The Soviets are going quietly on deporting Poles to the interior of Russia. They take not the smallest notice of the Anglo-Americans." (p. 190).

The situation under which Poles found themselves was obvious to Goebbels: (March 11, 1945): "Stalin is firmly determined--and no one can understand this--to negotiate with no one over the Polish question. How rigidly he has already imposed his will is evident from the fact that Mikolajczyk, the former Polish Minister-in-exile, now proposes to submit to the dictates of the Kremlin. Under protest admittedly, but what value are such protests today? Anyway the only choice for the Poles is either to be exterminated by force or to bow the Kremlin." (p. 100).

Goebbels saw right through the Communist smear campaign directed against non-Communist regimes (March 19, 1945): "It is well known that Communists always call everything fascist that is not Communist and, under the guise of a struggle against fascism, exterminate all forces opposing bolshevization of a country in which they have any influence...According to Pravda, the London Poles are a gang of degenerate landowners rejected by the Polish people. In short, Pravda's general tone is one hardly customary even between enemies, let alone between allies." (p. 172).

On March 22, 1945, Goebbels discussed the Soviet-staged trials, in Bulgaria, of two witnesses who had been present, two years earlier, at the site of the Katyn massacre (p. 206). The two priests were tearfully forced to recant their blame of the Soviets.

Goebbels repeats certain themes throughout this latest set of his diaries. He seems obsessed with the incipient British loss of their worldwide colonial empire, and that regardless of the outcome of the war. He thinks that the new German jets can enjoy a 5:1 kill ratio over the Allied propeller-driven planes, but recognizes that Germany can produce far too few jets to make a realistic impact in the air war. He repeatedly suggests that the Germans should have withdrawn from the Geneva Convention. This would have allowed the Germans to kill Allied POWs in reprisal for the German civilians killed by Allied bombing raids. It also would make the German soldiers fight harder, aware of the fact that the Allies would reciprocally take no prisoners.