Field Marshal Sir William Robertson: Chief of the Imperial General Staff in the Great War [Hardcover]

David Woodward has written a concise analysis of William Robertson's tenure as Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) of the British Army from 1915-1918. Before reading Woodward's study, I was aware of Robertson's importance to Haig's continued tenure and freedom of action as Commander in Chief of the BEF. I also knew that Robertson and Haig were in complete agreement as to the need for a "western" strategy- one designed to concentrate efforts on defeating Germany in France and Belgium. I did not know, however, that the CIGS and the C-in-C differed on the operational approach. Robertson very much supported the "bite-and-hold" approach of limited objectives accomplished through the use of huge concentrations of artillery, and less reliance on infantry assault, while Haig, argues Woodward, continued to look for the breakthrough, completed by cavalry exploitation. In their professional relationship, Robertson proved to be more direct with, and supportive of, Haig than the reverse: Robertson often came close to pleading with Haig for information on operations that the CIGS could use to defend the western strategy. In the end Robertson's failure to overrule Haig's continuation of 3rd Ypres would cost Robertson his remaining support in the War Cabinet.
The reader also learns that Robertson was not always the direct and honest soldier. He used the press and individuals close to the king to further his aims, a topic discussed in other books (He was not alone in this kind of intriguing. Haig, French, and Wilson were all schemers). In addition Robertson was not always fair in his presentation to the cabinet of the strengths and weakness of operations in France versus elsewhere. I am left with a deflated opinion of Robertson. He had a strong and sincere belief that the only way to defeat the Central Powers was by defeating Germany through destroying its major forces in France and Belgium. His methods, however, mirrored those of the devious Lloyd George, including the misuse of statistics. Perhaps most interestingly, I realize that Robertson's impact on the war was considerably less than I had previously believed. His protection provided Haig with the independence to fight in a manner that the CIGS did not always endorse, and the Palestine campaign was conducted against his wishes (an interesting insight from Woodward's discussion of strategy: many leaders in Britain and the Dominions endorsed campaigns outside France because they believed that a negotiated peace was likely, and they wished to secure the empire). Robertson lost control of strategy long before his removal in early 1918, and of course he had no impact of the successful conclusion of the war.
Woodward has written a very interesting and I think fair study. I would have liked, however, more discussion of his career development (this chapter is less than 10 pages), as I am curious how his strategic and tactical ideas developed. I recommend this book or readers with previous general knowledge of the issues of strategy and command on the Western Front, who want to learn more concerning Robertson's specific role in strategic direction.

A plainly absurd biography on Robertson, CIGS, and the only Fiied Marshal of the British Army who rose from the ranks, and most incompetent at that.

Whilst his bravery is indoubted, any sane person will question Robertson's qualifications to plan, and lead the BEF. A born intriguer and a devious person to boot, Robertson was an abject failure and his sacking by Lloyd George was long overdue.

And Hiag should get it too if only the PM had the courage.