This book is an interesting read. Dekker certainly knows his stuff and writes in a relatively approachable way.
The chapters are relatively short..so digestible..that's a key benefit when topics are heavy like 'human error'. They are also punctuated with quotes from accident reports, which help illustrate his arguments well, and puts some flesh onto the bones behind the principles he is discussing. The final chapter also summarises key points from previous chapters as a handy recap of what you need to take away after reading the book.
It's very much focused on the aircraft sector..though he does sometimes, and welcomely bring in some examples from other sectors (though not enough really to give users a comprehensive flavour).
Conceptually, what he preaches makes sense...and is something that really challenges how companies might have traditionally tackled human error. However, I am left with a little unease in trying to accept his viewpoint entirely. His New View as he calls it, places human error as a consequence (not a cause of accidents) of organisational inadequacy, rather than fixating the responsibility of error at the operators feet. That makes sense to some degree, but whether one can have one without the other is my key challenge to this paradigm he proposes.
Nonetheless, it is worth reading if only to see how he approaches human error and his viewpoint is worthy to keep in mind when considering what human error is.