A clearheaded critique of certain social constructivist tendencies would be a welcome contribution to the philosophical debate; unfortunately this book does not provide it. It consistently overstates the importance or relevance of some of the more outlandish ideas of individual 'relativists' and/or 'constructivists', thereby neglecting the bulk of the literature proposing entirely reasonable forms of 'social constructivism' (though they are rarely advertised under this label). Lack of familiarity breeds contempt, and so it should come as a no surprise that Boghossian makes little attempt to give the positions he criticises a charitable interpretation. What is more worrying, however, is that some of Boghossian's arguments are outright sloppy. (In some cases, he exploits an equivocation between an assertion of entailment and one of identity in order to force an argument to work -- hardly an argumentative move worthy of a philosopher of Boghossian's standing...) In the preface, Boghossian writes that he tried to make the book accessible beyond the narrow circle of academic philosophers. While this is a laudable goal, I am doubtful whether it suffices to justify (to mention but one example) delegating to a mere footnote problems with, e.g., the tripartite definition of knowledge (p. 16) -- when it is the stalemate arising from just such problems which has prompted many philosophers to seek a departure from traditional epistemology, e.g. along the lines of social epistemology (and for this one need not turn to Latour, Boghossian's favorite bogeyman, but to figures such as Edward Craig...) Finally, the timing for Boghossian's book is awkward. Any discerning observer of contemporary epistemology should by now have noticed that there is considerable rapprochement between different philosophical traditions, an increased awareness of the role of values in epistemology, new constructive uses of history in philosophy, all of which contributes to the project of philosophical inquiry rather than detracting from it. In summary, to paraphrase Bernard Williams, a work in philosophy may be unimaginative not because it fails to be clever but because it misses the point. Boghossian's book is a clear instance of that.