Europe's Last Summer: Who Started the Great War in 1914? [Hardcover]

It was with eager anticipation that I pre-ordered this volume. Dr. Fromkin's Pullitzer nominated A Peace To End All Peace is one of the best history books I have ever read. Europe's Last Summer, in stark contrast, is one of the most poorly written histories of my acquaintance.

Structurally, Fromkin divides his 305 pages into 53 chapters, many of which are merely two pages in length. The idea was to devote each one to a point by point presentation of the many steps and relevant considerations that led to the culminating conclusions about who was responsible for starting The Great War.

What became increasingly annoying was its redundancy. Frequently the reader sees the phrases "as noted earlier" and "as quoted earlier," as Fromkin keeps saying the same handful of statements over and over and over. He tells us no fewer than eight times that German General Helmuth von Moltke (the younger) wanted Germany to confront Russia in war earlier rather than later because he perceived that Russia's French funded industrialization would gradually displace Germany as the leading military power in the world. It became maddeningly tortuous to keep reading the same statements again and again.

For most of his conclusions, he refers to the analysis of other historians. By the time I finished reading, I felt that it would have been more profitable to read those historians' books instead.

He does ultimately make some important observations. His delineation of the Great War as having been in reality two wars is a valuable insight. That he carefully identifies individual views among the decision makers for each of the Great Powers illuminates the often conflicting machinations within each of their governments. Too often histories of the period treat those governments as having acted with one voice and one mind. His portrayal of Kaiser Wilhelm and those of his subordinates who contravened him as crisis evolved is especially relevant to understanding how German policy arrived at war.

On the other hand, his overall thesis is somewhat flawed. If Austria-Hungary had acted on Germany's advice to attack Serbia quickly, then those within the German decision makers such as Moltke who desired war with Russia would have been robbed of their pretext. Ultimately, his final conclusion misses the mark at least a little bit.

David Fromkin's "Europe's Last Summer" is a murder mystery writ large; Who ended the long peace Europe had known since the Napoleonic wars, and caused the great tragedy of the first world war, that seminal event of the twentieth century?

In my mind, Fromkin offers two mutually exclusive answers to this question. The largest portion of the book is a history of the background, personalities and events of the pre war world, and a day by day countdown from the serving of the Austrian ultimatum to the German invasion of Belgium and the British declaration of war.

The last section of the book is Fromkin's theoretical analysis, in which he introduces a fascinating conception of the July Crisis: that there were two wars being raged at the time, not one: Austria's War against Serbia, and Germany's War against Russia, France and Great Britain. Austria triggered the former, and Germany the latter: "It was no accident that Europe went to war at that time. It was the result of premeditated decisions by two governments" (p. 293). Allegedly, Germany found that the Sarajevo crisis was the perfect pretext for war - it was initiated by the Hapsburg Empire, and thus committed Austria-Hungary to fight along with Germany, and the assassination of Franz Ferdinand made the Serbs, and not the Austrians or the Germans, seem like the perpetrators. If one man could be said to be the criminal it is German Helmuth von Moltke, German chief of staff, the man who had wanted an all out European War all along. "To the extent that any individual did so... this rather ordinary career army officer started the Great War". (p. 305)

But Fromkin's account suggests a more complex answer; although Germany's Military leadership did plan the Great War, neither its Civilian Government nor the German Kaiser Wilhelm II wanted it, and even Moltke was ambivalent about it. The War broke out because two German-Austrian plots had failed; with the second failure, and with the Russian mobilization, moderates in Germany and Austria Hungary failed to control the events. The War was only partially premeditated; The Germans had played with matches, but they wanted a local, contained burning. The wildfire that erupted was neither planned not wished for.

I have previously read three of David Fromkin's books. His A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East is a superb description of the origin of Modern Middle East, and of its transformation during the First World War. Based on original research, it is one of the best, and best written, history books I know. Fromkin's The Way of the World: From the Dawn of Civilizations to the Eve of the Twenty-first Century and Kosovo Crossing: American Ideals Meet Reality On The Balkan Battlefields were less impressive, although every bit as well written. Not based on original research, they were less enlightening and ambitious in conception, even if not in scope (The Way of the World is literally a history of everything - from the Big Bang to the end of the Cold War and beyond).

Fortunately, Europe's Last Summer is closer to the Former than to the latter two. Although it is based primarily on secondary sources, Fromkin is very well familiar with the events. The narrow focus on the breaking war adds tension, and the character portraits - particularly of Franz Ferdinand and his wife - are nothing if not spectacular. Although the writing is not as flawless as in previous efforts (the book is occasionally factious and too often repetitive), it is nonetheless a page turner, and Fromkin is capable of prose that will put any novelist to shame:

"Denizens of the revolutionary underground tend to be thought of as belonging to the political left. But terrorists often occupy a time wrap of their own: sometimes they look not forward but backward. They seek to restore kingdoms long since crumbles into dust. They rally to the banners of forgotten causes. They hearken to prophets who preached to the people of a by gone age" (p. 118)

Following the terrorist assassination of Franz Ferdinand, Germany and Austria Hungary hoped to use the crisis in order to achieve a "fait accompli" - an invasion of Serbia that would end its existence as an independent power, and end the risk to the Hapsburg Empire. But the attack had to be done, and be over quickly. This was German policy which was expressed by none other then Moltke the younger, whom Fromkin holds to be the chief perpetrator of the War: "Austria must beat the Serbs and then make peace quickly" (p. 156).

But the Austrians could not be made to move fast enough. Not Wishing to appear the aggressors, they drew up an ultimatum that was bound to be, and was, refused. But the Serbian reply was compelling enough for the Kaiser to pronounce that "every cause for war has vanished". Wilhelm decided to mediate for peace, while "safeguard[ing] Austria Hungary's honor and self esteem" (p. 218).

The great mystery of the War, and the one that Fromkin does not entirely explain, is why the events deteriorated from this to the German declaration of War against Russia on August 1. For this, there are partial explanations: Wilhelm no longer controlled German policy; The Austrians, fearing that their accomplishments were robbed from them, pursued on regardless; The Russian mobilization was misinterpreted by Wilhelm, who thought that they were ahead of the Germans - and the military plans of Germany, which forced it to fight against France BEFORE fighting Russia, had a logic of their own.

Amidst this, the German Junkers, headed by Moltke, did wish for a European War, believing that one was inevitable, and that 1914 was the right time for that war. But their desires were not unambiguous, and it is not clear that they had to triumph over other forces in Germany. Fromkin is correct in centering on Germany and Austria as the key to understanding the war's outbreak; but pointing at the culprit is much more difficult than he makes it out to be.

This is as lucid an explanation of the tangled web European diplomats and military men weaved during the seminal summer of 1914. Fromkin does a fine job of disentangling it all and assigning motivations to the key players. It was, as he explains, pure balance of power politics, either an effort to maintain supremacy if you had it, or achieve it if you didn't. He lays the confusion as to the "causes" of WWI that have been so furiously debated for so long to what he maintains were two wars rather than one. What started as an Austria-Hungary vs Serbia war was co-opted by Germany to launch its preferred war against Russia and France.
Fromkin paints a less damning potrait of Kaiser Willie than one has become accustomed to, his fault here not infantile militarism, but that he lost control of his subordinates who executed or twisted his orders to serve their own belligerent ends.
Fromkin also argues that the "lessons" of the war that so many of Barbara Tuchman's generation grew up with, that the war started because the policy-makers lost control of events and were instead controlled by them, is false. Fromkin argues convincingly that the war started because the men in control in Austria and Germany wanted it. And he "names names" of those who were most responsible.
He absolves many of those who tried to prevent the oncoming cataclysm from blame, suggesting that it was not their incompetence that led to war but rather an unsettling fact of life: It takes two to make a peace, but only one to start a war.
Agree or not, Fromkin will leave all his readers with much to mull over after concluding this concise and convincing exposition of one of history's most contentious controversies: Who started World War One?