Ethical Realism: A Vision for America's Role in the World [Hardcover]

George W. Bush has made a hash of American foreign policy, but alternative visions seem in short supply. Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman offer a glimmer of hope, proposing a philosophy of "ethical realism."

They suggest several sensible preconditions for a successful foreign policy, preconditions completely lacking in the administration's philosophy of neoconservative imperialism. One is prudence, which was sadly absent at almost every stage of the Iraq disaster.

Another requirement is "national humility, and the tolerance and patience that stem from it." We haven't seen much of that over the last five years. The authors also cite the willingness to study and learn.

Moreover, write Lieven and Hulsman, "neither in statecraft nor in common sense can good intentions be a valid excuse if--as in the decision to go to war in Iraq--they are accompanied by gross recklessness, carelessness, and indifference to the range of possible consequences." Finally, the authors suggest patriotism, in contrast to mindless, destructive nationalism.

These principles are good starting point for any foreign policy. Ethical Realism is a refreshing read, an inciteful analysis that simultaneously critiques the mess that passes for American foreign policy today and offers a solid alternative. Anyone hoping for a real foreign policy debate should buy this book.

Messrs. Hulsman and Lieven have delivered a learned and principled gem for readers seeking an alternative to the reigning U.S. foreign policy of throwing hundreds of lives and billions of dollars down a wishing well vaguely dedicated to democracy. Ethical Realism is a lantern out of the morass, a book that offers a readable, sensible and practical vision to combat the international ills of today and shape tomorrow's solutions.

The authors present a foreign policy prescription grounded in history and ethics rather than ego or vendetta. The book's strength comes from its completeness, giving lessons from the past with applications for the future and a commonsense theory accompanied by realistic action. Clear writing highlights their clear thinking and the straightforward style is a refreshing change from numerous policy tomes that cloak threadbare ideas in overdressed prose.

Hulsman and Lieven themselves differ in their political affiliations and open the book by tracing the history of the Truman-Eisenhower moment when opposing parties shared a foreign policy that led to the containment of the Soviet Union and ultimately, the defeat of Communism and America's rise to the world's dominant power. The authors cogently discuss the pitfalls of the preventive war, the likes of which have led to an American death toll in Iraq rivaling that of 9/11 while the ostensible raison de guerre, Osama bin Laden, is watching Love Boat reruns in Balukastan. They also explore the so-called thinking - from neoconservatives on the right and liberal hawks on the left - that paved the way into Iraq without mapping a way out. The authors' bipartisan voice and broad-reaching scholarship will appeal to Democrats, Republicans, and those fed up with both parties.

Bad decisions have flowed from good intentions. As America tries to remain the city on the hill, Hulsman and Lieven draw attention to its foundations that risk erosion along with its diplomatic and political capital. One of the book's important achievements is the much-needed and overdue restoration of an ethical character to realism, empowering readers who believe trying to save the world is immoral when it costs the country its soldiers, wealth and allies. Realism has often been cut from the debate of what is the "right" thing to do on the suspicion its proponents are self-interested cynics, thereby ceding decisions on foreign engagement to utopians who write better poetry than history. Hulsman and Lieven revisit the teachings of Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, and others to revive realism and imbue it with the admirable virtues of prudence, patriotism, responsibility, study, and humility.

Ethical Realism cautions against the imperial aspirations that can yield raw power in the short term, but is won at the expense of America's values, institutions and legacy. It calls instead for a Great Capitalist Peace, for America to retain, not squander, its military and economic strength and to serve as an ordering, rather than a bullying, force in the world.

The authors apply their blueprint to current and future challenges, proposing clear and solid plans for dealing with Iran, Russia, China, Iraq and the Middle East. They stretch their solutions to much of the rest of the world through the concept of Developmental Realism, which promotes judicious aid and trade liberalization as cornerstones of global prosperity and peace.

Hulsman and Lieven have written an engaging work that spins history, philosophy, current events, and spirited prose into a hopeful - and yet practical -- vision for America. One hopes that the next time Washington forces gather to plot our nation's future course that the country has the good fortune to have Hulsman and Lieven at the table. Or at best, at 14 ounces, it's light enough to make the President's reading list.

Should we let facts get in the way of our daydreams?

This is a question posed by Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman early in this book. And, of course, their answer is yes. Not surprisingly, I agree. Let's see if they are willing to do that themselves.

Well, Iraq is a big mess right now. And the authors do say that some folks overrated our attempts to introduce democracy there. That's fair. They also say that in addition to criticism, we need effective counterproposals. That's fair as well.

There's a good discussion of the Marshall Plan. I agree that this plan was both moral and realistic.

And there is a discussion of the Bush administration record in reacting to the events of 9/11/2001. Is our security better now? Actually, not much. We have also increased our budget and undermined (via the Iraq war) our "ability to intervene or even threaten anywhere else." These are good points.

What about "pre-emptive" war. As the authors explain, Harry Truman said that all such wars prevent is peace. But perhaps that quote is overrated. There may indeed be a time and place where pre-emptive wars make sense. On the other hand, I agree with the authors that its recent use has been of dubious merit at best.

Could America become a garrison state? Could we lose our values? Yes. That is one of the threats we face. And the authors explain that there still are threats of direct attacks on the United States, and that our most important statecraft task is to reduce that risk. I think that is an exaggeration, as appeasement is a risk as well, and we need to be careful about engaging in it just to try to reduce the risk of an immediate attack.

The authors want peace in the Levant. And they have some recommendations on a peace settlement. While a peace settlement such as the one they suggest might be fine if it were agreed to and implemented, I think they ought to take an opportunity right here to let facts get in the way of their daydreams.

"Regional concert" in Iraq seems to me to have even more of the same problem. Yes, we may have a duty to make matters better, not worse. But I see no reason to think that this "concert" will help.

Anyway, the book is okay, but not really special.