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'In Empires of Mud, Giustozzi assesses the dynamics of warlordism. . . [It offers] a chilling prognosis for those who believe that the solution to stabilizing Afghanistan will come only from the top down -- by building strong central government institutions. Although creating a strong centralized state, assuming it ever happens, may help ensure long-term stability, it is not sufficient in Afghanistan. The current top-down state-building and counterinsurgency efforts must take place alongside bottom-up programs, such as reaching out to legitimate local leaders to enlist them in providing security and services at the village and district levels. Otherwise, the Afghan government will lose the war.' --Foreign Affairs
'Giustozzi has written a masterful account of the dilemmas of state-building in Afghanistan and his concluding words should be heeded when he warns that he doubts that strong national leadership will emerge in a context of external intervention in Afghanistan .' --International Affairs
'This constitutes the first book to provide a political sociology of warlordism in Afghanistan. In the words of the author the purpose of the book is to understand in detail how warlord polities work, expand and disintegrate. More specifically the books answers the following questions: What is warlordism? How and why did it take root and emerge in Afghanistan? What were its effects on the Afghan polity and society? How did warlordism change as a result of challenges first from the Taliban and then from international intervention in 2001? Finally how does a fine- grained analysis of warlordism in Afghanistan throw new light on current theoretical and policy debates? In my view this book will become required reading, both for academics and policy-makers studying the phenomenon of warlordism, and for those with a specialist interest in Afghanistan.' --Dr Jonathan Goodhand, SOAS, University of London
'Giustozzi has written a masterful account of the dilemmas of state-building in Afghanistan and his concluding words should be heeded when he warns that he doubts that strong national leadership will emerge in a context of external intervention in Afghanistan .' --International Affairs
'This constitutes the first book to provide a political sociology of warlordism in Afghanistan. In the words of the author the purpose of the book is to understand in detail how warlord polities work, expand and disintegrate. More specifically the books answers the following questions: What is warlordism? How and why did it take root and emerge in Afghanistan? What were its effects on the Afghan polity and society? How did warlordism change as a result of challenges first from the Taliban and then from international intervention in 2001? Finally how does a fine- grained analysis of warlordism in Afghanistan throw new light on current theoretical and policy debates? In my view this book will become required reading, both for academics and policy-makers studying the phenomenon of warlordism, and for those with a specialist interest in Afghanistan.' --Dr Jonathan Goodhand, SOAS, University of London
Product Description
Warlords, namely charismatic military leaders who exploit the weakness of central authorities to seize control of and autonomously rule a sub-national area, have earned much notoriety in recent years on account of the excesses of civil wars in Liberia, Somalia and Afghanistan. But notwithstanding their bad reputation, warlords have often participated in state formation. In 'Empires of Mud' Giustozzi analyses the dynamics of warlordism in Afghanistan within the context of such debates. He approaches this complex task by first analysing aspects of the Afghan environment that might have been conductive to the fragmentation of central authority and the emergence of warlords and then accounts for the emergence of warlordism in the 1980s and subsequently the lion's share of this book consists of an in-depth analysis of the systems of rule - political, economic, military - which developed under Afghanistan's two foremost warlords, Ismail Khan and Abdul Rashid Dostum, both of whom still wield considerable power even after the intervention of Allied forces in Afghanistan in 2001. Their two systems are compared, highlighting convergences and divergences, in order to explain how warlords administer the areas that they control within so-called 'failed states', in the process challenging much of the received wisdom in scholarly and policy circles about warlordism. The author also discusses Ahmad Shah Massoud, whose 'system' incorporated elements of rule not dissimilar from that of the warlords. Giustozzi concludes that although charismatic leaders play a key role in shaping the specific characteristics of each warlord polity, there are some common elements that underlie the emergence of warlordism. In particular, the role of local military leaders and their gradual acquisition of a form of 'class consciousness' appear to be key processes in allowing the formation of warlord polities, while the latter have repeatedly shown the ability over time to evolve in to more sophisticated, state-like, or political party-like, structures.
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4 of 4 people found the following review helpful
Format:Hardcover
Giustozzi takes on the challenging subject of the political sociology, history and evolution of warlordism in Afghanistan in a deeply penetrative account of the country. He starts off by telling a very readable history of warlordism exploring in particular the relationship between warlords and state building/state crisis, and between patrimonialism and institutionalism. This is a story of divide and rule, an intrigue of relationships, the influence of geography and the brutal role of Machiavellian diplomacy.
Giustozzi defines a warlord as "a legitimate, charismatic and patrimonial military leader with autonomous control over a military force capable of achieving/maintaining a monopoly of large scale violence over a sizeable territory". The book examines their powers of patrimonial legitimacy and their political economy made up largely of an autonomous revenue base relying on illicit sources of revenue. The author utilises a plethora of detailed maps, tables and lists to help trace fluctuating zones of warlord influence.
The later parts of Giustozzi's work explore with considerable depth the intricate dynamics of warlord power relations by examining the individual cases of two of the country's most famous figures; Abdul Rashid Dostum and Ismail Khan, in addition to the `more controversial' case of Ahmad Shah Massud, whose "lasting ideological commitment" separates him from the warlords.
The sheer depth of his analysis can be overwhelming at times resulting in a hyper Tolstoy-esq narrative with a bewildering array of characters. Unfortunately this makes the book only genuinely accessible to those with a significant grounding in Afghanistan's history and society.
For those willing to endure Giustozzi's dense prose they will be rewarded by a scientific examination of the bones of Afghan society. Abdul Rashid Dostum's feudal character is investigated through a history of his politics and the complexities of fluctuating alliances within the Junbesh, both regionally (especially with Kabul) and internationally.
There is slight uncertainty with Giustozzi's constant reference to charisma as a critical element within Dostum's character as it's a somewhat undefined variable that is overused. However unlike the more ahistorical Brookings book, Giustozzi links the present to the past effectively. In particular in writing about the 1997/8 period when sustained violence and the surge of criminalised road blocks across the country created a `peace cycle' whereby many households accepted the Taliban "as a better alternative to never-ending warfare".
Dostum was indeed "saved by the 9/11 attacks" riding on a wave of US support to eventually become Deputy Minister of Defence in 2001, the same position granted to him by the jihadi government of 1992-93. However he failed to either "force or convince the central government to grant him a suitable position" in the evolving Afghan state, as the book explained "warlords were inclined to seize state institutions and use them mainly for legitimising their rule, but without showing much interest in consolidating and strengthening them".
Giustozzi traces Junbesh's evolution into an area based party and its attempts to de-patrimonialise as witnessed by its sending of disciplined members to the Loya Jirgas. By the end of 2004 Dostum's militia was the first to complete demobilisation as he attempted to legitimise his rule. Yet old habits die hard and frictions developed between Dostum and his MPs, including the powerfully symbolic anecdote of a drunken Dostum beating one of his front bench MPs, highlighting the conflict between patrimonialism and electoral legitimacy.
Dostum's warlord character is in strong contrast to that of Ismail Khan, who rose to the position known as the `Amir of Herat' in the early 1980s. With a narrow support base made up largely of Sunni Tajiks from a rural background, Khan rejected Dostum's feudal role and insisted "in imposing a disciplined and centralised system which limited the role of the military class to obeying orders". His legitimacy was based millions collected through customs revenue which allowed him to develop Herat and distribute social benefits in addition to "the outward respect of Islamic laws and regulations and their imposition on the population".
Khan was an authoritarian leader who refused to "tolerate independent political activities" and whose ambitions were not matched by his means. His centralisation of patronage and power led to the collapse of the first Emirate in 1995 and 3 years in a Taliban prison in Kandahar between 1997 and 2000. Like Dostum the fall of the Taliban would provide him a second chance. Yet Khan's decision to keep Kabul at arm's length post 2001 proved to be a "strategic Cul de Sac". Eventually this isolation from Kabul caught up with Khan and he was deposed in 2004.
Giustozzi has written a masterful account of the dilemmas of state-building in Afghanistan and his concluding words should be heeded when he warns that he doubts that "strong national leadership will emerge in a context of external intervention in Afghanistan".
Giustozzi defines a warlord as "a legitimate, charismatic and patrimonial military leader with autonomous control over a military force capable of achieving/maintaining a monopoly of large scale violence over a sizeable territory". The book examines their powers of patrimonial legitimacy and their political economy made up largely of an autonomous revenue base relying on illicit sources of revenue. The author utilises a plethora of detailed maps, tables and lists to help trace fluctuating zones of warlord influence.
The later parts of Giustozzi's work explore with considerable depth the intricate dynamics of warlord power relations by examining the individual cases of two of the country's most famous figures; Abdul Rashid Dostum and Ismail Khan, in addition to the `more controversial' case of Ahmad Shah Massud, whose "lasting ideological commitment" separates him from the warlords.
The sheer depth of his analysis can be overwhelming at times resulting in a hyper Tolstoy-esq narrative with a bewildering array of characters. Unfortunately this makes the book only genuinely accessible to those with a significant grounding in Afghanistan's history and society.
For those willing to endure Giustozzi's dense prose they will be rewarded by a scientific examination of the bones of Afghan society. Abdul Rashid Dostum's feudal character is investigated through a history of his politics and the complexities of fluctuating alliances within the Junbesh, both regionally (especially with Kabul) and internationally.
There is slight uncertainty with Giustozzi's constant reference to charisma as a critical element within Dostum's character as it's a somewhat undefined variable that is overused. However unlike the more ahistorical Brookings book, Giustozzi links the present to the past effectively. In particular in writing about the 1997/8 period when sustained violence and the surge of criminalised road blocks across the country created a `peace cycle' whereby many households accepted the Taliban "as a better alternative to never-ending warfare".
Dostum was indeed "saved by the 9/11 attacks" riding on a wave of US support to eventually become Deputy Minister of Defence in 2001, the same position granted to him by the jihadi government of 1992-93. However he failed to either "force or convince the central government to grant him a suitable position" in the evolving Afghan state, as the book explained "warlords were inclined to seize state institutions and use them mainly for legitimising their rule, but without showing much interest in consolidating and strengthening them".
Giustozzi traces Junbesh's evolution into an area based party and its attempts to de-patrimonialise as witnessed by its sending of disciplined members to the Loya Jirgas. By the end of 2004 Dostum's militia was the first to complete demobilisation as he attempted to legitimise his rule. Yet old habits die hard and frictions developed between Dostum and his MPs, including the powerfully symbolic anecdote of a drunken Dostum beating one of his front bench MPs, highlighting the conflict between patrimonialism and electoral legitimacy.
Dostum's warlord character is in strong contrast to that of Ismail Khan, who rose to the position known as the `Amir of Herat' in the early 1980s. With a narrow support base made up largely of Sunni Tajiks from a rural background, Khan rejected Dostum's feudal role and insisted "in imposing a disciplined and centralised system which limited the role of the military class to obeying orders". His legitimacy was based millions collected through customs revenue which allowed him to develop Herat and distribute social benefits in addition to "the outward respect of Islamic laws and regulations and their imposition on the population".
Khan was an authoritarian leader who refused to "tolerate independent political activities" and whose ambitions were not matched by his means. His centralisation of patronage and power led to the collapse of the first Emirate in 1995 and 3 years in a Taliban prison in Kandahar between 1997 and 2000. Like Dostum the fall of the Taliban would provide him a second chance. Yet Khan's decision to keep Kabul at arm's length post 2001 proved to be a "strategic Cul de Sac". Eventually this isolation from Kabul caught up with Khan and he was deposed in 2004.
Giustozzi has written a masterful account of the dilemmas of state-building in Afghanistan and his concluding words should be heeded when he warns that he doubts that "strong national leadership will emerge in a context of external intervention in Afghanistan".
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