Dowding and Churchill: The Dark Side of the Battle of Britain [Hardcover]

This is one of the best researched books about Lord Dowding. It is a page-turner...I simply couldn't put it down. It was well-documented with detail concerning the principal players involved in Dowding's removal, after the Battle of Britain ended. The truth as revealed in its pages will be hard to refute by the Bader, Douglas, and Leigh-Mallory devotees. Unless there is more hidden by the British government not yet revealed, this work should stand for decades to come as the definitive source for information on how shabby Lord Dowding was treated, and yet, how brilliant he was, as a strategist, tactician, and commander during Britain's darkest days. Great Britain should be thankful for men like Dowding, who was instrumental in saving the situation. My highest recommendation.

Next year, 2010 will be the 40th anniversary of Lord Dowding of Bentley Priorys' death. Many aspects of this great mans' life have remained unanswered, the most long standing being the reasons for Dowdings' removal from office in November, 1940. Jack Dixons' fascinating book goes a long way to answering these thorny questions, principally by fragmenting the existing jigsaw puzzle and reasembling it so the overall picture is a lot clearer. The jealousies and clash of personalities are explained. The unpallatable truth that the long standing Trenchard Doctrine was fundamentaly flawed, proved beyound doubt by Dowding and certainly through no fault of his own. The obsessive ambitions of certain high ranking RAF officers and politicians, stood in the way of Dowding getting Fighter Command to the standards' he so wished for, to defend this country, as the home base for the eventual offensive against Germany. Few of his contemporaries had the vision and forsight of Dowding, Sholto-Douglas, Leigh-Mallory and Arthur Harris come under scrutany, and are found wanting, both as professionals and decent human beings. Churchills' blindness to Sinclairs attempts to remove Dowding from his post as early as July, 1940 proves even the greatest of men can have the wool pulled over their eyes. Throughout this book it is evident Dowding was virtually always right on important policy and the Air Ministry and Air Staff through ignorance and "bloody mindedness" were wrong. With the lack of written primary sources covering some aspects of these questions has been difficult but Dixon establishes sound theories for certain subjects, such as why Dowding was never made a Marshal of the Royal Air Force. A great read, and highly recommended.

DOWDING AND CHURCHILL: THE DARK SIDE OF THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN
by Dr. Jack E.G. Dixon

The 70th anniversary of the Battle of Britain was celebrated in Britain in 2010 with a number of special events, including of course on 19 September a magnificent commemorative service in Westminster Abbey, which was ennobled by six of the Battle pilots, who marched up the central nave, escorted each by a service officer of the Royal Air Force, and preceded by the colors of Fighter Command.
If there was one feature of the publicity surrounding the events in the press, it was the rather sad and ill-informed emphasis placed in nearly all the reports on the connection between Churchill, the Prime Minister, and the Battle itself and, even more notably, the pilots.
Ah, the pilots-forever immortal in the realms of defensive combat against odds! And here, at the expense of seeming partisan, I am sure Dowding and Park themselves would want me to mention the Polish and Czech squadrons who, having had their countries overrun, fought with a courage and tenacity which was an inspiration to their fellow-pilots.
I say "sad and ill-informed" because Churchill had almost nothing to do with the Battle. And he took as much credit for the Battle and its outcome as he could in his subsequent memoirs. But the press made almost no mention that I could detect of the man who created Fighter Command from the ground up, who led it during the Battle, and who defeated the German attempt to gain air superiority during four months of ferocious air fighting and so prevented any attempt of invasion. Dowding, the leader of Fighter Command, was the victor of the Battle of Britain, and it is to him that we of the English-speaking world-indeed of all the world-owe the final victory in 1945 and hence the freedoms that we enjoy today.
Even serious historians sometimes get it wrong. For example: at the unveiling on September 15 in London of the statue of Air Vice-Marshal (as he was then) Keith Park, an illustrious New Zealander who served as Dowding's chief and loyal lieutenant throughout the Battle, the Chief of the Air Staff quoted from the splendid book by Stephen Bungay, to the effect that Churchill gave the order to Dowding to engage the enemy in battle. Dixon makes it clear that this is a mis-reading of the events. It was rather Dowding's preparedness, aggressiveness and confidence, as expressed in his prophetic letter of May 16, that gave to Churchill and the government the assurance they needed to fling defiance at Hitler and galvanize the British people and their Commonwealth brothers to resist and fight the Germans to the bitter end, no matter what the cost. NEVER SURRENDER! (Here we must point out the magnificent pages in which Stephen expands on the extent of the debt which the entire world owes to Dowding and Park.)
Dixon brings out clearly that Churchill was Dowding's most admiring champion before and during the Battle. Why was it then that he acquiesced in Dowding's removal from Fighter Command shortly after the Battle was won - and seen to be won - in November? And why did Churchill make no mention in his account of the Second World War of Dowding's crucial intervention in the War Cabinet meeting of June 3 to forestall Churchill's intent to send even more fighters to France and thereby lay the homeland open to attack?

Dowding removed from his Command so soon after the Battle? Yes. And it was the direct consequence of the machinations carried on, mostly within the Air Ministry itself, by ambitious serving senior officers intent on usurping Dowding's and Park's commands. Yet Churchill, who knew of the intrigue rife within the Air Ministry, still went along with their schemes. The conspirators were successful in ousting Dowding and Park, and went on to prove their incompetence in their new, demanding positions.
This book is an eye-opener, and not only answers all the questions posed above, but in so doing calls in question some of the reputations of well-known figures of that dramatic time in Britain's and the world's history.
Atholl Sutherland Brown, 177 Squadron RAF, Burma, 1944-45.