Most Helpful Customer Reviews
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58 of 58 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Crassus, beyond the one dimensional view, 23 Jun 2008
In the Kubrick film Spartacus, Laurence Olivier plays the role of Marcus Licinius Crassus. He did a fine job, the veneer of a patrician hiding the ruthlessness of a consummate politician. You want to know more. Yet in Roman history, Crassus tends to be marginalised, merely a man obsessed by wealth brought down by his pursuit of glory. His military incompetence led to one of Rome's worst defeats at the Battle of Carrhae in 53BC. A year later Julius Caesar, whose career Crassus had propelled with money and influence, achieved the astonishing victory at Alesia. Caesar fought and won against a massively larger Gallic army, Crassus's legions were virtually wiped out by a Parthian force a quarter of their size. His reputation has not been flattered by time.
Sampson's pleasing book gives a picture of Crassus. It is not a biography but a background sketch to put the battle in context. He was born to a very wealthy ruling family that held the high offices, and excelled in a world where failure would often result in death. His father and two brothers were killed or committed suicide running foul of political enemies. That would certainly make him a man who took politics seriously. His reputation was tainted by greed, he benefited financially from proscription, and as an unscrupulous property developer. He was an extraordinary manipulator, a breeder of pedigree politicians. He was perhaps Rome's greatest patron. The formation and workings of the triumvirate are largely passed over, the big beasts (he, Pompey and Caesar) found it possible to work together rather than tear each other apart. Why did Crassus go to war having attained hegemony over the Roman republic? The assumption is he wanted a triumph and that required a significant foreign military victory. He had just reached 60 so time was against him.
Sampson traces the origins of Rome as it emerged as an Empire concentrating on the East, the numerous wars; arguably defensive Imperialism propelled Rome as the Hellenic world faded. He compares Rome with the rise of Parthia, boths progress being interrupted by relentless civil wars. A recurrent theme in the book is the imbalance in perception, we know so much more about Rome because they left so much more whereas Parthia was its equal but whose history has been largely eradicated or lost.
Dr Sampson's style is to present the facts, make deductions and produce a logical commentary. His thesis is that Crassus was far from an incompetent general; he had a proven military record saving Sulla and in defeating Spartacus. In his Parthian campaign, his generalship was as good as possible; he did the correct things in the right order. Rather it was the brilliance of his opponent, Surenas, who was meant to be an expendable decoy yet proved a devastating tactician. He used mobile armoured cavalry (with the well planned provision of lethally effective arrows) to engineer a turkey shoot. Simply they neutralised the close quarter fighting superiority of the Roman army. Any commander would have been so exposed. Well, perhaps. In trying to negotiate surrender, on the second day of the battle Crassus was killed. Dr Sampson goes on to analyse the immediate and longer-term consequences of the defeat. Surprisingly relevant to how the West and the East try to co exist today.
If a good book is one that sends you back to the bookshop for more, then this is one. It is certainly time for a new biography of Crassus. Let's hope some commissioning editors are likeminded.
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2 of 4 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
A curate's egg, 9 Aug 2009
The Defeat of Rome has several good parts. Sampson's coverage of the rise and history of the Parthian Empire on its on would provide a sound reason to recommend this book. The addition of the overview of the Roman Republic, and the useful reminder that when the First Triumvirate was formed Julius Caesar was the junior partner, together with a clear summary of events in the East up until 53BC makes the first 5 chapters a good, solid, read. And the Appendices are very useful.
Unfortunately, from chapter 6 on, Sampson dissolves into hero worship for the Parthian commander, Surenas. This then leads to mistakes, distortions and wild guesses and assumptions presented as fact. Examples include describing Centurions as junior NCOs (pg 115, ignoring Plutarch's clear description of Crasuss's failure to train the men over the winter of 54/53BC in favour of his own assumption that they spent the autumn, winter and spring training (pg 115) or believing that a fully armoured cataphract could long outrun a man under the mid-day sun (not for nothing did the Romans refer to such equipment as "ovens").
Sampson sees Surenas as a military genius who, based on a line in Plutarch, appears to have developed a missile weapon capable of punching through Roman shields and armour (but which never seems to have been used again) and developed a cunning plan that offered Crassus no chance of escape. Although I have doubts about any commander being that able if they can lose touch overnight with 2,00 slower moving troops leaving a trail of dead and wounded behind them. Crassus on the other hand is depicted as doing no wrong, despite marching out into the plain that suited the Parthians the best and not letting his troops properly prepare before pushing them ahead at high speed.
An alternative reading fits the sources just as well. And that is that Surenas thought his cataphracts might over awe the tired and thirsty legionaries (showing the usual mounted nobility disregard for infantry) and when that failed settled for a running fight, looking to wear down the Romans until either they retired or the main army came up. Crassus was bereft of ideas on how to respond, and shattered by the death of his son (and with him the majority of his cavalry). The raw legionaries then panic, and lacking strong leadership, begin to fall apart. Surenas then hounds them from Parthia, killing Crassus by subterfuge as he is unable to do so otherwise.
Sampson wants Carrhae to be a Blenheim, a mighty power out thought and out fought by a power of equal or greater might, thrown away only due to the ruler's paranoia. But as far as Rome was concerned, it was never more than a Majuba or an Isandlwana, an embarrassing defeat at the edge of the empire of a previously reliable general who was searching for glory.
Despite Sampson's efforts, it is still Rome's Defeat rather than Parthia's Victory.
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