Day of Deceit: The Truth about Fdr and Pearl Harbor [Paperback]

'The heart of this book,' Stinnett writes on page 258, is the assertion 'that a systematic plan had been in place long before Pearl Harbor that would climax with the attack.' As soon as the smoking ruins of the U.S. Pacific Fleet were extinguished in December, 1941, and ever since, many observers (Beard, Russett, Toland, etc.) have questioned whether President Franklin Roosevelt deliberately adopted a stance designed to provoke Japan into making the first 'overt act of war.' This aspect of Stinnett's argument is nothing new.

What *is* new is Stinnett's discovery of a memorandum by Arthur McCollum, a Navy lieutenant commander and Japan expert, outlining an eight-point scheme to back the Japanese into a corner and provoke an attack. Stinnet tracks the memo from McCollum to a naval strategist in the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) named Knox. From there, the trail goes cold, although Stinnett has circumstantial evidence that it traveled from Knox to ONI chief Captain Walter Anderson, USN, and thence to FDR himself.

Stinnett's argument is that FDR adopted McCollum's policy recommendations, thus setting America on the road to war with Japan. He can't prove this irrefutably, but you don't need the smoking gun to know there's a trout in the milk (to cruelly mix metaphors). Whether he needed McCollum to outline them for him or not, FDR unquestionably adopted policies, most significantly an embargo on trade with Japan, that he should have seen (Stinnett's argument is that he *did* see) would dramatically increase the likelihood of war. I wonder, therefore, whether McCollum's memo is as significant as Stinnett believes it is....

What is unquestionably significant, however, is the enormous volume of intercepted Japanese message traffic that Stinnett reports. For one reason or another (declassification of previously classified files, incomplete research, military cover-ups, etc.), much of the signal intelligence information in this book was previously unreported. The US government always denied it had broken both the Japanese naval and diplomatic codes prior to the attack. Stinnett proves that in fact, it had.

It is this mass of information that will have to be addressed, pro or con, by every serious writer on Pearl Harbor from now on.

Prior to 'Day of Deceit,' it was possible to argue that Roosevelt wanted to provoke Japan into striking the first blow, but that even he was surprised by the sudden, ferocious attack on Pearl Harbor. That position is much less tenable today. Accepting this fact does not require you to believe that American participation in the war was therefore unjustified. But it should lead us to a much more clear-eyed view of American foreign policy in the months and years leading up to the Day of Infamy. Read more ›

The McCollum�fs Eight Action Proposal to �gprovoke Japan to commit overt act of war�h suggested so-called �gABCD Encirclement�h: Economic encirclement of Japan by America, Britain, China and Dutch.

In May 1951, General Douglas MacArthur stated before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate; �gThere is practically nothing indigenous to Japan except the silk worm. They lack cotton, they lack wool, they lack petroleum products, they lack tin, they lack rubber, they lack a great many other things, all of which was in the Asiatic basin.�h And most of those were being imported from abovementioned four countries. Then MacArthur concludes; �gThey feared that if those supplies were cut off, there would be 10 to 12 million people unoccupied in Japan. Their purpose, therefore, in going to war was largely dictated by security.�h

At the court of the Tokyo Trial, the Prosecutors actually failed to prove Japan�fs evil intention to go for the war with China, the U.S.A. and the British and other Allied countries, let alone to �gconquer the world�h. They had to admit that the world famous forged document; Tanaka Memorial, which allegedly announced Japan�fs cunning plan of conquest of the world, was in fact a forgery....

As for Japan�fs starting war against China, the defense counsels almost succeeded to prove Japan had been provoked and harassed by the Chinese Communists with Red Russia behind them, if the trial�fs final judgments of guilty verdicts on all defendants had been already fixed from the first. Japan was not Aggressor there, either.

According to some judges who presented dissentient judgments to the trial, like Judge Radhabinod Pal of India and Judge Bert V.A. Roling of Holland, all the verdicts of guilty charges, including Death by Hanging to seven men, was �gpresumed guilty�h being against the decent law practice. With no perjury applied to the prosecutor�fs side, the trial accepted all evidences presented by the prosecutors even though most of them were in fact groundless hearsay or even mere rumors, while the evidences that would work in favour of the defendants were plainly dismissed altogether.
The trial was just a �gvictor�fs justice�h.

I have no intention to jump to the conclusion that Japan was pure innocent with all those warfare in the past, but, having seen those undeniable evidences of provocation of Japan by the U.S.A. that Stinnett has revealed before us, I think it is sensible for us all to, at least to say, re-examine whole issue of the war in the light of truly decent International Laws of War and history studies. This is about Calumny made against Japan by the Allied Powers under the name of the �gInternational justice�h. Does the International community recognise the responsibility towards the defamation on a country for half a century long? At least, I think, the false accusations on the Japanese individuals should be recognised and in that light true history should be re-studied to see if any other �gtrue�h aggressors have been overlooked for the sake of the world�fs peace seeking. Read more ›