Darwin's God: Evolution and the Problem of Evil [Paperback]

Littrell begins by saying I am mistaken that Darwinism hinges on religious assumptions. He notes a single quote on p. 48 that I use to support my claim, but by my count I included 117 specific examples of evolutionists using religious assertions. The examples are taken from mainstream sources, from Darwin right up to today's evolutionists. And importantly, the examples come from technical papers or books where the evolutionists are attempting to argue for their theory (as opposed to carelessly taking evolution for granted). Furthermore, I also provide many more examples of this sort of thinking in the pre Darwin era. Littrell's review gives the misleading impression that I have but scant evidence for my thesis.

Littrell next uses two examples to critique my analysis of the scientific evidence for evolution. First, I have a three-page discussion arguing that the universal genetic code (i.e., the DNA code) is not good evidence for evolution. The discussion is somewhat involved, but Littrell quotes only a single sentence from the passage, giving the false impression that my discussion was rather simplistic. He then uses an analogy about a rock smashing through his window that does not address the points I was making in the passage.

Second, Littrell believes he has found an error in my understanding of evolution. Evolutionists sometimes attempt to evaluate the adaptive value of some part of a species anatomy. And when what appears to be a poor design is detected, it is taken as evidence for evolution because the blind, imperfect process of evolution would be expected sometimes to produce inefficient designs. The problem with this reasoning is that fitness is difficult to measure. I give several examples of what are now known to be useful designs that in years past were erroneously assumed to be useless relics of the evolutionary process. Littrell rightly points out that Darwin's evolutionary process is driven only by reproductive success, no matter how it comes about. But in his search for errors, he reads one into my text. Again he quotes me out of context, and concludes that I fail to understand that "there is no more precise way to measure fitness" than by measuring reproductive success. But that was precisely my point: the causal factors behind reproductive success, ranging from dumb luck to superior design, cannot be accurately deciphered. Therefore, the evolutionist's argument that poorly designed organs are evidence for evolution is flawed because the fitness of those organs is so difficult to assess.

Finally, Littrell concludes by resorting to the sort of religious argument that he has previously agreed should not be used. He says that "the intricacies of the fossil and molecular record are better explained by evolution than by an appeal to metaphysics." In other words, the molecular clock may be full of anomalies, and explanatory devices may be required to rationalize the fossil record, but evolution is still better than creation. This of course is a religious statement which Littrell proceeds to expound upon. He compares evolution with a deceptive God who "divinely created everything in seven days and made it look like billions of years." He refers to this creator as the Green Cheese God and in typical fashion concludes that evolution is the best choice because his version of divine creation is so unlikely. Once again, the evolutionist finds traction in religious pronouncements rather than scientific reasoning. I do not take issue with the personal religious beliefs of evolutionists, but science should not be subjected to those beliefs.

A book review by Dan Schobert

It is fair to say that the question of evil has long vexed the human mind. What may not be so obvious is the relationship between this concern and the idea of organic evolution.

Cornelius Hunter delves into this realm with his recent book, Darwin's God. (Brazos Press, 2001) Subtitled `Evolution and the Problem of Evil,' this work of just under 200 pages takes a close look at the arguments usually put on the table in support of the evolutionary paradigm. At their heart, as Hunter points out, these thoughts are not so much evidence for evolution but are arguments against Creation. This being the case, as the thought goes, since creation cannot be supported, evolution wins by default. In essence these things are classic `straw man' arguments. Hunter, described on the book's cover as a student at the University of Illinois working on a Ph.D. in biophysics, points to argument after argument and shows that these are generally drawn up in response to an individual's particular view of God, and how God works or doesn't work. Having constructed this view, nature is studied and found to not harmonize with the preconceived notions. Therefore any creationary perspective must be wrong; at least incorrect.

There are nine chapters in this book. They are: (1)-Where Science Meets Religion, (2)-Comparative Anatomy, (3)-Small-Scale Evolution, (4)-The Fossil Record, (5)-One Long Argument, (6)- Modernism before Darwin, (7)-The Victorians, (8)-Evolution and Metaphysics and (9)- Blind Presuppositionalism.

What Hunter has done is to elucidate something most thinking scientists have long recognized. It is that at the heart of this discussion about ultimate origins rests a number of metaphysical concepts. As these have been pushed further and further away from public consideration, they attract less and less attention until we arrive at the present hour when they are completely absent...and people think the debate is (incorrectly) about science vs. religion.

By coming to grips with the foundational thoughts of so many in the evolutionary camp, (both now and in the past) scientists can more honestly address the real concerns. "Many wonder," says Hunter, "why evolutionists make such high claims of success while the theory incurs scientific difficulties that would do away with most theories. The answer is that evolutionists find their confidence not in positive arguments for evolution but in negative arguments against the modern idea of creation. When evolutionists claim that a particular scientific observation proves their theory, they are not committing the fallacy of affirming the consequent of the premise they wish to prove, rather, they are denying the consequent of the premise they wish to disprove. Evolution is proved not because it is verified but by the process of elimination. As Ernst Mayr wrote...it must be admitted that Darwinism has achieved acceptance less by irrefutable proofs in its favor and more by the default of opposing theories." (Toward a new Philosophy of Biology, Harvard University Press, 1988)

Hunter concludes by comparing the teaching of evolution with the statement issued some years ago by the National Academy of Sciences, a statement which stated that only `science should be taught in science classes.' ".... the evolutionists become their own judge," says Hunter. `The only possible conclusion is that evolution should not be taught in science classes, for Darwin's theory goes far beyond "scientific observation, interpretation, and experimentation." It includes religious presuppositions outside of science. Evolutionists argue that homologies and small-scale changes in species can only be explained by evolution, and that the fossil record makes evolution a fact. Evolutionists come to these conclusions because they believe in a certain type of God and creation, beliefs that are not open to scientific debate."

"Ultimately," says Hunter, "evolution is about God."

Hunter's book is an easy read and is one which any student of science, especially students working toward a degree involving biology would want to read. It should be required reading in any high school or college biology class. Sadly it probably won't be. Not that the things said are untrue but that they expose the sinking sand upon which so many in science have built their houses. To expose the sand is to expose the heart of those individuals choosing to ignore God.

April 2001

"Further analysis shows that this gene is a pseudogene, i.e., it looks like a real gene, but it is not expressed due to a mutation in the gene itself or in the region of DNA that controls the expression of that gene. Now we could argue that in God's inscrutable purpose he placed that vitamin C synthesis look-alike gene in the guinea pig or human DNA or we could admit the more obvious conclusion, that humans and primates and other mammals share a common ancestor" (p. 168).

By highlighting Gray's appeal to God's nature, Hunter justifies dismissing such evidence as metaphysical rather than scientific. Throughout the book, Hunter employs this novel approach to circumvent some of the strongest evidence for common descent. As is the case with pseudogenes, however, textual critics routinely use copyist errors for determining the ancestral relationships among historical manuscripts. It would be beyond coincidence to suppose that there exists no ancestral relationship in a series of texts containing the same set of differences vis-à-vis the majority of other manuscripts. The vitamin C pseudogene is just one example of many shared between humans and primates, and the differences in the pseudogenes grow with distance from humans in the standard phylogenic tree. Contrary to Hunter's claim that evolution makes no significant, testable predictions, the existence of the human vitamin C pseudogene was predicted and then discovered by Nishikimi et al in 1992. Do pseudogenes prove common decent in a mathematical sense, and are such arguments free from all metaphysical assumptions? Perhaps not, but at the end of the day, when we look into the mirror, we must ask ourselves, are we playing games with the evidence, trying to find loopholes to excuse us from its weight, or did we in fact descend from earlier primates?

Ironically, intelligent design theorist Michael Behe, who offers praise for Hunter's book, finds the evidence for common descent from pseudogenes to be conclusive (see Kenneth Miller's "Finding Darwin's God, p. 164). One wonders how Behe and Hunter can coexist in the same camp, given their diametrically opposed views on such a fundamental question as common descent.

Though I agree with Hunter that the nature of God should be left out of any strictly scientific discussion, there is a place for such considerations when evaluating ID claims. Whatever else might be supposed about God's nature, it is generally agreed that, if He exists, He is not deceptive. This is why many creationists are now abandoning the young-earth creationists' "appearance of age" theory. Yet Hunter is disturbed when evolutionists provide evidence for evolution and assert that "God would not have done it that way." Perhaps He did do it that way, but at the risk of introducing the strong appearance of evolution.

In addition to highlighting the metaphysical underpinnings of many of the arguments for evolution, Hunter presents an array of scientific difficulties in evolutionary theory. Foremost among them is the lack of transitional forms in the fossil record. He is not content to focus simply on the relatively sparse record leading up to the Cambrian explosion, but amazingly turns the very dense record of the reptile-mammal transition in his favor:

"Douglas Futuyma echoes this sentiment: 'The gradual transition from therapsid reptiles to mammals is so abundantly documented by scores of species in every stage of transition that it is impossible to tell which therapsid species were the actual ancestors of modern mammals.' If it is 'notoriously difficult to decipher true ancestral-descendant relationships,' then how can evolutionists be so sure there is one? Certainly we can select our favorite sequence, but the fossils cannot tell us which is the correct sequence, or even whether there is a correct sequence at all" (p. 77).

The upshot is that if the record of transition is sparse, that is evidence against evolution, and if it is dense, that is also evidence against evolution. However, if we find texts that appear to be intermediate between Latin and French (a descendent of Latin), but we do not know whether they are on a direct line to modern French or on a line to a dead French patois, can this be construed as an argument that French did not evolve from Latin? As a largely historical science, evolution suffers from many of the same difficulties as historical linguistics. If Hunter were sufficiently motivated, he could no doubt uncover many difficulties with historical linguistics (e.g., Japanese is apparently not related to any mainland languages), but this would not prove that, for example, Latin did not evolve into Italian, Spanish, Portuguese and French.

I give three stars to Hunter for introducing a novel and thought-provoking argument into the tired debate over evolution, as well as for not hesitating to include a number of quotes supporting evolution. Though he attempts to refute these arguments, this may be the only exposure that many readers ever receive to the evidence for evolution.