Darwinian Fairytales: Selfish Genes, Errors of Heredity and Other Fables of Evolution: Selfish Genes, Errors of Heredity, and Other Fables of Evolution [Kindle Edition]

"I believe that neo-Darwinism, though a very good approximation to truth and completeness for many of the simplest organisms, is an extremely poor approximation in the case of our own species. Or rather, to tell the truth, I think that it is, at least in the hands of its most confident and influential advocates, a ridiculous slander on human beings."

This is how late Australian philosopher David Stove (1927-1994), having already made the all-too-necessary clarification "I am of no religion", explains his reasons for writing Darwinian Fairytales, a collection of 11 essays in which he attacks the views of such evolutionary luminaries as Darwin himself, Thomas Malthus, T.H. Huxley, Alfred Wallace, R.A. Fischer, E.O. Wilson, R.D. Alexander and Richard Dawkins, to name just the ones I remember. In the above quotation, I have already given away what grates with Stove more than anything else on this topic: that Darwinists transfer their theories from "pines and cod" to people and then, when the theory wildly fails to predict the facts, blame the facts. He accepts descent by modification from a common ancestor, but denies that random variation + natural selection can account for that modification. His main complaint is that natural selection has been grossly overstated in the higher animals.

Firstly, he asks, where is natural selection going among human populations now? We do not observe "a continual free fight" (Huxley, Essay 1), nor is it true that "The primary or fundamental check to the continued increase of man is the difficulty of gaining subsistence" (Malthus, 2 and 3); and to think that "of the many individuals of any species which are periodically born, but a small number can survive" (Darwin, 4 and 5) is so obviously false in the case of humans as to be embarrassing to read. Stove is not "quote-farming". When Darwin says "any species" not only does he mean it, but also he has to - otherwise his is not the universal principle so desired by his disciples.

This strange overestimation of human infant mortality is reflective of the "problem of altruism" (Essay 6), which of course is only a problem for Darwinists (Stove likens it the problem of evil faced by Christians), and which has dogged Darwinism from its inception. One might think that the problem has been resolved by moving the language of all-out-war from the level of the individual to that of the ("selfish") gene, but it hasn't, says Stove, and here's why:

1. This view makes individuals epiphenomenal to their genes (Essay 7). Now, Stove is by no means the first to notice the glaring self-contradiction which Dawkins commits off the back of this view, between saying

"we are survival machines, robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules known as genes" (The Selfish Gene, preface)

and saying

"we have the power to defy the selfish genes of our birth (ibid., chapter 11).

But even without that dialectical eyesore, the view that "an organism is just DNA's way of making more DNA" (Wilson) is still obviously false. There is such a long list of popular human behaviour detrimental to genetic fitness as to be exhausting to read. Stove likens this genetic determinism to other "puppet theories" astrology, Freudianism, Marxism and Calvinism. For Stove, it is no surprise that someone as prone to such theories as Dawkins should discover (with a minimum of effort and zero research) another set of puppet-masters in the shape of "memes".

2. The inclusive fitness (kin selection) theory hereby used to solve the "problem of altruism" (Essay 8) would lead to some very strange expectations if we really took it seriously:
a) Given that the amount of genetic material shared by parents and children is the same in all sexually reproducing species, parental altruism should be the same in all those species - but it isn't.
b) "There is nothing special about the parent-offspring relationship [...] the full-sibling relationship is just as close" (Hamilton): and so we would expect sibling altruism, or indeed child-to-parent altruism, to equal parent-to-child altruism - but it doesn't.
c) Asexually reproducing organisms should be identically concerned about the welfare of exact genetic copies of themselves as they are of themselves - but they aren't.
d) So should identical twins - but neither are they.
e) Incestuous families (where they survive) ought to be more harmonious than others - but they aren't.
...and so on.

3. Dawkins and others cannot help attributing purposes, desires and intentions - in short, teleology - to genes themselves, which of course utterly defeats the purpose of the exercise (Essays 9 and 10). He may protest every so often that such language is not to be taken literally, and that it can be "translated back into respectable terms" later, but Stove would very much like to see a translation of such terms as "selfishness" (and indeed, exactly how benefiting an exact copy of oneself is to benefit oneself), "benefit", "manipulation", "striving" and "function". On my view, this is the weakest part of the book, and the only point where I start to see some of the "anti-philosophy" about which some have complained. Surely the non-teleological translation of "each gene is striving to make as many copies of itself as possible" is something like "those genes which are best at making copies of themselves end up more numerous than others" (a tautology, to be sure, but no tautology was every false)? Dawkins may be guilty of sloppy or even misleading use of the English language, but that in itself doesn't count against neo-Darwinism. The point that "`not conscious' does not imply `not purposive'" is, however, well taken.

By way of conclusion, Stove notes that human behaviour in general is one giant amalgamation of what "armour-plated neo-Darwinians" would describe as errors, that is, characteristics which count against an organism having as many descendants as possible: natural celibacy, accepting submission signals in a fight, contraception and abortion, adoption, baby-snatching and the resentment of it, homosexuality, devoting one's life to the pursuit of truth or beauty instead of making babies, various kinds of asceticism, heroism and its admiration... It is manifestly not the case that "we are programmed to use all our effort, and in fact to use our lives, in reproduction" (Alexander). While this critique may not always hit the mark squarely, I think Stove succeeds perfectly in showing that

"Darwinism was always intended to bridge the gap between man and the animals, to mortify human self-importance, and to "cut us down to size". Now isn't that just too bad? Because a vast gulf does separate us from all other animals, in point of altruism, as in point of intelligence. That is simply a fact, and a very obvious one"

This was a very interesting read. The late David Stove was not a creationist, or even a Christian - he describes himself as "of no religion". However, he lays various charges at darwinism - both as it was presented by Darwin and his contemporaries and as it is presented today by neodarwinists. The heart of these is that, insofar as it is used to explain humans, it is "a ridiculous slander on human beings." He points out that:

- human life is not a "continual free fight" in the sense that Darwin envisaged necessary as a driver of natural selection;

- the human population has never increased to the limit of the food available, which is what Darwin understood to be the driver of evolutionary development;

- contrary to the darwinist concept, more privileged (better educated, richer, more socially advanced) humans have generally shown themselves less successful at reproducing than those less privileged;

- the "discovery" of memes is not a scientific advance akin to the discovery of genes, but simply a truism - "Sometimes such things as beliefs, attitudes, etc., are transmitted non-genetically from one person to another";

- if altruism is linked to the number of shared genes (a widely held position), then people should be as altruistic towards their egg or sperm cells as they are to their offspring;

- although neodarwinists claim that they don't believe in purposiveness, their language about genes contradicts this. "For every once that Dawkins says that genes are not purposive, he says a hundred things ... which imply that genes are purposive."

This quick summary of some of Stove's points doesn't do the book justice. His writing is literate and funny. On every other page was a quotable paragraph. There were issues where I felt that his arguments failed to reflect "the state of the art" in darwinism. But suffice it to say that his book makes a great many points which undercut darwinism as it relates to humans.

I am reading this book to counter or as it may turn out, agree with a commentator of a previous review of mine. My first thoughts on the author's attack on Darwinism seems to fall on the premise that all life forms are in a free state of struggle for survival. At a narrow view of Human life his conclusion seems to agree with what we see for ourselves, we as a species are not competing for individual survival. Maybe it could be countered that we do struggle on ideological differences, surely the reason for most wars to this date. Also in his division of ideas on natural selection on humans David Stove categorises three ideologies. The first I wish to concentrate upon this review is the "Cave Man" philosophy as just because it is not seen in the present the struggle for life and limited resources for humans that doesn't mean it did not happen in the past. I take it that the cave was the refuge for the unobservant witnesses and because they did not see or experience a struggle you cannot say it did not happen. A strong counter to Stove's first critique that struggle for human survival is not evident and therefore not relevant in our origin makes the major mistake of not understanding the total annihilation of our close cousins the Neanderthal. Surely this is a perfect example of our struggle for limited resources and a fundamental victory for the group theory in evolution that pitted one type of species against another based purely on species recognition. The Neanderthals were too different from our species that they were easily recognised as competition and destroyed. I will have furthur views as I delve deeper into the book but disappointed that such an omission of historical fact was left out of the author's argument.