Culloden: The History and Archaeology of the Last Clan Battle [Hardcover]

It is no easy task to dispell many of the myths which surround as famous a battle as Culloden but Tony Pollard attempts to do exactly that using the latest archaeological evidence available which has been collected from work undertaken by his team over the past ten years. Pollard is in fact the editor rather than the author of this works although the introduction and a fascinating chapter by the aforesaid gentleman regarding the archaeology of the site are included. The book is in fact a compilation of essays with input from renowned authorities on the subject such as Christopher Duffy and Daniel Szechi.

Pollard acknowledges in the course of his introduction that there are widely varying opinions of the battle, the campaign which led up to the clash and of course the opposing armies which makes for excellent debate within the content of the book between authors with strong opinions. As Pollard states, "This volume does not attempt to reconcile these various viewpoints....nor does it ignore them", and wisely realises that "Any attempt by me as editor to remove these idiosyncrasies would be sailing uncomfortably close to censorship." The reader is therefore left to form their own conclusions from hearing 'both sides of the story'.

Christopher Duffy, writer of the superb volume, 'The '45', covers the history of the campaign leading up to the battle in a brief but masterful overview which is perhaps the most balanced of all the chapters included. Once again Duffy contends that Charles Stuart was a very 'impressive' character whilst his views on Lord George Murray border at times on being overcritical. Murray is inevitably a prominent figure in most of the chapters in this book,(surprisingly) even more so than Charles Stuart, and Duffy is not alone in his criticism of the lieutenant-general.
However, statements made by Duffy describing Murray as 'head-strong to the point of irresponsible' and also of his leading a 'counter-attack' at Falkirk following the rout of Hawley's dragoons are highly debatable. First of all, Murray exerted day-to-day control of the Jacobite army, remained undefeated in battle while in overall command throughout the campaign and consistently out-thought enemy generals, be they Hawley, Cumberland or Wade. It is hardly the behaviour of an irresponsible individual. As for leading a MacDonald counter-attack at Falkirk, eye-witness accounts unanimously agree that Murray ordered his right wing to remain where they stood and only the Clan Donald's aggression and excitability caused the pursuit of the dragoons.
On the other hand Duffy praises Murray's role in 'paralysing' the army of Hessians and the 'spectacular' success of the Atholl raids which should and could have been further capitalised upon.

Stuart Reid, an author of whom I have been extremely critical of in the past, provides descriptions of the contending armies and also a modern, military account of the battle itself. To his credit, the author of these chapters provides an informative, realistic and exciting account of the battle based upon the most modern model of events as they unfolded on the day. Reid's knowledge of military protocol, weaponry and the British army enhance his input to the book although his 'expertise' on the Jacobite army is certainly less strong.
Again, there are several debatable points. Reid makes much play of Lord George Murray's 'changement' before the battle and the detrimental impact this had on Jacobite hopes. The only first-hand source to mention this is the absurdly incompetent O'Sullivan who's own memoires of the campaign contradict almost every other recollection written down- even by Murray's strongest detractors.
Mention is also made of the Jacobites being overwhelmingly armed with muskets. While it is undoubtedly true that many would have carried both captured and French muskets, eye-witness accounts from the private soldier right up to commander level on both sides make very little mention of musket-armed Highlanders. The fact that Highlanders traditionally disposed of firearms after firing a volley at close range is a more likely explanation of the high number of captured guns.
There are other quibbles, most notably Reid's notorious biased stance, which to be fair is far less evident here than in previous works by the same author.

An opposing view of events is provided by Jeffrey Stephen, who concentrates on the divisions within the Jacobite leadership which he believes ultimately led to disaster for the Stuart cause. Stephen forcefully argues his case by examining correspondences by the said officers to build a clearer picture of what happened on that fateful day. John William O'Sullivan, quarter-master general of the Jacobite army is rightly criticised for being 'tactically inept and negligent' in selecting the field for battle which the author states was 'a serious miscalculation'. The Irishman's memories of the night-march and subsequent battle, "consists of a series of semi-fictional cameos in which he contrasts his loyalty, industry and bravery with Murray's obstructionism, disloyalty and cowardice," according to Stephen. Given the many available accounts of Murray's conduct during the campaign, both by friend and foe, it is hard to find a cogent argument to support O'Sullivan.
On a personal level this is one of the most enjoyable of chapters in that I feel it provides a realistic asssessment of the Jacobite leadership, the situation they found themselves in on Culloden Moor and the alternative policies advocated by Murray along with the chiefs in how best to respond to Cumberland's advance. Exploring the 'what-if' in history, I feel, is always a worthwhile exercise.

The largest chapter in the compilation is written by Dr Tony Pollard, concentrating upon the archaeology of the battlefield and the relevance of his team's findings to our understanding what happpened on that April day in 1746. Pollard's discoveries add a human element to what has become almost a mythical battle and the spread of the items found, especially with small arms fire, develop our appreciation of what happened, where and why. More personal items which the team uncovered are a poignant reminder of the human tragedy which is war and the desperation of the struggle is not lost on the reader. What also becomes clear is the resolution with which the Jacobites fought overwhelming odds (the spread and density of French musket balls are testament to their determination) before finally being forced to retreat. This is a fascinating chapter, unique in that nothing similar on this scale has been attempted at Culloden with such superb results. Dr Pollard along with his team deserve warm praise for showing such commitment to attempting to tell the story of the battle through modern technology for present and future generations alike.

There are four smaller chapters in the book which discuss the role of cavalry in the '45, the relevance of Culloden battle maps created at this time, development and memorialisation in the area and the '45's impact in a wider European context.

David Blackmore, himself a keen rider, discusses the role and impact of cavalry , both Jacobite and Hanoverian, in the campaign. Inevitably most of the discussion concerns the British army cavalry due to the fact that they heavily outnumbered their Jacobite counterparts. Cobham's dragoons feature prominently in the piece, most of it very favourable indeed which puts a positive spin on a regiment which was cut/shot up at the Battle of Falkirk by the Clan Donald and refused to engage the Jacobites for long periods at Culloden. According to the author, Cobham's came close to reversing the outcome at Falkirk when the reality was, they were routed. Not the strongest of contributions.

Robert Woosnam-Savage contributes an essay examining maps created at or close to the time of the battle and how they enhance our understanding of events. Naturally enough, there are a wide interpretation of the battlefield, it's terrain, boundaries and the position of regiments. It is intriguing to analyse the variance between these maps-from the concise straight-lines interpretation of a royal army engineer to the sketch made by a French participant in the battle which strangely replaces the Moray Firth with the Firth of Forth!

The final two essays, by Elspeth Masson and Daniel Schezi respectively, discuss the development, change and memorialisation of Culloden whilst Szechi looks at Culloden's impact within the context of a wider European war.
It is evident from both that Culloden has had a far-reaching impact over the years which draws thousands of people to visit an ever-changing landscape where the course of British and European history was altered.

This book is a refreshing, innovative look at history, utilising the latest evidence, technology and expertise to tackle a much-debated subject. Approaching a subject such as this with an open mind is essential to striking a balance between these contrasting views and creating one's own conclusions as a result. Tony Pollard has brought together a compilation which challenges outdated interpretations which often follow well trodden paths based upon flimsy evidence or historical biasness. This surely will set the benchmark for future work on this subject.

I found this book to be a highly interesting read. As an Archaeologist, it's fantastic to actually have a book that deals with not just the history of the last battle to be fought on British soil, but which also discusses the archaeology of the battle and how understanding the archaeology has allowed for the Battle of Culloden to be reinterpreted. If you're interested in military history and battlefield/conflict archaeology, this book is an essential read.

This is a truly engaging and highly informative read. The battle of Culloden has always had a vague history but this has been substianally reinforced by the archaeology carried out over the last few years. This is an excellent example of how archaeology and written history can be combined to considerably enhance our understanding of the past. Very recommended!!