This is a substantive book, all 400 pages of it, not necessarily an easy read. But that's really okay, because the topics covered and questions addressed are very important ones. As author Richard Posner writes in the book's last chapter, "The question I want to leave the reader with is whether the United States has an institutional structure and a political culture equal to the economic challenges facing it." That's really the big issue at the heart of this book, although there is plenty of supporting economics, discussion and commentary that occupies the book's chapters.
I'm guessing that you may already have heard of Richard Posner. If not, he is Circuit Judge, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and he is a well-known senior lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School. He is often described as a libertarian, although he seems to keep an open mind. (For example, he criticizes Alan Greenspan--a lot--and spends more space writing about John Maynard Keynes than you might have guessed. In his nonpartisan approach, Posner criticizes some of both President Obama's and President George W. Bush's policies and actions.)
This book follows Posner's (slightly) earlier book, A Failure of Capitalism, although he states that this book, The Crisis of Capitalist Democracy, is not intended to be a sequel. A Failure of Capitalism takes readers up through February 2009, and The Crisis of Capitalist Democracy brings us very close to the present time. By the way, Posner says his title, A Failure of Capitalism, was not intended to imply that capitalism has failed us, or that we need something different. (Still, I wish he chose a different title.)
This book is divided into three parts. Part I provides an analytic narrative of the recent financial crisis. I suspect that many readers will find Posner's coverage of the events from late 2001 (when the Fed lowered interest rates dramatically) until mid-September of 2008 (when Lehman Brothers failed and all heck broke loose) to be somewhat repetitive, given all the books that have been devoted to this period. Nevertheless, Part I discusses a lot of relevant history and economics. In addition to the now seemingly obligatory discussion of the interplay between very low interest rates and the housing bubble, the reader gets discussions of Chinese mercantilism, the Fed's open market operations, the Taylor Rule, Say's Law, securitizations, CDOs (collateralized debt obligations), SIVs (structure investment vehicles), and the concepts of leverage, moral hazard and Schumpeterian creative destruction. There's no higher math. As you might expect from a judge, in discussing the development period of the financial crisis, Posner offers criticisms of various individuals and policies--but his arguments are not partisan. They are also not highly personal or insulting (I hate that stuff). His attitude is more one of getting to the facts and letting the chips fall where they may.
Part II of the book addresses the lessons learned from the recent financial crisis. By the way, Posner continually refers to the most recent recession as a "depression," but that's mainly because he likes to call all economic downturns depressions. (He does conclude that the most recent recession--err, depression--was the worst since the Great Depression of the 1930s.) In this part of the book, I enjoyed his portrayal of Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner's "stress test" as more of a confidence building exercise than anything else--somewhat akin to President Franklin Roosevelt's brief "bank holiday" implemented immediately after his taking office in 1933. Posner considers three of the what-have-we-learned chapters in Part II to be the heart of the book, but I think the governance issues that he saves for the very last chapter are the meatiest.
Part III of this book discusses Posner's way forward--"reform you can believe in." He makes nine recommendations, although he notes, "I am not entirely happy with the suggestions I have made in this chapter." That's okay with me--we need some preliminary suggestions to consider. (Before I summarize Posner's suggestions, I'd like to repeat that they're his suggestions, not necessarily mine.) They include: (1) Establish an executive commission to study the crisis and suggest reforms. (Posner thinks the existing Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, consisting of six Democrat and four Republican non-economists--most with strong partisan affiliations--is unlikely to remain impartial); (2) Consider limited legal reforms, such as changes to the bankruptcy code; (3) Rotate the staff of the financial regulatory agencies; (4) Consider changing the financing of the financial regulatory agencies; (5) Establish a financial intelligence agency; (6) Regulate off-balance-sheet contingent liabilities; (7) Reform credit ratings (amen, brother); (8) Tie capital requirements to the business cycle; and (9) Return to the Glass-Steagall Act. In the interest of saving space, I am not going to address these recommendations, other than to say they are obviously controversial and I suspect that few people will agree exactly with all of Posner's suggestions. (That doesn't reduce their value as discussion starters, though.)
In the last chapter of the book, Posner addresses some of what seem to me to be the most fundamental issues/problems the U.S. faces, such as our unsustainable entitlement spending trends and, very importantly, how (and whether) a capitalist economic system tied to a democratic political system can successfully address its most critical issues. He also makes an interesting point that the economic analysis of externalities (in pollution control, for example) applies to corporate decision making. That is, "In making business decisions, [corporate executives] don't consider costs they don't bear." Good point, Judge Posner. Frankly, I wish you spent more time on this type of issue. All in all, The Crisis of Capitalist Democracy is informative, thought-provoking, sometimes opinionated, but always interesting. It's worth a careful reading.