This is a great book about how to expand the value of a privately held company, especially one that is heavily leveraged (say a company that went private through a Leveraged Buy Out). The book has a great flaw, however, that you should watch out for. It assumes that improving the cash flow returns and growth of an enterprise transfer one-for-one into stock price growth. As a consultant who has worked with dozens of major companies, I can assure you that the valuation of a company is always quite different based on who owns the company and in what form. For example, a company planning to buy another public company will normally pay a 30 - 60% premium over what the company's own shareholders were willing to pay only the day before. Why? Because the new owner thinks the value is higher in the form of the combined companies, which can now be operated more effectively. Sometimes the new owner is wrong, but many times they are right. When other companies want to raise share value, they will often do this by taking subsidiaries partially public, or even breaking the company up into various tracking stocks as Pittston did very successfully. Why are investors willing to pay much more money for pieces than they are for the whole? Usually, the pieces will be managed more effectively when separated, and it is easier to understand the business. Both are important investor benefits. There are many more types of values based on ownership and ownership form, but the point is that Rappoport seems to suggest that the markets are perfectly rational, fully well informed, and never misunderstand value. If that is the case, why can a stock's value rise or fall by 30% in a year (the typical volatility of many stocks), when performance is fairly steady? Underlying this book is a source of "stalled" thinking in the Capital Asset Pricing Model. Still taught as gospel in most business schools, some studies suggest that it does an ineffective job of describing stock prices. If you read the assumptions that go with the model (no taxes paid, an individual investor perspective, perfect information, no transaction costs, etc.), you know there is no way it could work in the real world. People who follow the advice in this book run a large risk of being taken over by other companies, if their stock is publicly held. The reason is that this advice will be effective in improving cash flow and the value of the company to an acquirer, while not raising the stock price nearly as much. You will have created a better bargain for the acquirer. If that is your objective, go ahead. Otherwise, caveat emptor. To show why this is true, consider that less than half of all institutional investors do any form of valuation before making buy and sell decisions. Of those that do, less than one-third apply cash-flow valuation methods similar to those in this book. On the other hand, this work is very valuable within its limited scope. It should be renamed (more accurately) as CREATING SHAREHOLDER VALUE FOR PRIVATELY-HELD COMPANIES AND THOSE THAT WISH TO BE TAKEN OVER. Seriously, if you are a private company, this is a great book for you. Read, enjoy, and apply. If you are a public company, this book can be risky if you do not do the parallel work needed to expand your stock price while you expand your discounted cash flow value.