Cowardly Capitalism: The Myth of the Global Financial Casino [Hardcover]

Ben-Ami manages to explain in a few dozen pages the basics of apparently difficult concepts (as he rightly tells us, "even the most complex strategies tend to be built from simple components") such as derivatives, mutual funds, pension funds, hedging, etc. In the process, he shatters a lot of mistaken myths and conventional wisdom.

It is simply not true, he explains, that the instruments of modern finance are essentially speculative; on the contrary, they are usually a means for corporations and investors in general to better manage risk. Modern capitalists, unlike their predecessors of a more dynamic era, have an exaggerated aversion to risk and they try to build their portfolio in a way that minimises it. Thus a corporation dedicated to making cars, for instance, might prefer to invest part of its earnings in derivatives or hedge funds instead of innovating its production processes. The result would of course be a less dynamic form of capitalism, where more resources are spent on the financial markets - as opposed to the real, productive side of the economy. This, insists Ben-Ami, is in short what has been happening since the end of the post-war (1945-73) economic boom.

He offers powerful examples to illustrate his thesis. Yes, he says, it's true that George Soros made a billion dollars out of speculating against the British Pound in the early nineties - but that was only because the fundamentals of the British economy were really incompatible with the high value of its currency. A few years later Soros was betting on a fall of the Rouble and eventually lost two billion dollars. This time he had made a wrong analysis of the fundamentals of the Russian economy and got his fingers burned. The conclusion? Well, speculators really don't have the power to dominate events. So much for the idea that modern economies are but passive instruments at the hands of unscrupulous capitalistic sharks!

Ben-Ami regrets the general climate of fear for the future and horror of risk-taking that he thinks has taken hold of Western Europe and even more the USA in the last few decades - and has been, BTW, amply demonstrated in the recent near-hysteria caused by the appearance of a few cases of Anthrax in the US. He sees in this tendency a sign that the "animal spirits" that Keynes considered essential for the proper working of a dynamic capitalist economy are faltering.

The author doesn't present us a "solution" for this problem, probably because he's well aware of the fact that cultural attitudes are very hard to change. But he does warn that the climate of fear that currently permeates western society constitutes a clear impediment to stronger economic growth, both in the First and Third worlds. And he writes in such a clear, unpretentious style that one might just hope his analysis will eventually find a sympathetic hearing in the decision-making centers of Europe and the United States.