Consciousness: A Very Short Introduction (Very Short Introductions) [Paperback]

Considering that this is a Very Short Introduction, this book is odd and I am ambivalent towards it.

On the one hand, it is well-written, persuasive and thought-provoking. On the other, it is openly biased and inappropriate for a short introduction to a new subject.

My misgivings about it mainly concern the style of presentation of the subject rather than Blackmore's actual opinions. These may or may not be correct, but it is unusual in an introductory work to present and then dismiss the opinions of swathes of other researchers and present your own views in the best light possible.

For example, the use of the word "magic" in scientific literature when describing a theory is obviously pejorative. Yet Blackmore uses it in this way several times, while also describing the theories of Descartes and the 20th century scientists Popper and Eccles as "hopeless". The only theories that receive unequivocal backing are her own and those of Daniel Dennett. Other opinions are often explained in terms of facile metaphors which lead the unguarded reader to see such views as silly.

Balance is not an easy thing to achieve and objectivity is, of course, the impossible goal. Yet Blackmore should have tried harder. The perspective she has may well be valid, but in an introductory work one should give a broad outline of the field and let the reader decide which arguments seems the most interesting or plausible. At most the reader can be given a prod in the directions that seem the most fruitful, but Blackmore indulges in several hearty shoves.

The above is the main criticism, but I also wonder whether Blackmore fully believes what she is saying or whether she has thought about the true implications.

Firstly, it is rather strange to write an introduction to a field of study and then argue that the thing being discussed is an illusion and does not exist - why not write an introduction to alchemy? Would a convinced atheist write a book introducing theology?

Secondly, consider this quote (p81), discussing the self: "We can equate it with some kind of brain process and shelve the problem of why this brain process should have conscious experience at all, or we can reject any persisting entity that corresponds to our feeling of being a self. I think that intellectually we have to take this last path." In the space of a few lines, Blackmore dismisses the self and uses the words "I think...". If the self does not exist, what does it mean to say "I think"? Whether or not Blackmore's view on the self is correct or not, her view on this and her writing a book on consciousness are blatantly contradictory. Who will read it? Why put your name on the cover? Perhaps "she" has thought of this: if the self does not exist, "she" can hardly be blamed for any flaws in the book.

Overall, it is a stimulating book to read and it will get you interested in the subject, but some may be tempted to throw it out of the window at various points. Perhaps Oxford should rename it a Very Controversial Introduction.

Many books in this excellent series have provided clear and balanced introductions to their subjects - but not this one. It becomes clear early on that the author is determined to "sell" her take on the subject, which seems to be pretty much the same as that of Daniel Dennett. This rather unhelpful view is that consciousness does not exist and that we "imagine" it, missing the obvious problem that there has to be a consciousness to be able to imagine anything. Much experimental data is summarised to show that things are not exactly how they seem but there is no logical link between these findings and her nihilistic conclusion. For example the evidence that a decision to make a simple movement seems to have been made before we become aware of it only shows that some actions are controlled unconsciously - as everyday experience of eg walking illustrates: the "record keeping" function of consciousness does not require it to precede every action and she is quite unjustified in extrapolating this to asserting that consciousness is not involved in more complex decision-making.

She does not seem to have any clear idea of the value of consciousness in imagining hypothetical situations allowing us to formulate contingency plans, an important reason for humans and possibly other higher mammals to have evolved this capacity. She prefers to regard it as an incidental (and unexplained) by-product of parallel processing in the brain - again with no logical support for this assertion.

The author's dismissive viewpoint allows her to side-step the difficult problems of the subject and these are barely addressed in this disappointing book.

While neuroscientific research provides ever more detailed pictures of the brain's physiology and its intricate and staggeringly complex processing abilities, its presumed superiority as a means for answering the philosophical questions posed by any honest enquiry into the nature of consciousness or "knowingness" - not to mention self-consciousness - seems quite grossly overestimated in this book. Writers of Blackmore's ilk (Dennett and Dawkins are well-known frequenters of the same club) rely heavily on ridiculing "naive" or "speculative" theories which have been troubling philosophy for millennia. It's as though their own misconceptions about anything metaphysical are necessarily shared by the rest of us and necessarily prove that metaphysics and religious dogma are one and the same. Well they aren't, and there are plenty of very intelligent, earnest, open-minded and dedicated seekers of truth (as opposed to fact, a discrepancy dangerously overlooked by many an otherwise diligent scientist) who are no doubt more than a little disturbed by the irresponsible and disillusioning views presented in this book. It's not pleasant to be disabused of any belief or psychological crutch, and I was astonished to read that Blackmore casually imparted the "fact" of there being no self to the volunteers in her replication of Libet's experiment, and that she seemed surprised to note their "depression" at this conclusion. Surely a psychologist would understand the implications of such an action. The reaction of another of the reviewers here is not uncommon, I suspect, and it is perhaps only those who don't understand the implications of her assertion who are immune to its effects.

Psychoanalytic literature is riddled with accounts of patients who have become so traumatised as to have completely dissociated from themselves. This can manifest in such an extreme way as to leave the sufferer permanently without any sense of there being a "self" whatsoever. It is reported as being the most undesirable state of affairs. It is, in fact, the closest (hopefully!) anyone will come to becoming the zombie so casually invoked in so many philosophical "thought experiments." Conversely, the opposite process - that of gradually revealing the repressed, hidden and reviled self - is the aim of psychoanalytic therapy, and this process (if successful - and it rarely is, thanks, no doubt, to the hopeless attitude engendered by these nihilistic physicalist theories) always involves recognising something which feels like an "authentic self." Blackmore's assumptions radically undermine the possibility of psychotherapies ever being truly effective, and I'm sure they support more superficial and cognitive based therapies. And psychoanalytic theory is the tip of a very big philosophical iceberg in relation to theories pertaining to metaphysical actuality.

But the real danger is that this book, in overreaching its premise so radically, actually contributes even further to the greatest "delusion" of all - the "fact" that metaphysics is dead. This is simply not true, and I'm genuinely disturbed at the conceit with which modern "philosophers" like Blackmore are allowed to approach their readers, especially since most of these readers are as yet unable to formulate sophisticated arguments of their own; which is why, of course, they would want to buy an unbiased, balanced, critical, scientific work written by a trustworthy expert in the field. Instead, I'm afraid readers will get a potentially lethal dose of irresponsible one-sidedness.

That, at least, is my opinion on the matter.....