Consciousness and Experience (A Bradford book) (Bradford Books) [Hardcover]

I really regret having taken so long to get to read this book. It is surely one of the great contributons to the consicousness debate, although it may not have been as influential as Lycans previous book, Consicousness. There are some aspects of this book that really separate it from many others, but there are things that are to be expected in any philosophy book on consicousness as well.

One of the things in the first group of things I mentioned, is Lycans ability to clarify just exactly what is the problem. He manages to define 8 diferent concepts of consicousness, and over 14 problems concerning these concepts, in just the first chapter. This is no easy task on its own, but it is also a very important one. Although by realizing all these concepts and problems may be players in the study of consicousness, one realizes that many authors have been talking about different things all along, it also makes things easy for the reader, because one is certain of what exactly Lycan will be talking about. This is not to say that his discussions concern just one or another of these concepts. He actually goes trhough quite a number of them.

Now Lycans position is clear. He is a representationalist, and his thesis, wich he defends along the whole book, is that all consicous states are exhausted by their representational properties plus the functional organization of the system. The view itself is not completely new. Many others are representationalists (notably Dretske and Tye). But the fine points, the details, are different. And it is because of these differences that one can see the strenghts of Lycans position.

Lycan then, in this book, aims to explain his ideas on consicousness and qualia. These are not equivalent, Lycan argues. Consciousness is one thing, and qualia are other things, so to say that one is consicous of a certain qualia is not at all tautological. To Lycan qualia are first-order properties of intentional represented objects. Consicousness is the ¨internal monitoring¨ of these first order states. Much of the arguing begins here. Is this not just another higher order thought theory? No, becuase it is not a thought, but a ¨monitoring¨, where Lycan hold this to be somewhat perceptionlike, but not quite. Is it not that leading to infinite regress? no, because, the monitoring does not have qualia, qualia qre one thing, consicousness is another. So there is no need for another monitoring to monitor the second other monitoring to make IT have qualia consicousness. This is, however, probably subject of the above mentioned previous book.

So in this book Lycan sets to defend his theory against 4 objections dues to differetn philosophers. Here Lycan shows his ability as a philosopher, and argues for his position adequately. The first objection is of course that of fallibility. Can the internal monitor fail? yes it can, says Lycan. So can there be unfelt pains (pains not monitored, or mismonitored)? yes. Is this sensible. Yes, argues Lycan. And he does this adequatley too. Lycan manages to make his position intellegible even when at first sight it seems that this might not be possible. This is what philosphers are supposed to do.

How about the classical problems. Levine answers Nagels famous bat example much the same way David Papineau has in his work: Knowing about consicous mental states in a creature will not recreate these states in us. He argues Levines explanatory gap and Jacksons knowledge argument are wrong because they both ignore modes of presentation. The explanatory gap is to be expected because the represetational functional role, and the extension of that representation can only ocurr in one person at the same time. Color blind Mary, on the other hand, does learn a new fact, but this fact is finely-grained by the mode of presentation it has. These discussions are on my opinion the books high points. Lycan finally answers all kinds of objections concerning qualia, nonrepresentational qualia, strange qualia, inversion thought experiments, etc. In every case Lycan suceeds in defending his position, and in defending representationalism itself against its oponents.

Lycan, in closing, has written an excellent book on the philosophy of consicousness. His position is very compelling, and his arguments all semm quite sound. But in these types of books one must be careful to to believe it all. Its philosophy were talking about, and complete agreement is impossible. The debates are certainly not over, and there are some parts in Lycans ideas that need a little bit of work. But these are bridging principle, and psychosemantic issues, which Lycan deliberately ignores. I recomend this book highly as yet another example that philosophers can make advancements in this difficult topic.

In the introduction to this book, Lycan isolates no fewer than eight uses of the term 'conscious' and fifteen candidates for what one might mean by 'the problem of consciousness'.

Lycan's points are clear and direct. One always knows _exactly_ what issue is being addressed, which is no small accomplishment in this field.