This book does introduce some basic macro concepts concisely, and in clear prose. Most of the main points are nicely summarized in simple graphics showing you how one thing (GDP, inflation, whatever) goes up as something else goes down, etc. And the author (DM) does remind you several times, in a general way, that the real world often behaves differently from macroeconomic theory.
That said, it's often hard to distinguish whether DM is talking about real effects or hypothetical ones. For example, DM mentions a couple of arguments aginst the Keynesian idea of stimulating the economy by means of deficit spending (an idea that was big in the 1930s-1970s, and that might make a comeback under the Obama Administration). The "rational expectations" argument says that consumers might rationally expect taxes to be higher in the future, to pay back for the deficit spending; and therefore they might increase their savings (in preparation for paying those taxes) instead of spending on goods or services. To the extent they save, that would neutralize the intended stimulus effect. The "crowding out" argument says that if the government tries to raise money by selling bonds, it will be competing with private borrowers for funds; the resulting increased demand for money could raise interest rates; and the higher rates, in turn, could discourage entrepreneurs and other private borrowers from borrowing; with the result that potentially useful projects would go unfunded and be scuttled. Has either of these effects ever been observed, and if so, to what extent? Or are they just arguments by supply-side economists, Reagan Republicans and other anti-Keynesian partisans? We are never told.
The book may also disappoint you if you're looking for insights into the current world situation. For example, in the chapter describing economic output (i.e., goods and services, usually measured by GDP), DM notes "At root, most financial assets represent claims on real productive assets (such as plants and equipment), which in turn are expected to generate output in the future. But of course, all of these productive assets were once output themselves" (@27; emphasis in the original). Maybe this statement is true, in a textbook theoretical way, about shares of stock in corporations: profs teach that a share of stock represents a claim to a piece of the company's assets. But this statement doesn't help you understand how the value of outstanding credit default swaps and other financial derivatives based on US home mortgages can be $33-$47 trillion, while the value of the mortgages themselves is only $10-$11 trillion, and the value of the homes (real assets, and BTW not "productive" ones) subject to the mortgages is in many cases less than the mortgages themselves. How do those financial assets in excess of 1x the mortgage values represent claims on real anything? DM's book doesn't clarify the mystery of derivatives -- or even mention it. Unfortunate, since the estimated value of all outstanding financial derivatives of all types is around $60T.
Another striking comment comes from a discussion of monetary policy: "A lower rate of interest may encourage consumption by making saving appear less attractive (since it now pays less) and -- what is essentially the same thing -- by reducing the cost of consumer borrowing" (@73). Sure, a lower interest rate could reduce the cost of consumer borrowing; the problem with DM's remark is between the dashes. If you don't save, couldn't that simply mean you're spending the money you earn, rather than borrowing? To call borrowing "essentially the same thing" as not saving seems an illustration of the messed-up thinking that got us into the current crisis, rather than something that will help you think your way out of that crisis.
If DM had allowed himself even 10 additional pages or so for thoughtful analysis and more specific examples of how well the theory relates to the real world, the book might have been more balanced. Instead, while its generally clear writing style is admirable, the book is a bit too short on substance.