In Codename Downfall, Allen and Polmar accomplish an amazing feat. In a book describing U.S.
President Harry Truman's decision to use the atom bomb, they make the world's only nuclear attacks
seem almost unimportant.
Fifty years have passed since U.S. bombers annihilated the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
but those events have been debated frequently and furiously ever since. Using insightful research the
authors paint so terrible a picture of the Pacific war's escalating destruction it even dwarfs the instant
vaporization of two complete cities.
Downfall does not linger on the classic numerical comparison of lives lost to nukes versus invasion.
Instead, the authors provide a sweeping account of the Allies' efforts to liberate or capture island after
island in their determined drive to seize the Japanese homeland and stop the Japanese war-making ability.
Both sides expected a full mobilization of every Japanese citizen to fight what would be the largest
invasion of all time. As Japanese generals preached about "100 million souls" all dying together, the
American leaders searched for any alternative to the "decisive battle" as the Japanese military referred to
it. The book described how the U.S. leaders grasped at the atomic bomb as a last, desperate hope to
avoid this bloody climax their enemies thirsted for.
By the end of the book, the reader no longer wonders why Truman dropped the Bomb, but how the Japanese
leaders could refuse the mercy of a peaceful surrender. Responsibility for the bombing finally rests
squarely on the shoulders of the Japanese "cabinet."
Codename Downfall gives a fresh and convincing perspective on a very old question.
R. Day: May 29, 1996