Churchill: Visionary, Statesman, Historian (Hardcover)

Much has been written about Churchill in recent years - is this short book worthy of a prominent place on the bookshelves of Churchilliana? The answer is an enthusiastic yes. Lukacs has examined a few themes which are usually glossed over in the narrative excitement of Churchill's life convincingly to demonstrate that Churchill's instinctive understanding of his present and view of the future - his vision - was, with the benefit of 50 years'hindsight, more perceptive than many gave him credit for.

The chapters on Churchill's relationships with Stalin, Roosevelt and Eisenhower are particularly good in this respect. Churchill was under no illusions about Stalin and the undesirablity, to put it mildly, of an eastern Europe dominated by Russia. But, a whole continent dominated by the Nazis was inconceivable and thus Churchill realised he had to deal with Stalin and salvage what he could. Churchill has beeen criticised, especially by Poles, for Yalta but this belies the feeling Churchill had for the Poles, the appreciation of their situation and his efforts an their behalf. What ultimately did for the Poles, and the rest of eastern Europe (Churchill saved Greece) was the American failure to understand, as did Churchill, the subtlety of Stalin's game. At the Tehran conference Roosevelt tried to demonstarte to Stalin that he, Roosevelt, had the closer realtionship to the extent of trying to sideline Churchill, a tactic which was not unnoticed by Churchill and, more importantly, by Stalin himself. Later in the war, when Churchill stressed the importance of the other allies meeting the Red Army as far east as possible and as the allies raced across Germany, Eisenhower took it upon himself (unbenown to Churchill) in March 1945 to write to Stalin directly to say that the allies would not adavance to Prague or Berlin - with fateful consequences. Again, in 1954 when Stalin died and there appeared to be a genuine oppprtunity for rapprochement with the new Soviet government, Eisenhower (now president) curtly rejected Churcill's attempt to set up a summit - for nothing had Churchill played down in his war memoirs the disagreements with the Americans.

Despite the American failure to support Churchill in his attempts to obtain a better deal for eastern Europe from Stalin in 1945, Churchill did win freedom for half of Europe and did, at least, ensure that Poland existed as a separate country albeit under soviet domination. And, in 1952, he predicted that within 30 years (only seven years adrift) the end of communism would be seen in eastern Europe.

There is much else of value in this book. Lukacs efficiently deals with the revisionists of the Charmley school, those who blindly critise Churchill's historical work (largely, it appears, because Churchill was not a professional historian and without really understanding why Churchill wrote history) and has some useful, even topical, thoughts on how Churchill saw Europe and the Franco- German connection. Read this book - you will not be disappointed.