Churchill, Hitler, and "The Unnecessary War": How Britain Lost Its Empire and the West Lost the World [Paperback]

Hard reading for a Brit raised on The Battle of Britain, Airix models, the Victor comic and Commando comic books. I later learnt of the deliberate starvation of Germany after the Armistice, The injustices of Versailles, the vacillations of the West in the thirties and the colossal sacrifice of the Soviets.

However there was much in the book I was ignorant of. Does anyone fully understand the causes of WW1? How about Britain's staunch pre-war ally Japan? Danzig? the political situation in Poland and central Europe between the wars?

Pat Buchanan's political views make me wince but I can't fault his reasearch and am concerned that his forebodings for the West may be prescient. On finishing the book our current flounderings do seem oddly familiar.

If you have an open mind this is a jolly good thought-provoking read.

Like most people born in the post war years I grew up on a diet of Churchill the Great Hero. I bought the book after a German contemporary asked me, "Why did Churchill keep bombing our cities when we had so clearly lost the war". I thought the answer was that Hitler had refused to surrender, but then I started to think about this more deeply. Although I do not share the politics of Patrick Buchanan and thus read his book with caution, the contents were an eye opener. He gives not only his own views but those of other well established historians to make his case. I would recommend this to anyone who would like to hear an alternative view.

This work combines meticulous historical research with Pat Buchanan's political agenda. The point of the book is that Winston Churchill, rather than being the indispensable Man of the Century and defender of the West was the man most responsible for the British involvement in World War I, World War II and the loss of the British Empire?

Buchanan highlights three monumental errors which lead to the Twentieth Century's Civil War of the West: The Treaty of Versailles which left Germany vengeful and receptive to Hitler's message, American pressure on Britain to abandon its alliance with Japan and Britain's war guarantee to Poland in 1939. Without those errors World War II may have been avoided or its destruction mitigated.

Buchanan challenges the conventional wisdom that German aggression against the West was inevitable and that Churchill alone focused the attention of the West on this mortal threat. He posits the idea that Hitler's ambitions were focused to the East and Southeast and that he tried to preserve the peace with Britain and France. Buchanan claims that Hitler reluctantly turned on the West only after it had declared war on Germany.

In contrast to many of our histories which present the story of the World Wars from the Anglo-Franco perspective, this one also includes the German one also. Buchanan makes the case that, as Europe tumbled toward war in 1914, it was the Kaiser who worked tirelessly to avoid war. Time after time during the inter-war years the West let opportunities to limit rising power of German or to channel its destructive path away from the West drift by. He proposes that Hitler did not have ambitions to conquer the world, but that he would have been satisfied to expand into Russia and leave the west alone. It was Churchill and likeminded Britons who forced conflict between the German and British people who shared so much. This book compares the Nazi atrocities with those of Stalin's Russia and asks the question of whether the defeat of Germany justified the Stalinization of Eastern Europe?

Churchill's motives are exposed as being hypocritical. After excoriating Chamberlain for not defending Czech freedom and insisting that Britain go to war to preserve Polish independence, Churchill meekly turned his allies over to Soviet tyranny. Buchanan contrasts the strong claim for alliance made by a democratic, industrial, militarily modern Czechoslovakia with that of a dictatorial Poland defended by an antiquated military. He presents 1939 as a reckless period in during which Britain gave war guarantees to countries, including Poland, in whom Britain had neither national interest nor the ability to defend. He contrasts the case of Belgium, whose shoreline was of vital interest to Britain, with that of Poland, in which Britain had never had much interest.

The depth of historical research which went into this book is staggering. That alone makes it a worthwhile read. Buchanan's conclusion advances his crusade against the use of American power in areas in which America has no vital interest. Although his political agenda drives this book, it is not totally outside the current of historical thinking. Although I have not read his work, I understand that British historian, Niall Ferguson, has advanced the theory that Britain made a horrendous mistake by becoming involved in World War I, a position which Buchanan seems to share. This book presents the reader with a viewpoint which forces one to rethink his or her own thoughts about the Great Civil War of the West.

Ultimately, this book, like so much of the history of the Twentieth Century, is tragedy. When we think about it we realize what terrible damage and suffering the West inflicted upon itself during this recent century. Books such as this make us stop to think that, maybe this half century of war and tragedy was not necessary. Maybe our leaders brought it upon us and maybe, just maybe, these self-inflicted wounds could have been avoided. Maybe the Decline of the West and Christendom was not necessary and, if so, that is the tragedy of the age.