'China Since Tiananmen' begins with the back and forth post-Tiananmen Square (TS) 1989. Deng's reform movement essentially stagnated for three years after that point until after Deng undertook his 1992 'Southern Tour,' revisiting China's original SEZ and blasting reform opponents as he went from site to site. Deng also contended that without the ten years of reform and opening up prior to TS, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would not have survived that situation; his opponents, naturally, countered that Deng's reforms created TS and would eventually bring the CCP's downfall, just as in Eastern Europe. Some opponents even called for rolling back all Deng's reforms, but most realized this would not be accepted.
Deng called on the SEZs to catch up to the 'four small dragons (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong) in 20 years.' Deng's continued criticisms, along with adding top PLA attendance and support and endorsing Zhu Rongji (former Shanghai General Secretary) for his current post as vice-premier (and potential replacement for Premier Jiang Zemin finally stirred action. The month of May saw the Central Committee endorsing 44 new SEZs, and betting behind Deng's 2000 goal for the original SEZs. In October, 1992, the Party Congress also endorsed Deng's concept of 'socialist market economic system,' replacing their prior focus on a 'socialist planned economy.' Deng also managed to have several reform opponents replaced on the Standing Committee. Finally, growth targets were also raised.
In 1994, China's inflation rate jumped to 21.7%, 44% of its State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) were losing money, and 80% of SOE income went to debt service.
Fewsmith also points out that despite Chinese youth having a very positive opinion of the U.S. during TS, this turned negative after the Gulf War, U.S. opposition to China's 2000 Olympic bid (lost by two votes), U.S. involvement supporting Taiwan and Tibet, U.S. impediments to China joining the WTO, and our constant carping about human rights, which the Chinese began seeing as a smoke-screen hiding other U.S. interests.